But let's know that such events of level crossing is not

exactly the same as a transition to

a truly absorbing state where the stock price would stay forever.

Instead, when we model defaults as

level crossing events as we normally do in financial models for credit risk,

we proceed in the somewhat artificial way.

We just stop looking at the stock once it crosses some level on its way down.

At this moment from the point of view of the model,

we just declare the stock to be in

default and just stop looking at it from that point on.

It does not matter with

this purely mathematical approach that immediately after the moment of first crossing,

the stock may well come back and continue raising and falling and so on.

So even though such view of corporate defaults as level crossing events

underlies many models such as the Merton firm value a model which we'll discuss later,

this construction is therefore somewhat artificial.

It's very different from say the way raging transitions are usually modeled.

In this approach, a corporate default is modeled as a truly absorbing state.

If a firm goes into the state,

it will stay there forever.

An alternative to using in-stock prices themselves to describe default is

to use absorbed market credit spreads as predictors of defaults.

This is good because there are liquid markets

for credit default swaps that can be used to

find markets implied views of probabilities of default for a number of stocks,

a huge number of stocks.

So one possible approach would be to introduce additional state variables such as

the guest expressed as drivers of defaults and calibrate them to the CDS data.

But this approach brings another problem as we now have to

ensure consistency between the stock price dynamics and spread dynamics.

The same multi-model demonstrates that spreads are not independent of stock prices.

Therefore if we reduce credit spreads are separate state variables,

we generally end up with quite a complex model of joint dynamics of prices and spreads,

where we also have to ensure some sort of

consistency between the stock price and spread dynamics.

So, the first conclusion even though it's not normally viewed as a deficiency of

the GBM model is that the fact

that it doesn't contain defaults is certainly a drawback of this model.

Now, another problematic point with the GBM model

is an unbounded asset growth in this model.

Let's take another look at the stock price equation of the GBM model in the form

that we put before and this is shown in Equation 5 on this slide.

Now, again, the important point here is that the drift in this equation is linear in Xt.

If we now take expectations in both sides of Equation 8,

we can obtain an equation for the mean value that we call x bar and it's shown in

Equation 6 and its solution describes an exponential growth of the mean as a price.

So to reiterate, this behavior is obtained as a consequence of linearity of the drift,

and equivalently, we can say that it's

a consequence of the fact that the GBM model is scale invariant.

It does not change if we scale,

the asset price Xt to Alpha times Xt,

where alpha is a positive parameter.

So we can conclude that on average,

you should get infinitely rich in the long run if only the GBM model go through.

But how realistic is this assumption?

In classical financial models based on the competitive market equilibrium concept,

a market is assumed to be a closed system without

any exchange of capital or information with an outside world.

But how can you get infinitely rich in such scenario?

We can also ask the same question differently.

How can the market grow infinitely large without any income of money or capital?

This appears somewhat puzzling implication of conventional financial equilibrium models.

But we might conjecture that such behavior is absorbed as

simply an artifact of not incorporating some effects of

market saturation or alternatively competition of

market participants for the same limited value in

stock prices that can be exploited for investments.

Therefore, we can assume that there are some effects of

saturation in the market that may show up when market

grows very large and if

such effects only show up very late when the market is already very high,

they will be almost unnoticeable for levels that are much

lower or rather for normal levels prevailing in markets in normal regimes.