[MUSIC] These last few weeks, Ghislain Waterlot and myself have given overviews of various ethical currents -- utilitarianism, eudemonism, duty ethics, eudemonism and the ethics of giving -- and our discussion has shown that there are different ways of approaching and defining the issues involved in ethics or morality. For each current, we've looked at concrete, real-life situations, particularly in order to understand how each can help us tackle the ethical dilemmas life presents us with. Today, we are going to look at another real-life example, but this time we'll analyze it in light of all four ethical schools of thought. In real life, you can't truly depend on a single, "pure," ethical current -- that's not how things work. So let's take an issue that is currently relevant to all Western societies and approach it using everything we've learned. The issue is whether it is legitimate for Muslim women, or any woman who so chooses, to wear a veil in the public space. Is it a good idea? Should Muslim women who wish to do so be allowed to wear the veil (also known as a headscarf) when they are in school, or in the street, or in any public place in our societies? How might each of the different ethical currents approach this issue? >> From an Aristotelian standpoint, you might view the search for fulfillment and the development of personal qualities as "excellences," in that they produce happiness, not only for the individual but for the community as a whole. An Aristotelian might argue in favor of letting women wear the veil, and greater freedom in general, on the grounds that happiness depends on the opportunity to express yourself as you are, in confrontation with others, of course, but also in relation to yourself. When institutions seek to promote neutrality, i.e., the idea that individuals should not manifest their particularity -- what separates them or isolates them from others -- but that we should instead seek to build up what people have in common, an Aristotelian would view this as negativity, as a sort of denial of the conditions in which a person can hope, not only to be happy, but to develop those qualities that will allow her to truly fulfill herself and blossom as a person. At the same time, a proponent of virtue ethics might also point out, on the contrary, that if you wish to promote the happiness and flourishing of a community, allowing such strong disparities, such points of contention, to exist within to the community is going to be a big problem. >> Indeed, especially since in the Aristotelian perspective, society is held together by a common Good, a shared cause. Our societies' claims to neutrality are perhaps less strong than they seem. Every society is based on certain shared values, some of which are very meaningful, so is it not legitimate for society to feel that a veiled woman is an assault, not only on individual rights but on the very notion of what constitutes a good society? So behind the pretense of neutrality, there is society's need to defend its substantial conception of the Good. >> I agree. And we might do well to distinguish between two aspects of the issue, and two attitudes towards the veil. Indeed, some argue for total prohibition across the board, while others seek a more limited prohibition applied to specific situations. Underlying the debate is the question of secularism. A distinction is often made between two types of public space: you have social spaces, such as the street, on one hand, and institutional spaces, such as the school, on the other. A school or a university is different in that it is a space in which citizens are educated, where they develop their rational knowledge -- the argument is that in these settings, it is legitimate to ask individuals to set aside their particularities in favor of what we all have in common. This is the most prevalent argument given by institutions for prohibiting headscarves. A much more rarely cited rationale is that only inner conscience is free, and any external expression of faith is a potential assault on others, and therefore the headscarf should be forbidden in all public spaces, including the street. This kind of argument leads us to reflect on what a Kantian, or deontologist, would say about the issue. >> Before we talk about the deontological position, however, I'd like to point out that from a virtue ethics standpoint, there are arguments in favor of and against forbidding the headscarf. Aristotle, you may recall, gives a very special place to education; for him, the school is society's instrument for putting young citizens on the right track. As such, if a society consciously designates the religious as strictly belonging to the private sphere, then any outward symbol of faith should be forbidden in schools, but not in the street. Now, from a deontological standpoint, one would think a deontologist would seek to protect the dignity of women, a dignity that is synonymous with freedom. A proponent of duty ethics might argue that though it may seem that women are free to choose to wear a headscarf, such a choice is not in fact a reflection of true freedom, because true freedom is rational and the decision to wear a veil is irrational. Ghislain, do you see any other Kantian arguments, either in line with such a position, or opposed to it? >> Yes. As opposed to the argument you just outlined, a Kantian might point to the preeminence and categorical nature of the individual's fundamental rights. To support such an argument, he might rely on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." So it could be argued that respecting each person's fundamental dignity means allowing them to express their deepest beliefs, the beliefs that give each person his sense of identity in the deepest way. Thus the requirement of categorically respecting the things that give humans dignity can serve as a counter-argument, as a sort of moral law or principle calling us to respect the notion of individual dignity. >> Yes, so we see that, from a deontological position, a person can be considered as free or not free, and the issue is how to express this freedom in the public space. Now, let's turn to utilitarianism. For an utilitarian, what matters is maximizing the happiness of the greatest number. The argument, then, might be: it's clear that the majority of people in secular Western societies want to restrict the religious to the private sphere, and therefore Muslims should simply follow the wishes of the majority. This is the reason why Switzerland banned minarets; so why should the same argument not apply to headscarves in the public space? >> To which one might retort, still from an utilitarian standpoint, that when you have minorities in society -- the issue here concerns minorities, after all -- that feel stigmatized, rejected, unable to express themselves, you are creating a problem. A rule-utilitarian, for instance, might say that any rule that leads to such a situation -- a situation where certain groups become resentful or bitter -- cannot be considered a good rule as regards the overall happiness of society, the maximum utility of society, since it will inevitably favor the growth of social crises, antagonism and disunity. So an utilitarian, and more specifically a rule-utilitarian, is likely to argue for a rule that allows each person to express their religious beliefs as they see fit, provided this does not undermine the public order or society as a whole, particularly through the threat of of violence and fanaticism. The right rule, then, is to allow each person to do as they please. In fact, a rule-utilitarian might also say that preventing people from expressing their beliefs by relegating all things religious to the private sphere constitutes a threat to society in that it is likely to make people bitter, angry and eventually hateful; such that any legislation privatizing religiousness goes against the interests of civil peace in society. So here again, we find arguments both in favor and against. So how should we proceed? Well, it's probably a good idea to adopt a prudential attitude, that is, to return to virtue ethics in order weigh and compare the pros and cons of all of these positions and determine what would best further the goal of a good, or just, society. [MUSIC] [MUSIC]