So here's the following that for Damasio, when you're deciding whether to make a decision if your somatic markers are normal, that is to say if you don't have something like the Gage Matrix, then your somatic markers will guide you. But Damasio also wants to use this as a criticism of what he takes to be subjective expected utility theory and his thought is the following. What he calls the high reason view he sometimes refers to as formal logic. And that's not quite right because formal logic is best understood as having do with theoretical rather than practical rationality. So formal logic is not an issue for practical reasoning. There's no criticism that could be happening in this context. But it also makes clear that he thinks that subjective expected utility theory cannot accommodate the value and importance of using somatic markers in decision making, and here's the thought. Damasio suggests that if you're doing subjective expected utility theory, you've got to drop a matrix, you've got to calculate utilities and probabilities, multiply, add across, take the sum of those products in a given row and then figure out which row has the greatest subjected expected utility. Damasio does not see any place in which Somatic markedness of an outcome in that outcome space could play a role. And as results he want to say that according to subjective expected utility theory, there is no room for emotions and the way in which emotions allow our objects of perception to be charged in the somatic sense. There's no room, he suggests, for emotions to guide us in decision-making. And as a result Damasio wants to put the somatic marker hypothesis, which is essential for his line of thought, as something that he wants to use to criticize subjective expected utility theory. However, I want to argue that that's a misunderstanding on Damasio's part of what SEUT actually says. I emphasized before that subjective expected utility theory does not require not paying attention to your emotions. As I mentioned, if you decide whether to take an umbrella on a day where it's a non zero chance of rain, you need to ask how much you would like or dislike getting wet? How upset you would be if you had some rain falling on you even if you didn't get soaked? Even getting a little bit wet could be a big problem for you if you're going to an interview for an important job for example. Otherwise, it might not be a big deal. But you do need to consult your emotions in asking, how much would I like or dislike this outcome. If you don't have any emotions to consult, then you're going to be like David Hume's character, who is in a building. He has nothing but cognition, no access to his emotions. He's in a building, he's aware of the fact that the building is now on fire. But unless he has access to an emotion such as, I care, it would be bad, I'm afraid to be burned and so forth; he's just going to sit there and watch the building burn around him. So too, when you're doing subjective expected utility theory, you not just can, but need to, appeal to your emotional reactions to various outcomes in the outcome space. So I want to suggest that whereas Damasio argues that the Somatic marker hypothesis serves as a challenge to and a criticism of Subjective Expected Utility Theory. There's no reasons why that you have to be at odds. SEUT can love this Somatic marker hypothesis in the following sense. If I've got that business and I'm deciding whether or not to enter into a partnership or visit or transaction with this potential client, who happens to be my best friend's worst enemy. I do need to ask myself, how much would I cringe when my friend finds out? Probably, it's just a matter of time til my friend does find out. Is that something I could stomach? Or is that something that I would hate myself for doing? And that might actually upset our friendship, maybe destroy our friendship. How much do I care about that? Those somatically marked potential situations, the ones I need to listen to in order to decide what to do. Likewise, when you're deciding whether or not you want to become friends with someone, you've met them once. You're considering whether or not you want to continue to develop a relationship with that person, whether or not that person gives you a funny feeling, sort of uneasiness that you can't quite name. But that when you see that person, you somehow cringe, you somehow shudder, somehow have a bodily desire to turn away for example. That's evidence that should not be ignored in deciding what it is practically rational thing to do. Likewise, When I'm, for example, advising my students, that just maybe my students come to me and ask what I think they should major in, they can't decide, there are a lot of things they get excited about. I tell them, go to a good book store and up and down the isles, look at the different subjects, and which of those subjects makes your spine tingle? Which of those subjects makes you feel like you want to take every book off the shelf and read each one? If you find a subject like that, that's a very good reason to study that subject. Whereas if there's a subject that you look at as a potential chore, as something that maybe is important, something you need to do in order to get a job, But that you kind of don't get very excited about and perhaps be a little bit put off by when you look at the actual books, or magazines, or workbooks, or things of the kind concerning that topic. That's evidence of your emotional and thereby bodily reaction to the prospect of pursuing that course of study. And that's a good indication, not a perfect indication, not the only bit of evidence that you should consult. But one bit of evidence that you should consult in deciding what to do. So somatic markers can be married to the subjected expected utility theory, in such ways to help us make good decisions. So long as those somatic markers are themselves, so to speak, in good order.
