Whereas the previous lecture presented the criticism of European citizenship, this lecture will respond to the main points of the criticism. Since the Maastricht treaty, EU citizenship provides a certain number of additional rights on top of those provided by the national citizenship. I will argue that these rights should not be dismissed too casually, as done by the Neo-Republicans. These rights are not only for the elite but also historically for Italian migrants, Bulgarian or Romanian nurses, Polish plumbers, etc. They are not only for EU citizens, either. A European directive passed in 2003 tentatively opened the way towards a form of status equalization between member states and third country nationals within a long term residence permit, and introduced a form of residence citizenship. When looking at the rights related to the European citizenship, history matters. For sure, EU citizenship was designed in the context of the implementation of the single market, but later on, the increasingly substantial meaning conferred to the principle of non-discrimination led the ECJ to institute a more substantial form of citizenship with important rights. Beyond the right to travel freely, citizens have the right to be treated as if they were not foreigners in the territory of another member state. This could be a kind of federal notion of citizenship that ensures equality of civic rights and equal treatment between the citizens of the different entities united in the federation, like in the United States, Germany, Canada, or Switzerland. I have invited Professor Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot who is a public law professor, because she's one of the leading experts on this issue. Dear Professor Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot, how valuable are those rights attached to the EU citizenship? Very valuable. The link between EU citizenship and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality was first recognized in the case law of the Court of Justice, and is now enshrined in the treaties and in secondary law. It has given migrant EU citizens access to social benefits in the member state of residence, which is actually an embryonic form of European social citizenship. Of course, there were reactions by member states which led the court to a more conservative reading of the social status of Union citizens. I think it would also be interesting to further link EU citizenship with a rapidly developing legal corpus on nondiscrimination on other grounds such as sex, sexual orientation, handicap, religion, race, and ethnic origin, and, of course, further reflect on the possible links between EU citizenship and the rights proclaimed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Would you even talk about a federal notion of citizenship? Absolutely. The comparison with the historical evolution of citizenship in federal contexts, especially the United States of America, allows us to speak of a federal citizenship in the case of Union citizenship. The Ruiz Zambrano decision of the court, which underlies the link between EU citizenship and the territory of the union, is evidence of the presence of the federal spirit. Of course, EU citizenship does not yet provide a complete set of rights and protection. I think we are at the beginning of the process, so we simply need to give it time, I suppose. Thank you, Professor Anastasia Iliopoupou- Penot. Thank you, Professor Spector, for the questions. It is undeniable that over and above the protection of consumers, EU citizenship has fulfilled its goal of protecting or even emancipating certain categories of citizens within the member states. EU citizenship has a derivative and complementary nature, as it is not meant to replace national citizenship. Yet, according to Samantha Besson, the idea is to grant maximum freedom and equality under law to the members of increasingly transnational societies. In this respect, the EU contributed significantly to the fight for gender equality and the protection of minorities, notably Romanis and LGBTQ, today particularly under threat in Poland and Hungary. The European Union has recently unveiled policies intended to strengthen the rights of LGBTQ people. Proposals that are aimed particularly at right-wing governments in Hungary and Poland that have promoted discrimination. The move drawn up by the European Commission would classify hate crime, including homophobic speech on the list of EU crimes. The proposal would also protect same-sex families in all 27 of the bloc's members, and promises more funding for organizations promoting equality. To be sure, it would not be accurate to imagine EU citizenship as a replica of national citizenship. Political rights associated with EU citizenship will probably remain unsatisfactory, although not insignificant. But instead of a collective self-government, the EU is missioned with extending universal rights gradually to those who currently have none. In such a view of citizenship, equality of treatment is at the heart of a real democratic progress. This is the case not only for civil or political rights, but also for social security rights, namely: equal access to working conditions, equal salary, gender pay equality, and the various benefits that welfare states have granted to their citizens. We can reply to the Neo Republican critique on another key issue. It is untrue that citizenship associated with rights is necessarily individualistic. According to the political theorist, Justine Lacroix, the fact that some rights protect individual interests does not mean that they cannot be reclaimed in a political struggle fought with others and for others. Claims can be put forward on other people's behalf. This means involving political passions and emotions in politics, not only individual reason. EU citizens are both passive and active. They benefit from a particular set of individual rights, and can at the same time become a full member of the European polity empowered to shape it through a democratic process. As shown in the previous lecture, the Neo-Republican political theorists argue that the EU lacks democratic legitimacy, and that the nation is the best place to exercise citizenship. Now, in my answer to that criticism, I will emphasize two points in favor of EU citizenship, finding inspiration in the political theorist Paul Magnette. First, applying the same rights to foreigners as nationals undermines civic exclusion practices, at least where populist parties and nationalistic reactions are not too strong. In time, national barriers to citizenship could be eroded. Second, EU citizenship integrates the views of non-nationals into our understanding of the world. This is how mutual recognition can be achieved. From this perspective, it is far from certain that substantial citizenship should actually replace procedural citizenship, defined mainly by your rights and responsibilities. For Habermas, a nation of citizens does not derive its identity neither from ethnic and cultural properties, nor from a national background, but "Rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights." In a multicultural society, it is the political culture that is shared. On the contrary, reinforcing a common identity grounded on a shared history and culture, not to mention a shared religion, can reactivate exclusive feelings. More often than not, a common cultural identity operates to the detriment of others. A substantial vision of citizenship could convey a reduction in mutual tolerance, and a desire to impose a notion of what is right and good. Let's call it a single European way of life. We should hope that the access to European public goods, such as human rights, a cleaner environment, a good health care system, or an access to higher education all over the EU could promote a civic feeling of belonging at the European level. If the budget of the European parliament is increased to fund the European Green Deal and various cultural projects such as the New Bauhaus, we can hope that the benefits that people obtain from EU institutions may foster a common European identity based on principles, not exclusion. This was the hope of many enlightenment philosophers like Montesquieu, Rousseau, or Kant, who had imagined Europe as a single civil society. As a conclusion, I can thus answer to the Neo-Republican political theorists, that the gradual emergence of a European demos is not a crazy dream.
