[MUSIC] Welcome back. And thanks for joining us for the third class in our journey toward a better understanding of the Israeli state in society. In our previous class, Professor Vered Vinitsky-Seroussi told us the story of the attempt to construct a common identity and a collective memory that would bridge the differences between the many groups that constitute Israeli society, or maybe Israeli societies. But what exactly are these groups? Where do they come from? When did they arrive in Israel? What are their demographic features? And how has their arrival affected Israel's evolution and evolvement? I have asked two demographers, Professor Barbara Okun and Dr. Eliahu Ben-Moshe to share with us some of the most significant and fascinating facts about Israel and its population. Professor Barbara Okun is a demographer at the Hebrew University whose research has focused on the overlapping areas of fertility and family change. Marriage patterns and their social consequences. Educational attainment and inequality, and women's pay work. In most of her writing, she highlights the fascinating case that Israel presents at the demographic laboratory, influenced by an extraordinary history of migration and population change. At the same time, her research has illustrated how social issues in Israel can be examined in order to address theoretical concerns that are not unique to this country. Dr. Eliahu Ben-Moshe is a demographer and statistician, an expert in population census and demographic statistics. He was the deputy director general of the Israeli centre of bureau of statistics. And now, serves as International Consultant to less developed countries around the world. >> Hello, I'm Barbara Okun of the Hebrew University. And today, my colleague, Eliahu Ben-Moshe, and I will be discussing the demography of Israel, population dynamics, and structure. We will present portraits of heterogeneous population groups in Israel and their evolution over time. We will also touch upon the social causes and consequences of demographic change. While Israeli population dynamics share common contours with global patterns of demographic change, the constellation of demographic patterns in Israel is unique in several ways. We will begin by describing Israel's major societal divisions between two nationality groups. Palestinian Arabs, referred to here as Arabs and Jews. In this lecture, we refer to Palestinian Arabs as those Arabs living within the boundaries of the state of Israel and not including Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Patterns of population change within the Arab and Jewish populations of Israel have been closely connected with Israel's political conflict and ideational history and differ in important ways. Arabs is Israel are a heterogeneous minority. In terms of their population size, Arabs account for slightly over one-fifth of the total population of Israel. Around the time of the war and establishment of the state in 1948, most Arabs were expelled or fled from their homes. Or were displaced within what would become the borders of the state of Israel. Although formally, Arabs who live within the internationally recognized borders of Israel have citizenship status, they are subject to various forms of discrimination in education and employment. Which have contributed to their social and economic disadvantage, vis-a-vis the Jewish majority. The Arab population is also characterized by clear residential segregation from Jews. The majority population in Israel is Jewish. The adult Jewish population of Israel today is largely comprised of a heterogeneous group of immigrants, their children and their grandchildren. And its history has been influenced greatly by waves of immigration, which were especially large following the foundation of the state in 1948. Israel is ranked by the United Nations as among the very high development countries in terms of income, education and health. For example, its income puts it at about 75% of the OECD average, just below Korea. Israel is ranked near the highest among OECD countries in terms of the proportions of persons age 25 to 64 with tertiary level education, higher than that in the United States and even Japan, and significantly above the OECD average. Women's labor force participation is also high, particularly among mothers with young children. The division of household labor in Israel is relatively egalitarian. Life expectancy in Israel is also very high, 83 years for women and 80 for men. That's matching or exceeding that of many northern, western, and southern European countries. Despite its high overall rankings in terms of socioeconomic development, the population of Israel is extremely heterogeneous along many dimensions. Now, my colleague, Eliahu Ben-Moshe, will present to you the three theme in demography of Israel, which will form the framework of the rest of our lecture. >> Thank you Barbara. Three themes characterize Israel the demography and we will return to them during this lecture. The first, extraordinarily high levels of demographic phenomenon including very high population growth. Second, rapid change in terms of immigration waves, fertility change, mortality decline. And third, heterogeneous demographic behavior of medically important social groups. We shall begin now with a snapshot of how Israel looks today. Israel is a Middle Eastern country on the Mediterranean Sea. It is about the same area as the state of New Jersey, which is one of the smallest states in the Unites States. Is its area big or small? As we can see, the territory of Israel is very small in compared with other countries. Both countries more developed and less developed all over the world. Population size is also relatively small, but not as small as population area is small when compared with other countries. As a consequence, population density is very high and this has implications for transportation, environment, social, and economical issues Population growth in Israel is as we said before very, very high when compared with other countries. Just to give us some idea and to illustrate that, we will introduce the concept of doubling time. Doubling time answers to the question of what is the time it takes, given a fixed rate of population growth, to the population to double itself? In the case of Israel, two percents, it will take 35 time to double it's population, that means that every 35 years we will need to have. We will have twice as many cars, twice as many schools, twice as many people entering the labor market, twice as many new apartments that will need to be built. And this is when compared with the United States, a very, very quick doubling time. In the United States, it will take 100 years to double the population, in Russia it will take 350 years to double its population. >> Described the high rates of population growth which have characterized Israel in recent years. If we look historically at population growth rates since the foundation of the state in 1948, then average growth rates annually are even higher, 3.5%. And this translates into a doubling time of only 20 years and explains why the population of Israel has doubled more than three times since 1948. Now I would like to discuss what are the sources of those population growth rates. While average growth rates in the Jewish and Arab populations are similar, the source of the population growth differ. Large net in-migration accounted for a substantial proportion of Jewish population growth during the period 1948 to 2014 while among Arabs, net migration was negligible. Natural increase, that is births minus deaths, accounts for the high rates of population growth among Arabs. And in recent years, both Arabs and Jews grow as a consequence of high natural increase originating in high fertility and low mortality rates. Since immigration is the key factor in understanding the source of population growth among Jews in Israel. I would like to take a few minutes to describe the waves of Jewish immigrants to the area which is now the state of Israel. Since 1880, when the Jewish population in the area which is now the state of Israel totald fewer than 25,000. Great waves of immigration occurred both in relation to the number of Jews in the world and in relation to the size of the local population. Jewish immigration to Israel has had very diverse origins including many parts of the Islamic world of West Asia. The Middle East and North Africa as well as origins in Eastern and Central Europe and the Americas. Completely different circumstances, and hundreds, sometimes thousands of years of mutual disconnection. Led to wide gaps between Jews of different ethnic origins in terms of different languages, values, customs, politics. Economics, technology, culture and demographic patterns. About half a million Jewish immigrants arrived to Pre-State Israel. Most of Jews living in Israel in 1948, just before Statehood, were immigrants or descendants of immigrants from Central to Eastern Europe. This Jewish population was enlarged by an additional 700,000 immigrants by 1951. This mass migration wave during the first years of statehood included a large number of Jews from the Islamic world who had been a small minority in pre-state Israel. Later, waves of North African Jews left their home countries in reaction to the French decolonization around 1960. And about half of these 450,000 Jews arrived in Israel. Immigrants who arrived between 1948 and 1967 totalled 1.2 million. During the 1970's and 80's immigration streams continued at much lower levels. Most recently there was another large wave of immigration beginning in 1990, between 1990 and 2002. Approximately one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union arrived in Israel then a nation of roughly seven million. Over time, ethnic flux in Israel has led to the evolution of new ethnic groups. For example, a broadening of the basis of ethnicity has resulted in the creation of a pan-ethnic identity. Israelis of Middle Eastern or North African origin known in Hebrew as Mizrahim or persons of eastern origin. It is likely that the creation of a pan-ethnic identity came about, despite cultural, and socio-economic diversity, among Israelis, as Middle Eastern, and North African decent. Because of broad differences between these groups and the groups from Eastern and Central Europe. Ashkenazim in terms of socioeconomic status, residential location, and cultural, and religious practices. Despite the immigration of Jews from diverse origins, Israeli society has been dominated by Ashkenazim. Some of these were Jews who were the first to immigrate to pre-independence Israel and were the founders of most political, economic and cultural institutions. In general, Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East were characterized by lower levels of socio-economic status as well as higher levels of fertility and mortality. For a variety of reasons including differential placement of newly arrived immigrants in geographically and economically peripheral regions. As well as differential veteranship in Israel. Mizrahim have generally been disadvantaged socioeconomically. The split between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim has become a dominant one in contemporary Israeli Jewish society. Especially because it is understood largely in terms of class inequality and historical discrimination. Most recently, the last large wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union has changed the face of Israeli society and added to the mosaic of Jewish society. Marked by different cultures, languages, levels of socioeconomic status and demographic regimes. >> Based on aggregate statistics, the population of Israel, as compared to other developed societies as well as most developing societies, has very high levels of fertility in marriage. However, studying aggregate demographic measures is problematic because Israel is an extremely heterogeneous society with family formation patterns differing greatly across numerically important social groups. There are significant differences in demographic patterns between the minority Arab chromatically Muslim population and the majority Jewish population. Moreover, there is great heterogeneity in dmoraphic patterns within the Arab and Jewish populations by religion, religiosity and ethnic origin. What is fertility transition? Fertility transition is a general term used to describe decades or centuries long trend towards reducing fertility from high to low levels. Usually we refer to fertility transition occurring at the national, or regional, or provincial level. Fertility transition does not refer to relatively short term fluctuations up or down in fertility, but to more long term trends from high to low. Generally, historically, these fertility declines have been called transitions, because once the decline has begun it's rarely reverses itself so that fertility does not ever go back to high levels again. Usually, the historical process has been that of the reduction from high, to medium, to low levels. Some fertility declines have occurred very fast, while others have taken much more time. The fertility transition can be seen as part of broader demographic change understanding the framework of demographic transition. As we can see, Arabs seem to have experienced fertility transition and there has been a great convergence to levels close to those of the Jewish population. >> Other groups in Israel have also experienced fertility transition. For example, we see here fertility decline among Mizrahi population in Israel following their immigration. And we also see that there has been a reduction in the gap between the level of Mizrahi fertility as compared to Ashkenazi fertility. On the other hand, fertility among other groups in Israel remains high. And in this slide, I'd like to discuss the important differentials in fertility across groups defined by religiosity in the Jewish population. A discussion of religiosity groups in the Jewish population in Israel can be organized around categories of Jewish rep, religiosity, which correspond with well-defined social constructs. Although there is variation within these broadly defined groups, distinctions are made among the following numerically important groups. The ultra orthodox, the religious, the traditional, and the secular or non-religious. It is generally quite well understood what these groups mean, both socially and in terms of religious practice. Thus we take these groups as our starting points in the discussion of religiosity within the Jewish Israeli context here. As well as in the graphs that we will show below. The ultra orthodox in Israel have a commitment to extreme segregation from the secular world in general and, in particular, from Jewish Israeli society, which is largely secular in nature. The ultra orthodox groups stem from a contra acculturation movement. Which developed during the period of enlightenment in Europe. The ultra orthodox shunned all contact with outside culture, and essentially formed a separate society. For example, ultra orthodox men often study in yeshivut religious schools until the age of 40. They do not generally study secular subjects, they have very low labor force participation rates and they do not usually perform the military service that is mandatory for other Jewish men. While ultra-Orthodox women may have greater contact with Israeli society than their male counterparts, their behavior is also more limited than among secular women. And their labor force participation is generally lower than that of other women. Likewise, community norms prohibit any exposure to secular culture in the form of mass media and Internet for men, women, and children. And social norms are enforced from within by neighbors, and by community members through social surveillance and the threat of rejection by the group. The strict adherence to a very particular constrained way of life on the part of the ultra-Orthodox in Israel must also be understood in the context of the powerful religious institution and leaders in Israel. Politically, the ultra-Orthodox groups are organized and have formed the balance between the two large political parties on the left and the right. This strategic political position has empowered religious leaders, and enabled the ultra-orthodox to receive much general government assistance, in terms of financial support. Nonetheless, this group is among the poorest segments of the Israeli population. Based on recent data, approximately 7.5% of adult Jewish men and women define themselves as ultra-orthodox. And among these groups, women have had on average between six and eight children in recent decades. In contrast to the ultra Orthodox, the National Religious Movement originated during Enlightenment in the acculturation groups that promoted contact with the outside world while maintaining Jewish culture and practices. These religious Jews are generally well integrated into Jewish Israeli secular society. They participate in major institutions such as the military. Their school system teaches secular as well as religious subjects. They participate in secular post secondary study and they have high labor force participation rates, both among men and women. Persons who see themselves as part of the national religious movement are likely to self-identify as religious but not ultra-Orthodox. Based on recent studies approximately 10% to 11% of adult Jewish men and women self-identify as religious. And religious women have been shown to have approximately four children on average. An additional, approximately 40% of Jewish adults define themselves as traditional. Traditional Jews in Israel do not define themselves as strictly religious or Ultra-Orthodox and not as secular. Generally traditional Jews do fullfill some religious commandments and maintain Jewish customs. However their traditional behavior is not necessarily motivated only by religious commitment but may also be associated with identification and affiliation with the Jewish people or with their Jewish ethnic group community or family. Self defined traditional women have completed fertility in the range of two and a half to three and a half children each, with a slight downward trend noticeable. The largest group of adult Jews in Israel, approximately 40%, define themselves as secular or not religious. We note that even the secular women report that they do observe some religious commandments. They do attend some major They do attend synagogue for major holidays and they rate religious ceremonies as very important in their lives. This would seem to suggest that even the self-defined secular Jews in Israel are not completely secularized. Secular women in Israel have the lowest number of children on average among all Jewish religiosity groups, but maintain levels that are higher than in most developed societies. This graph shows fertility levels and trends among Jews by levels of religiosity. We note here the strikingly high levels of fertility among the Ultra-Orthodox, and also, the much lower but still high levels of fertility among religious Jews. We also note that there is a very close association between level of religiosity and fertility level. >> The Israeli Arab population is subdivided into three subgroups, characterized by different religions. The vast majority is Muslim, 84% of the total Arab population of Israel, while the Christian and Druze population comprised about 8% each. Long-term differences in socioeconomic status between Muslim and Christian Arab groups, which emerged roughly 100 years ago in various societies, have been known as a general characteristic of the Middle East. Differences between these population groups took the form of higher educational attainment, higher status of women, lower child mortality, greater organization, and more exposure to the West among the Christian Arabs. Druze used to be most similar to the Muslim population several generations ago, but in the last generation they became closer to the Christian Arabs in their demographic characteristics. As we can see from the graph, there was a great heterogeneity in fertility by religion in their group. However, we can see a high convergence in the last two decades, and we can see that Muslim fertility that was very high in the past is already getting to levels of the Druze and Christian fertility. As we have seen changes over time in fertility as well as great heterogeneity in fertility levels across groups and recent convergence, we can now look at mortality change. Life expectancy overall as compared with other selected countries showed that Israel mortality is low in international standards. In recent years, life expectancy of men in Israel is about 80 years and for women is nearly 84 years. As we can see, over the years, expectancy of life was increasing in Israel as in all other countries in general and more developed countries in particular, and both for men and for women. When we compare the different groups in terms of infant mortality we can see that in general there is a trend downwards in infant mortality in all population groups. But there is still heterogeneity with Muslims having the highest IMR, infant mortality rates, Druze somewhat lower, and Christians and Jews, the lowest levels of infant mortality rates. Though Druze, we see convergence but the gaps remain by religions. We have looked at trends over time in migration, fertility, and mortality. How do historical patterns result in population structure that we see today? The age pyramid for all of Israel, as compared with US and Uganda, show clearly that Israel, it's closer in some terms to Uganda than to the United States. In general, age pyramids has many social consequences. For example, age structure is an important factor in economic growth. Israel's pyramid, in practice, looks like a combination of the Uganda's wide base and US upper section. The wide base reflects high fertility levels, and the top part, the early stage of the aging of the Israel's baby boom generation. Having a high proportion of children and a substantial proportion of old person implies that the working age population is relatively small. And therefore the economic burden on the working age population to support children and older people is heavy. When we compare the population pyramids of different groups in Israel we note significant variation reflecting primarily differences in fertility across groups. Muslims have had historically high fertility, leading to a wide base, and Ultra-Orthodox, even more so. The population pyramid among secular Jews is more rectangular, reflecting their lower fertility. We have talked about the characteristics of the Israeli population and the main demographic processes that Israeli population experienced in the last years. Now we'll talk a bit about the future. Population projections allow us to get some insights about what will happen in the next decades. From what we can see, the population of Israel, it's going to continue its rapid growth and therefore increase in population density is for granted. And those will happen during a process of rapid aging, when the baby boomers will arrive to the pension and retirement ages. That will reflect in high dependency overall because of the high levels of fertility that still remain relatively high. >> Thank you, Eliahu. Just like to summarize and sum up our lecture by going back to the three themes in the demography of Israel that Eliahu discussed before. The exceptionally high population growth with average annual growth rates over time, which leads to a doubling time of 20 years on average during the period since 1948. Rapid population change, for example, with large waves of immigration, with Jews coming from diverse origins. Fertility change, for example fertility transition among the Arabs in Israel and among Mizrahim. Mortality change, which has lead to improvements in life expectancy but still reflects inequality and gaps across groups. And very heterogeneous demographic behavior across social groups. Israel has been, and still is, a demographic laboratory experiencing many demographic changes that are experienced in other places across the globe. But unusual in the high rates of immigration and population growth and in population heterogeneity in demographic parameters. >> Thank you Barbara and Eliahu. In my own view, one of the most fascinating demographic facts about Israel is its high fertility rates, and the highest of all industrial Western society. This high fertility rate is not coincidental. Since its earliest days, Israel's leadership have encouraged Jewish families to have as many children as possible to help revive the Jewish people after the Holocaust in which more than one-third of the nation has been eradicated by the Nazis. To this end, different policies have been adopted. For example, large families were given special stipend and awards. The employment of women law, was legislated as early as 1954 when Israel was still a young and very poor country securing paid maternity leave for every mother and her right to regain similar employment afterward. Motherhood has been conceptualized as a national endeavor and women's contribution to the nation rather than an individualistic decision borne of her own personal aspiration or those of her immediate family. The state's attempt to encourage high fertility rates have also taken the form of a public health policy. Posing hardly any restrictions on the eligibility of the Israeli citizens for fertility treatment within the national health insurance system. In fact Israeli society has the highest rates of assisted reproductive technology intervention in the world as well as the highest per capita consumption rate of fertility therapy with in vitro fertilization at it's center. In her study of reproductive policies in Israel my colleague Dr. Sigal Godin has shown that despite their political disputes in all other issues, Zionists and Arab parties both religious and secular, on the left and on the right, seems to converge on one area only. The need to continue generous state support of these assisted reproductive technologies. But what are the social consequences of such an emphasis on high fertility rates? What does it mean for women's ability to integrate into the labor market? What does it mean for people who do not want to have children or for those who even after fertility treatment have not been able to conceive. As Barbara and Eliahu have told us already, the level of mothers' integration into the labor market in Israel is one of the highest in the industrialized world because all women are expected to give birth at one time or another. Employers' tendency to discriminate against mothers compared to women who are not mothers, is lower in Israel yet evidence also show that despite the law, women are still discriminated against when they are expecting and the time for fertility expectations are still regarded as an excuse for employers to maintain gender pay gap. Can you think of other social consequences this high fertility rates may have? What about social and political consequences of the other demographic trends we have explored today? In our next class, we will ask how the complex demography of Israel affects the country's political system.