[MUSIC] Worries currently defined as a conflict among state using military force. In a traditional vision war is the normal result of the interstate rivalry, it's exactly what Raymond Aron pointed point when said, that it's only the result of the traditional recurrent rivalry among nations states. And war is considered also as a paroxysm of this rivalry. The rivalry is lasting but when it is at its peak, we are in a war situation, that's why in our European history war is consider as normal in an international arena. And we know now why, if we take into account what Thomas Hobbes said, he explained to her that states were like gladiators in the international arena. That's to say they are permitted to use all the means for dominating their rivals. All the means including force, every kind of force. That's why in this region, peace is only an interwar. Peace doesn't exist by itself and it is probably one of the most pessimistic feature of our western vision of international relations. War it has to center at the core of international relation when piece is consider as a no war, a situation between two wars. This pessimistic vision is important to take into account. Because in this ops construction, we mean we understand that war is synonymous of international relations, the science of international relations is considered as a science of war. No room for peace and this is probably one of the most pessimistic vision that we can have on our international relation studies. But behind this pessimistic vision there's something very important for us. That's to say to consider that war is functional. War is functional for several reasons. The first one in that war is considered as an instrument for achieving a competition amongst states. War is the only way for overcoming the disputes among states as such it's considered, as functional. But war is also functional for reassessing power of states, for redistributing powers, for redefining the condition of balancing powers among states. War is also functional for drawing territories, for drawing border lines. War, overall is considered as functional because war is the major instrument of state making. We go back to these very famous American sociologist and historian, Charles Tilly. Who claimed that war making is a way of state making. If you take into account the history of the European state, taxes were adopted. Taxes were defined by wars in Europe, in our European history. State administration was created during war, and by wars. State legitimacy was redefined and enhanced by wars. Nation, nation-building Was strongly defined, was strongly organized, structured by wars. And this is probably one of the main points stressed by the famous German philosopher and lawyer Karl Schmitt who claimed that enmity is functional for nation-building, without an enemy, a nation is not able to develop properly. The nation needs an enemy for existing. For being being at the very centre of the history of the collectivity which is led to be transformed in a nation without enemy, no nation, no strong nation. This is a terrible formula, but one of the cornerstones of our European histories emitted inside Europe was the main instrument for shaping the political map of the old continent. Our European history, our European map have been shaped by war. And this is also explaining the fragmentation process which took place along the history of modern Europe. The contemporary and so complex political map of Europe is mainly, Structured by this succession of wars. Which took place from the Westphalia Treaty up to the two World Wars. Charles Steele explained that this vision leads to the famous concept that kind, the concept of rocket state, a state which has the purpose to reinforce. To enhance his capacity, he's using the strength for mobilizing his own citizen. And so Charles Steele explained that during the European history, States were even creating, inventing and security threats for mobilizing their own citizens, for enhancing the level of the nation building in size every state constituting the European map. What about now? The first question is this is the European history is this European history relevant for explaining other histories? Is it true elsewhere what I explain about this relationship between state making and war making is really, Conform to all the histories. Is it possible to explain the, South America and North America or Asian histories through this paradigm? I don't think so. This war making, state making process is a European process and is hardly exploitable to other histories. Second question, what about now? Now we are facing a new kind of war. If we go back to the definition that I gave to the traditional war, this definition is no more relevant. First because these new wars are not mainly made by state actors but non state actors, is a non state actor war able to achieve the same function that I described about the traditional war? And what about the territorial background? I don't say that territorial disputes don't have any room now but the the role of territorial disputes in organizing, in triggering war is less important than it was previously. The territorial background does not have the same meaning now it had previously. What about also this new kind of war in which the interstate playing is not so essential, is not so crucial, is no more at the core of the international conflict, as it was previously. What about a world in which the concept of enemy has not the same relevance? That's to say we are now in a world in which rivalry does not have the same meaning it had previously and in which enmity does not have the same relevance. Ladies and gentlemen our culture of war is coming from limited history. That's to say sequence of European history, but only of European history and it is not relevant for other cultures and other histories. That's why our vision must reconsider our present world, reconsider the present wars and to imagine what are the new international conflicts. [MUSIC]
