So, put in its simplest form, a way to describe the challenge of leadership, especially in the UN context, is the ability to build this convergence, which is an ability to create space, ability to create space often in a way you might think there is none. And we're going to be exploring quite a few examples of that especially when we get to the second segment, and we'll be talking a lot, for example, about Dag Hammarskjold. There is expression that Mark Moore has used which, I think, sums it up wonderfully. He describes the role of the public sector manager as an explorer commissioned by society to create public value, an explorer commissioned by society to create public value. What a wonderful way to describe the opportunity of finding, of creating that space and adding value in that space. I think it kind of sums up the opportunity that leaders in the UN face. So let me go from there then to that particular issue which I've just kind of surfaced, which is the issue of other particular characteristics in the UN that one could think of with respond to the use of this analytical framework. And to get into that in detail would require a whole other segment, which we don't have time for. But I would like to just touch maybe on the central characteristic of the UN in this, and that is the extraordinary complexity of trying to understand and interpret each of these circles, because in an inter-governmental setting and in the UN setting in particular, none of these circles are self-contained. The circles themselves are highly porous. So, for example, if you take the authorizing environment over here, you take the authorizing environment and take a particular part of the UN because different parts of the UN, different frameworks would apply. But let's take the development part of the UN. If you're sitting in a UN program or fund, one of the development agencies of the UN, what actually is your authorizing environment over here? How do you know whether you have the agreement, the political agreement to go ahead? And the fact is that you have many competing authorizing environments. For example, you would have the official representatives of member states to sit on the board of your particular organization. So, I don't know, take UNICEF, for example, so you have the board of UNICEF and they officially legislate for UNICEF. So, in the sense, that is your authorizing environment. But, is that really your authorizing environment? Because what you're actually doing is you have programs in countries. And in those countries, you're talking every day with the Minister of Finance, or the Minister of Planning, or the Prime Minister's Office, or the Health Ministry. And these technical development people working within their own structures in their countries may tell you something quite different, actually, from the delegates that come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are sitting on your board. The donor community, the people who actually give you money, may tell you different things, normally do, from the countries that are spending the money. So these are some reflections on the characteristics that pertain specifically to the UN with regard to the use of this analytical framework. And what I just said with reference to the fragmentation of the authorizing environment, and we could go on a long time on that, but actually one could say the same thing about both the other circles. I mean, again, for example, very briefly, if you take the capacity circle, you might imagine that your capacity is non-porous, I mean, your capacity is something that you have and you control, and you can plan for it, and it's not really a variable in that sense. You either have it or you don't have it. But that's far from being the truth in the UN because there are huge parts of your capacity that you're never quite sure whether they're actually yours or not. You often have senior staff appointments where you're never quite sure who they're reporting to. The UN troops have a command structure that goes back to national commanders, not to some UN accountability. So there are very complex issues of how you assess each of these circles. And I think that's really part of what working in the UN is all about. What comes out of that is, I think, somewhat unique situation, which carries with it both huge opportunities and huge risks. Huge opportunities because there's so much space to use and to create. There's so many openings. The situation is so porous. So there is a lot that a leadership at an initiative can actually do. But also, huge risks because when you have that kind of porous situation, there's not much to protect you. If you make a mistake, if you make a miscalculation, if you think you can move the authorizing environment in a certain direction and you can't, you can fall very, very quickly. And we've seen that of Secretary Generals, let alone of other levels within the UN system. And let me add too, maybe slightly on the side of this, but when you're looking at leadership at the UN and when you're looking at the calculation of opportunity and risk, let us not forget that somehow in the case of the UN, it is the case that you carry as much risk for what you do not do as you carry for what you do. And that is a somewhat unusual situation. What do I mean by that? Well, let's just take one single example. If you look at the last 50 years, what is probably the worst thing that the United Nations has associated with? Well, probably, everybody will say something different, but I would venture to say that if I said to you that the worst thing that the UN did was, it's complete failure to act on Rwanda, on the Rwandan genocide, I don't think many of you would disagree. And that was a failure to do something. It was a failure to seize an opportunity to actually do something. That's a very high measure. That's a very high benchmark to try and measure up to that. Let me move slightly and try and relate this way of analyzing it and mock most concepts with two other leading thinkers on issues of leadership and strategy. Again, like what we just discussed, I'm afraid that we're not going to have time to go into much detail, but I just want to at least put the association out for you because I think it's worth looking at and it's worth exploring. I'm thinking, in particular, of two gurus in their own way, one on strategy, Michael Porter, and the other on leadership, John Kotter. They're both people that have written extensively. They're very well-known. They have spent a lifetime interviewing and talking with leaders mostly in the private sector in these particular cases trying to grapple with the issue of what is leadership and what is strategy. At least in my mind, there are some very clear similarities in the concepts. If you take Michael Porter on strategy, there are a couple of very key issues which he likes to talk about. And the first is that strategy is fundamentally about creating fit, he uses the word fit, among a company's activities. What does he mean by that word fit? And I would suggest to you, again in a very sketchy way for the purposes of our discussion today, that fit is very close to this idea of convergence and alignment. Fit means that the pieces have to come together in a way that you create something which is bigger. And I think that those concepts are very, very close. And similarly, if you go to John Kotter, his big thing is distinguishing between leadership and management. And the way he describes leadership is actually about the ability to motivate and to align people. And you go back again to this concept of the power of aligning, of bringing forces together. So, I think that if one does a quick survey of some of the literature in this area, a lot of it is moving in the same direction and a lot of it is about, as I said earlier, simply put, it's about creating the space, and the space has to bring these converging parts together. Whether it's your vision of strategy, whether it's your vision of leadership, it really pretty much comes, I think, to the same thing.
