One of the most significant changes in the world in the past 30 years is the opening of China to the outside world and its engagement with that world. In the initial years of the opening, external forces influenced China’s economy, regional balances, bureaucracy, as well as the political authority of local leaders in the coastal areas. More recently, the world is feeling the effects of a rising China which seeks resources and talent from all around the globe and uses its financial wealth to strengthen its position in the world. This course tracks the opening of China up from 1978 until it joins the WTO, focusing on how the world affected China’s internal development. We then look at various aspects of China’s “going out strategy” — its search for energy, talent, as well as its relations with the United States and the states within the Asia-Pacific region. The instructor has been deeply engaged in research on all these topics, having lived in China during various stages of China’s opening to the outside world. Course Overview video: https://youtu.be/7FpNL67EbE4
5.6: Problems of Misperceptions
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From the course by The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Chinese Politics Part 2 – China and the World
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The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
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From the lesson
Module 5: China’s Rise and the World: A Panel Discussion
In this module, we invited three professors from various universities in Hong Kong to share with us their views on China's foreign policy and China's rise. Let's learn from these experts.
Meet the Instructors
David ZweigChair Professor of the Division of Social Science and Director of Center on China’s Transnational Relations
[MUSIC]
One of my favorite topics in international relations is the whole question of
misperceptions, and states often have a hard time understanding how other states
actually see them.
They tend to see themselves, let's say, as peace loving.
China always says that it wants to rise peacefully, and
China I remember at a seminar that I was at a long time ago, twenty years ago.
Someone from the foreign ministry stood up and
said you know everyone knows that China has a peaceful foreign policy.
Yet if we look at the world today, Japan, U.S., Indonesia, The Philippines,
Vietnam, all these states don't see a peaceful rise.
Now just by rising in many ways, China is destabilizing and
perhaps threatening these states.
So, my question would be, why can't China see that, and
respond to those concerns about its behavior,
rather than respond in behavior in a way it behaves rather than just?
Rhetorically saying that, we will rise peacefully.
Baohui, here's the first question for you.
So why can't states respond to that kind,
why can't China respond to that perception out there, that it's.
>> Well first, I would, [CROSSTALK] >> Not rising peacefully.
>> I will disagree with you,
that China's not trying to understand other country's concerns.
The reality is China is very much aware that it's own rise
will trigger fear, at least concerns in other countries.
And that is why Xi Jinping pursued the lying low grand strategy
to keep a low profile.
You try to make other countries feel less threatened, and
China has always championed.
We pursue a peaceful rise strategy.
Why does China hammer this message over and over again?
Precisely because China's aware that its arise worries other countries.
So we cannot say that Chinese is not aware of other country's concerns.
They have been trying very hard to preempt other country's concerns.
But then the question is nonetheless why do other countries still distrust China?
>> Okay. >> Now that doesn't necessarily mean that
China has done bad things, that it deserves suspicion from other countries.
It's all because of security level.
The security level is an important industry behavior.
That once your power increases other countries have to assume the worst
because of the anarchic order.
If they are powerful nobody can help them and you can abuse that.
So they tend to assume the worst.
So if your powers rising, other countries have to hedge against it.
Hedging in part means they have to have concerns and take appropriate measures.
So no matter what China does.
China cannot fully assure other countries, that is the problem.
>> Okay, Richard,
how's China been doing in terms of trying to make other countries feel more relaxed?
>> I think it's not easy job, and
let me put into a broader context, a rising power.
How rising power will reassure others, and
this is a classic questions in the world history, rise and fall of great powers.
Now China is rising, and others feel threatened.
That's natural.
That's realist logic.
So that's why China wants to reassure others, we are going to rise peacefully.
But others seems not quite trust China's promises.
So here we comes to the typical security dilemma, and
also there's a perception problems.
You know other countries see China as a threat, and China see
others from the mirror image you're not accepting us you're trying to contain me.
So, here comes the conflict.
And in so, this process will not, will last very long.
And then here, I see two problems.
First, how international society accept the rise of China as a reality.
Accommodating this rise of China.
And second, of on the China part,
how China will come to the terms of its own rise.
And here's a lot of things.
>> Not easy.
>> Yeah, not easy.
Yeah. >> Right.
Right. But, JP go ahead.
>> I would agree with everything that has been said, but
at the same time I would take the look at the issue from another perspective.
I like very Edward Ruthphacs' idea that China has been hit by what
he calls great power autism.
>> Autism.
>> Autism, it means its inability to listen and
to care about other country's opinion and interests.
And here I think we are moving very far away from the Deng Xiaoping's motto.
You know keep a low profile.
And be careful.
What kind of waves of waves you are creating in the world by your sheer
empowerment.
I think if we try to explain that, there are a number of reasons.
I think there is a cultural reason.
The fact that China has been for 2000 years, an empire.
And it sees itself at the top of the hierarchy of states.
And remember when your teacher said, well big country and
other countries inside the states are small countries.
So there's an idea of a hierarchy among states.
And the only country which China still feels respect to, or
fear, is the United States, because it's more powerful than China.
And then there are ideological reasons,
the fact that China is still you know a one party state, in which which values,
political values clashes with Western values.
And I think it's kind of exceptionalism which is not without similarity with
American exceptionalism which makes China also a bit more enables,
unable to listen to other countries and to take into other country's interest.
So they.
I think on the whole, China has been today much more
ready to you know push its interests without taking much
into consideration other country's reaction.
And that's a big difference between including between Hu Jintao and
Xi Jinping so that's why Xi Jinping is more risk taken than his predecessors.
>> I just want to add a question, or sort of add a point to that,
which is the constructivist model, right, so we're here, we're sitting here,
we're discussing as a realist, right?
Because Bao Hai really set the agenda as a realist, but
there is an alternative model out there, and some would call it the liberal model.
But I'll, also the constructivist model where you create institutions and
if China to me wants to encourage states to see it in a more
positive light than one would anticipate.
It doesn't just go out and create new institutions like the AIIB,
which is great but there are institutions that are out there.
So when I think of the Philippines taking China to UNCLOS,
to the Law of the Sea convention and saying you know we have a dispute.
Well, if China wants to make the countries of Southeast Asia feel better about it,
then it should say, well, let's accept global international law, and
let's go to UNCLOS.
And let's see what the world says about this, and that we, even the word great
rising power, were peaceful, and we will accept the international decision on that.
>> Yeah, but let's don't forget that the conflicts between countries,
between China and other countries,
are not always triggered by misperception issues or by the civil dilemma issues.
They also have conflicts over substantive issues.
They have genuine incompatible national interests.
And for example, China's total dispute with the Philippines.
Now, so it's not a matter of whether China accept intentional norms.
No, on territorial issues,
very few companies are willing to say, yes it's yours.
I don't argue with you anymore.
[CROSSTALK] >> No one, but
no one's saying the Philippines should say it's yours.
[CROSSTALK] >> Or we say, or
we say let the international court, or third party decide.
Very few countries don't do that.
>> The US, great powers don't do that.
The US does not do that.
>> Exactly. The US and China's not an exception.
>> A lot of countries [CROSSTALK] >> But it is right but
the point is it is rising and if it's rising and it's worried.
>> I agree. China. >> Can I finish my point?
>> Yeah. >> It is rising and
if it's worried about that, then that would be an easy opportunity for
China to have said that.
>> I agree. China could have done better on many
issues.
In particular, I would argue as a rising state China has the responsibility
to assure other countries.
>> Okay. >> The burden is on China.
>> Right. >> But unfortunately,
because of skewed dilemma, no matter what China tries.
>> Other countries will always have to assume the worst.
They will have to fight against China.
>> But it is easier to assume the worst when someone behaves in a way that
reinforces that.
Richard?
>> I think security dilemma always there.
Now my view on this is, yes, I agree,
China has a responsibility to assure other countries.
>> But look at the perception issues from both sides.
First, look in a more generic term.
First is about information.
How to get a message across.
How send out the Chinese domestic change,
reform, to let others know what's going on in China.
Second, is perspective.
How to change or shape or influence other's perspective to look at China.
Now on the first questions, China is doing more, putting more efforts now.
You have CCTV all over the world.
You have computer's institute all over the world.
And China's cultural prodsacul all over the world, but
on the second question it's difficult to change other's perspective.
And China is doing more and China is trying to teach, trying to tell others,
Chinese Culture, our tradition is more peaceful.
In a history we never invade anybody else.
>> It's quite true.
>> And then the Confucius logic is something argue for
peaceful and harmonial world.
>> But that was the Hoogental argument, and
now we're moving into a world where you're both saying that Xi Jinping has moved
into a period where it's not so emphasis on harmony.
I mean he talks about harmony with the neighbors but still, JP.
>> I think the problem is it's still a very top much, a top down message,
a state organized message.
So it decrediblized >> Makes it less credible?
>> It's basically less credible because it comes from the party,
it comes from a system which is still pretty opaque.
>> Where the debate tends to be hijacked by a, a few number of speakers and
people have the right to participate in the discussion.
So I mean it's very hard for China to send the message across
when the domestic environment is pretty repressive and constrained.
And well, actually the civil society itself doesn't export values,
doesn't export ideas, or doesn't participate in any debate.
And that makes the message which China wants to convey pretty weak actually, and
not very credible.
>> But I think a fundamentalist states as Aurelius always argue hedge against power,
not professed intentions.
>> Because intentions can always change.
So even if China says, we are adamant in rising peacefully,
nobody will fully believe that.
It would always have to hedge against China.
And the fundamental, as long as China's power keeps on increasing,
they will have to worry.
>> Okay. >> One thing we haven't mentioned,
it's ironic, but China feels empowered but at the same time less secure than before.
I mean there's a kind of paranoia in China among
China's elite because they feel assaulted.
They feel besieged by outside forces.
So they still have a way of dealing with the outside world which is very much of
our friends and our enemies.
It kind of you know applying the.
>> The Maoist.
>> The Maoist theory of contradictions, so if you are not a friend you are an enemy.
And that's the paranoid way of looking at international relations,
which is problematic for.
>> Wait, I'm going to have the last word.
>> Which is problematic for China's, again, message and
its credibility further.
>> Well I look here, we all live here in Hong Kong.
>> And here's a place where China has an enormous opportunity
to influence the terms of the discussion, the information.
It owns newspapers, it has large companies here, and
yet it has a very hard time convincing the people of Hong Kong.
That its intentions are completely peaceful, and neutral, and amicable.
So anyway, thanks a lot, we've got one more question to go.
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