[MUSIC] The Iranian dissident journalist, Akbar Ganji, argued in an article for the American news channel CNN, that the west gets Iran wrong. Much of what he wrote is directly applicable also to our societies. Ganji begins by stating that much contemporary academic popular and official analysis about the state of liberalism, economics and feminism in Iran and by implication also in the Arab world has been mistaken. He notes the principled ideological objection by the founder of the Islamic Republic and his successors to western concepts of liberal democracy to Marxism to capitalism and to feminism. As Ganji notes it is apparent from both Khomeini's writings and his actions in government that he quote, was not really familiar with liberalism and Marxism, yet he was opposed to both, end of quote. Interested, he and his successors postulated. Religious democracy as both superior to liberal democracy in producing government outcomes and crucially, as more respectful of family values than liberal democracy. [FOREIGN] the official ideology that gives the prominent and institutionalized role to the clergy and governing the state is peculiar to the Islamic Republic of Iran. But the claim that democracy needs somehow to be tampered by religious precepts, respectful of Muslim identity and interest is not peculiar to Iran. The claim that the clergy as the interpreters of God's law should be given some role and formulation and implementation of law and public policy in enjoys considerable appeal. The enormous electoral success of Islamists throughout the Arab world after the uprisings. Indicates popular support for the idea that religion must play a strong, if not controlling role in public affairs to ensure authenticity and Muslim identity. The constitutional debates in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, that have seen regime change as a result of the uprisings. Or in Jordan, Morocco or Algeria, that did not. All devoted considerable time to questions of the appropriate role of Islam in the machinery of the state. What Ganji then goes on to state has important repercussions on the way we perceive both the source and the likely trajectory of the Arab uprisings. While the commitment to competitive elections and popular participation in social and economic decisions certainly is much larger in Iran than in any Arab nation. The Iranian leadership shares with all Arab regimes the belief that key decisions simply can not be entrusted to the electorate. At best, they subscribe to a guided religiously tempered version of democracy which allows the leadership to retain ultimate control. So far, so depressingly familiar. But Ganji then goes on to say something counterintuitive. Yet anyone believing that Khamenei's views have in turn resulted In a top down squashing of political discussion even of imported ideas would be mistaken, end of quote. He explains this by restating the well know opposition of all Islamists including the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran to western notion of feminism. Because they quote consider their own views on women and their rights to be fair and just, and claim that unlike the west. Islam is opposed to using women as an object for advancing one's own agenda, end of quote. Irrespective of our assessment of the veracity of this position. We can acknowledge that there exists an important difference in opinion about social values between the idealized Islamic vision of the good life, and that observed in modern western societies. The reason Ganji surmises, that the Islamist leadership has been unable despite trying very, very hard to impose its social vision on society is due to the existence of structural changes beyond anyone's control. These have brought about realignments in society which cannot be turned back and which in turn leads to normative changes that no one decreed and that no one can steer. The dramatic rise in literacy, in urbanization, in female university attendance, in the availability of foreign ideas in translated books and through the Internet. Economic pressures of urban life which force both spouses to earn a living. The opening of professional careers to women, required by macroeconomic needs, and many similar structural changes inevitably and irrevocably leads to normative changes that cannot be controlled. Ganji points to the dogged and often violent determination of the Iranian supreme leader to stop these changes, but observes the futility of these efforts. Quote, and yet, despite this, certain social developments are beyond his control. In part because his power is not absolute, and also because of the strides that Iranian civil society has made in recent years, end of quote. The point to note here, is the dualism between an immutable ideological, often religious, dogma, controlled and defended by an identifiable group of persons often the clergy or political leaders, on the one hand. In structural, impersonal forces on the other hand. These forces lead to often drastic changes in what is perceived appropriate behavior. As people's practice changes in response to material changes in their livelihoods, idealization change ensues. People begin to look differently onto the world and eventually their normative world view changes. A public order that is unable to accommodate these inevitable changes in the way people perceive the world and what they consider to be legitimate will be inherently unstable. [MUSIC]
