Evolution of the Russia-West relations after the end of the Cold War is the best case to illustrate this realist logic of Russian foreign policy. In the early 90s, Russia sincerely anticipated that it will determine the nature of international order together with the United States and the West at large, both regionally in Europe above all and globally on the issues of state sovereignty, the use of military force, and so on. Russia wanted to be co-designer of the Post-Cold War international order and manager of that order on par with the United States, EU, China, and other global power centers. This co-management and co-designing was regarded as the rightful place for Russia in the international system. And in this context, imagine the shock, confusion, and anger in Moscow when it turned out that this agenda will never be fulfilled, that instead of building a new Post-Cold War order together with Russia as the equal partner, the United States started instead to build this order without Russia, both globally and regionally, that Russia was sidelined from the decision making table, and the major manifestation of this change was NATO enlargement. Russia indeed perceived NATO enlargement as the greatest challenge not because it posed a military threat to Russia, but because NATO enlargement constituted Russia's expulsion from the Post-Cold War order making and decision making on the issues of war and peace. It manifested the Western refusal to address Russia as a great power. Later, since the middle of 2000s, Russia perceives NATO enlargement to the post Soviet countries, Ukraine and Georgia, as the major security threat. Again, not because it would make Russia more vulnerable militarily, but this as well, but mainly because it threatens to ruin the Russia-centric subsystem of the international system, the Russia-centric world which is indispensable for Russia's great power identity. So, for two decades after the end of the Cold War, Russia has been trying to reach a deal with the West and figure out the rules of the game. Such as to limit the expansion of the Western order, to figure out the rules of the use of force in Europe and beyond Europe, mechanisms of decision making that would guarantee that opinion of the major European power, which is Russia, is taken into account, and so on. And Russia did it in various forms. And each time, the Russian opinion was ignored. And each time, Russia was compelled to take provocative steps and use force as a response to this ignoring Russia policy pursued by the West. Remember, they accelerated march of the Russian paratroopers from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo in 1999. Recall the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and subsequent Russia's recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Recall Russia's interference with Ukraine and incorporation of Crimea in 2014 into Russian Federation. And finally, the Russian mission in Syria conducted since 2015. Each time the Russian actions were generally getting more tough and dangerous because the vital interests of Russia were at stake. But the roots of all of these actions are absolutely the same. Indeed, for Russia-Ukraine crisis and even incorporation of Crimea is about rules and order, about resisting the Western regime change policy, especially the Russian neighborhood. And about the limits to the expansion of the West. Not about Russian territorial expansion or rebuilding of the empire. The Western support for Euromaidan in Ukraine and the rapid institutionalization of the results of the Euromaidan were perceived in Russia as a deliberate war against Russia itself, that the United States and the EU wants to pull Ukraine into their orbit, prevent any chance of Ukraine's integration with Russia in the observable future, and perhaps even the start of a series of regime changes in the former USSR, and thus, the purpose was perceived to throw Russia back into 1990s, deprive Russia of many of its foreign policy achievements since late 2000s. And Russia reacted to this policy with incorporation of Crimea and support of one of the sides of the civil conflict in Ukraine, including through the unrecognized military interference into the eastern part of Ukraine. Except for Crimea which is indeed a unique case, Russian purpose in Ukraine is not territorial conquest, is not partition or any other local nature. The purposes are indeed global and realist. First, it was vital for Moscow to destroy the precedent of the US supporting and encouraging a forceful regime change in a country which Russia considers most vital, territorially, culturally, historically closest to Russia. A regime change in a country which Russia considers the same people with Russians. Russia is generally against the regime change policy, but in Ukraine, it is simply beyond the limits of good and bad. Secondly, Russia tries to crash the political and international status quo that emerged in Ukraine after the Euromaidan won, and Russia wants to confirm a rule according to which a political regime in Ukraine and international positioning of Ukraine can be sustainable and peaceful only with the Russian consent, and if they are created jointly with Russia and managed together with Russia. Regionally, Russia tried to do it through the counter-revolution. Now, Russia is trying to do this through the implementation of the Minsk agreements, especially the political obligations that Ukraine should fulfill in accordance to the Minsk agreements: constitutional reform, decentralization, special status for Donbas, and so on. These are for Russia, the change of political status quo in Ukraine. So, Ukraine was the first battlefield for rules and the recognition of Russia's status and role as great power, as co-designer and co-manager of the international order. However, achieving this is extremely difficult. And today, there is little prospect that a resolution in Ukraine will happen in the observable future. Instead, there is a stalemate. Thus, in late 2015, Russia decided to establish the second battle field for rules and for Russia's great power status promotion. And the second battlefield became Syria. Russian game in Syria was and is much more global than regional or local. It was again much more about Russia as a great power and international order than some local interests Russia has or had in this country. The rationale behind Russia's joining the war in Syria was three-fold. First, preventing forceful regime change and Russia came exactly when the fall of the Assad regime in Syria seemed very likely. Secondly, promoting Russia as a great power capable of projecting power and creating realities on the ground, the new geopolitical realities, no matter what the West and the United States think of it. And third, preventing Syria from turning into a black hole, a safe haven for terrorists such as Libya today, preserving statehood and secular regime in Syria. And look, as for 2017, we can say that Russia succeeded. Thus, we can make the following conclusion on the Russian foreign policy. We can make a conclusion that Russian foreign policy is predictable. Ukraine and crisis Crimea are natural and quite predictable results of the fundamental and systemic disagreement between Russia and the West on the international order and Russia's place in it. They are results, not causes of the problems. Secondly, we can make a conclusion that Russian foreign policy is defensive, not revisionist or expansionist. Russia is not trying to question the Western order as such. Russia is not trying to roll NATO back to the status quo of 1989. Instead, it is fighting further expansion of the western order, be it NATO or association with the EU, and Ukraine and Crimea are defensive steps for Russia, not offensive steps. They are the ways to limit the Western expansion. In Syria, Russia also struggles against the West revisionist policy, preventing regime change which is the apex, of course, of revisionism. So from this, we clearly see that Russian foreign policies driven by realists and even neorealist, defensive realist logic. And thirdly, Russian foreign policy is driven by systemic factors, not by who is president today or by the purpose of, let's say, strengthening Vladimir Putin's domestic regime. Russia Western disagreement on the Post-Cold War order and Russia's place in this order existed well before Putin came to power, and they have little to do with the Russian domestic regime. Again, remember the accelerated march of the Russian paratroopers in Kosovo in 1999 or the Russia's vigorous struggle against NATO enlargement in 1990s. It happened during Yeltsin period, not Putin period. So, Russian foreign policy is driven by systemic factors which prove that Russian foreign policy is essentially realist.
