Today we will talk about the safeguards and export and import control in nuclear law. The official definition of International safeguards, as implemented by the IAEA, represents the key means of verifying the compliance by States with commitments not to use nuclear material or technology to develop nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The foundations of the safeguards system lie in the IAEA’s Statute (a multilateral treaty, which is binding on both the IAEA’s Secretariat and the IAEA’s Member States). Article II of the Statute requires the IAEA to ensure that assistance provided by or through it is not used to further any military purpose. Article III. authorizes the IAEA to establish and administer safeguards, so as to ensure that nuclear energy projects carried out by the IAEA or under its auspices /ˈɔːspɪses/ do not further any military purpose. Article XI establishes the detailed framework for safeguards implementation and Article XII requires safeguards on all IAEA sponsored projects. Article III also authorizes the IAEA to apply safeguards, at the request of the Parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement and, at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy. Broadly speaking safeguards comprise three functions accountancy, containment and surveillance, and inspection. Accountancy measures require a State to report to the IAEA the types and quantities of fissionable material under its control. The ability of a State to provide accurate information in a timely manner depends on the establishment of a State system for accounting and control (SSAC) capable of tracking relevant material. Containment and surveillance measures are applied by the IAEA through the use of seals on nuclear material containers and filmed or televised recordings of key areas at nuclear facilities to determine whether unauthorized movements of material have occurred. Inspections are conducted by IAEA inspectors to verify that the declared quantities of nuclear material are where they are declared to be, and that there is no undeclared nuclear material in a State. Inspection activities include checking seals and instruments, reviewing facility records and independently measuring material or other items listed in accountancy documents subject to safeguards. The ability of the IAEA to perform the three functions described, and the scope of material and facilities to be covered by IAEA safeguards, are determined by the legal obligations that a State has assumed through treaties and by the type of safeguards implementation agreement that a State has negotiated with the IAEA. Non-proliferation treaties and agreements. Through a number of international, regional and bilateral instruments, States have undertaken to accept the application of safeguards to nuclear material and activities under their jurisdiction or control. Chief among the international instruments is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT), now ratified by 190 States (non-parties: India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan). To ensure compliance with the basic commitments in Articles I and II of the NPT (not to transfer or to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices), Article III codifies the undertaking of all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties “to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement” to be negotiated with the IAEA “for the purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This international instrument is supplemented by a number of regional non-proliferation treaties, providing for additional measures that reflect the political aspirations of States in the regions in question. The following treaties are in force or in the process of ratification: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which was opened for signature in 1967; the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which entered into force in 1986; the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Bangkok Treaty), which entered into force in 1997; the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which was opened for signature in 1996. In addition to the international and regional non-proliferation instruments, a large number of bilateral agreements on peaceful nuclear cooperation have been concluded between States for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of nuclear material and technology. Most of these agreements provide for the application of IAEA safeguards to any transferred nuclear material. Furthermore, European States have created a system of safeguards administered by the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and in 1990 Argentina and Brazil concluded an arrangement creating a bilateral inspectorate to apply full scope safeguards in both States. These regional and bilateral agreements contain the provisions prohibiting testing of nuclear explosive devices, the sea dumping of radioactive material, the stationing of nuclear weapons and various other activities. All contain a requirement that all nuclear activities within the relevant regions be covered by IAEA safeguards (the full scope or comprehensive safeguards concept).
