The first few chapters of Freud's book, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, are about what he calls parapraxis, and that's his term for what now is known as Freudian slips. Again, here's another example of something that's part of pop culture and it seems poised interestingly between what we take to be an established part of knowledge about ourselves on the one hand and fiction and mythology, urban legends and so on, that might or might not be subject to empirical validation. The concept of a Freudian slip is such a part of contemporary culture that, for example, there's a lingerie shop in Oregon, I believe in Portland USA, that is called the Freudian Slip, and the potential customers surely get the reference, the double meaning of that. So, it's a characteristic part of modern thought that there are these slips for example. Well, Freud talks about these, as Freud refers to as dregs of the world of phenomena. He's considering objections to his view that suggest that well these things are so trivial, so uninteresting, that it's hardly worth bothering with them when we're trying to be scientific and get a theory that allows us to understand the mind. But I think rightly he points out, let us not underestimate small indications, and in that respect I think he's right. Just as at about the same time, what we now refer to as forensic science was getting it start. A hundred years ago, early part of the 20th century, it probably would have been thought silly to, for example, look for fingernail clippings, or fingerprints, or bits of hair, or bits of fiber from somebody's clothing around a crime scene. But now we know those things are incredibly crucial. Likewise, Freud says rightly so I think that there's nothing illegitimate scientifically about looking for relatively small aspects that would seem like trivial aspects of human behavior. Perhaps he's right about that. Then he gives many examples including one in which a speaker proposing a toast of honor on a ceremonial occasion, calls on his audience to hiccup to, the German was, 'Aufstoßen' the health of the chief, the boss of some organization, whereas he presumably intended to ask his audience to toast which is 'anstoßen', the health of the Chief. Freud also sites an historical case in which the president of Germany's lower house of parliament, wants to open proceedings with words that translated to English as, "Gentlemen, I take notice that a full quorum of members is present and hereby declare the sittings closed, I mean open!" Where he intended to declare them open, unfortunately the wrong word came out. Likewise, if you search on YouTube with terms like “hilarious Freudian slips on the news”, that'll lead you to many hours of amusing clips in which newscasters and other public figures tripped over their words with quite embarrassing results. One famous case was the longtime mayor of Chicago, Mayor Daley, who said in a news conference, "A policeman isn't there to create disorder, a policeman is there to preserve disorder." Not presumably what he consciously intended to say. Freud also puts onto the general rubric of parapraxis, cases of mislaying something, confusing one thing with another, forgetting for instance. So when you keep on forgetting to do something or you keep on forgetting somebody's name, he thinks that there might be an explanation of that that comes from some aspect of what's happening with you at the unconscious level. For instance, take an example in which you have a message from an old friend, an email perhaps that you just keep on managing to forget to respond to, and that old friend might be, if you were to think about it, you might notice that that old friend might be from a period of your life that you've been trying to put behind you, perhaps you've moved on to other things, and getting in touch with that old friend might be fraught a little bit with feelings of danger or discomfort, and nevertheless, you might not acknowledge that consciously. You might find yourself this week you forgot to respond, and another week goes by you intended but never got to it. Once you're away from your computer or your phone, you forgot it once again. You thought once again that you should respond to that friend but once back in front of your technology, something else keeps on distracting you, weeks go by until the point at which you feel guilty about how long it's taken you but you never respond. This is a process that I'm not completely unfamiliar with, am not sure many of you are as well, and the idea is there is something that, it's not just a complete chance occurrence, that you keep on not managing to remember to respond to that old acquaintance or friend. There's probably some reason, and the reason is perhaps something at the unconscious level. So, Freud says, nevertheless, somebody might suppose that there is a non-psychic explanation for what happens in the cases of a parapraxis such as a slip of the tongue. Maybe exhaustion or excitation, or maybe I'm distracted, and Freud replies, well, these explanations of a physical kind are extremely unsatisfying and we should always look for what he refers to as a psychic explanation for these phenomena. I believe there he might be overreaching a little bit suggesting that whenever there is a slip there must be a psychic explanation in terms of something at the unconscious level. It seems to me he could very well make the point that he wants to make without having to reach that far, and just say some cases of for example mislaying, or forgetting, or confusing or misspeaking, can be given a psychic explanation. It's not clear why he would need to explain all of them in those terms. Freud suggests interestingly that slips of the tongue for example, and these are his words, “have a sense of their own.” And by that I think what he means is that they suggest that there's a statement being made, a proposition being offered, a communicative act being carried out by something like an unconscious aspect of yourself. Take the example of the speaker the lower house, presumably, he was not looking forward to the proceedings that we're going to be happening that day he was wishing that they were not going to occur at all, and that's why there was some desire inside of him that wanted to have the preceding closed and not open, because he found what was going to be happening that day somehow distasteful. If that's right, then there's going to be a mechanism that explains why at least some of our parapraxis occur, and that will be along the following lines. That there is an unconscious desire or intention that takes control of my tongue or whatever other body part I'm using for communicating, and tries to satisfy itself. Freud also talks about a disturbing purpose as distinct from a disturbed purpose, the disturbed purpose will be something at the conscious level, I'm trying to declare these proceedings open, the disturbing purpose is something that is at the unconscious level, some other part of me is trying to keep that from happening. Now, if that's right, then these unconscious desires aren't always completely tamped down inside of our unconscious minds. Sometimes they have a way of as it were reaching up from below and messing with what we're trying to do at the conscious level. If that's right, then on that model, Freud will be able to say that his picture of things would explain some aspects of human behavior, would explain why it is we do some things that are otherwise puzzling. That general approach I want to suggest is something that is in itself scientifically legitimate as a hypothesis as to why we do the things that we do. There's no reason why Freud has to say at this point any skepticism or any doubt that you've got about this theory must be your repression, or your vested interest in turn, and having it turn out to be so. If you were to say that to me, I think I would say, well, I might have vested interests in this not turning out to be so. Nevertheless, I'm still curious about how it is. I might find that I can improve my understanding of myself if I can investigate that theory, just as I've got a vested interest in not getting a vaccination because they're unpleasant, nevertheless I'll put up with the pain in order to better my chances of resisting disease. Freud continues writing, "My interpretation carries with it. The hypothesis that intentions can find expression in a speaker, of which he himself knows nothing, but which I am able to infer by a circumstantial evidence." And in that quotation, it seems to me what he says is perfectly legitimate. Here's an example of a phenomenon that can be accounted for by the hypothesis that something is going on in my unconscious mind. He continues, "We seek not really to describe and classify a phenomena, but to understand them as signs of an interplay of forces in the mind. On our view, the phenomena that are perceived must yield an importance to trends which are only hypothetical. That is he saying, "I can't, perhaps none of us can, directly observe these unconscious phenomena, at least until we're able to bring them up to conscious experience but that doesn't mean we can't hypothesize them, just as at least, given the scientific tools that were available a century ago, we couldn't directly experience the movement of the plates that were thought to be suggested by some scientists to be things that made up the Earth's crust. Nevertheless, we can hypothesize their presence to help explain phenomena. In some respects, I think in various respects in his writing, Freud switches back and forth between saying things that are perfectly legitimate and reasonable and well supported by the evidence, and other things that are perhaps less, So. He has a bit of a Jekyll and Hyde character to his writing. These aspects of what he has to say strike me as perfectly Dr. Jekyll like and not very Mr. Hyde like. That is to say Jekyll like in the sense that he says here's an evidence, here's the hypothesis I want to offer to explain the evidence, and let's go and see whether we can form some experiments that might support those further. To that extent, it seems to me what he says is perfectly legitimate
