Now we come to another question. What is the modern era? Where do we start? And why do we start where we start? It is very common and customary in the writing of Middle Eastern history to start the modern era in 1798. Why 1798? Because in 1798 Napoleon invaded Egypt, and ushered in through his invasion, a long period of rapid and radical change. That sounds reasonable. But it is problematic. Because in this determination of the Napoleonic invasion as the beginning of the modern era, there is a hidden assumption. That hidden assumption is, that the modern era in the Middle East was created only and solely through European influence and European supremacy on an area which is in decline, stagnant and moving nowhere. So there is now a historiographical debate about whether it was ever really correct to begin the modern era with the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. The Italian historian and philosopher Benedetto Croce said that history was always writing about contemporary history. All history is contemporary history, meaning to say that all history is written from the point of view of the present. And as the present changes all the time, with the changing of the present, we have a changing view of the past. And our ideas about the past, the way we write about the past, change all the time. And therefore, the idea of seeing the Napoleonic invasion as the sole impetus for change and modernization in the region has been challenged in later years. First let's have a look at the so called thesis of decline. The thesis of decline argues that the Ottoman Empire since its peak in the period of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent who died in 1556, that since this mid-16th Century, the Ottoman Empire was in a 350 year linear decline. That half of the empire's existence was this linear decline for centuries upon centuries. That the Middle East had become a dormant, stagnant society resurrected by the Western encroachment. That it was Western enlightenment and vitality that brought about the modernization of the Middle East. But this was was not so. In the Middle East, well after the 17th century, there are vibrant cities with centers of government and courts of law and centers of learning and arts and crafts, and trade with the West and the East. It was not a stagnant, rotting identity or entity. It is true that the empire did not expand. And from 1683 onwards, the failure in the Siege of Vienna, the Ottoman Empire was in constant retreat, in terms of territory. It did weaken in comparison to part of Europe, not to all of it. Certainly to northern and western Europe. Far less in comparison to southern Europe or Russia. But this was a matter of relative retreat, in comparison to the empire's former greatness. It was not a total linear decline. On the one hand, it is true. The defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 was the beginning of a period of territorial contraction. But, on the other hand, there were very handsome Ottoman defeats dealt to the Russians, for example, after the Siege of Vienna in 1711, in the war with Russians, in what is presently the country of Moldavia. On the one hand, the Ottoman Empire was the sick man of Europe. But on the other, it enjoyed unquestioned Islamic legitimacy. Even when rebellions in the empire brought down the ruling Sultan, legitimacy of the empire remained intact. And this remained true until the rise of new ideas like nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th Century. It was only then that the empire was really challenged by new ideas from Europe, and that the legal system was questioned. Until then, the legal system was seen as fair and reasonable. But when European style legal and educational reforms were introduced, these had a dramatic impact on issues such as collective identity. And these did not make matters better, but quite the opposite. It is also true that in the 19th century, the difficulties of the empire were more clearly visible, clearly seen from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, as one example. But another example that goes on throughout the 19th century are the nationalist uprising against the Ottoman Empire, amongst the Christians in the Balkans. And these were Nationalist uprisings that succeeded in obtaining independence for the Christian nations of the Balkans. The Greeks, the Serbs, the Bulgarians, who gradually through the 19th century, broke away from the Ottoman Empire. It is true also that in the 19th century, the Western advance and advantage in science and technology and power projection was very, very clear. But then again, on the other hand, the empire strengthened its hold in much of the Arab-speaking provinces, and controlled a huge domain. All the way from Yemen to Libya was all still the Ottoman Empire. There were indeed frequent rebellions against the Ottomans since the end of the 16th Century. This was a sign of weakness. But the fact that the empire survived these rebellions time and time again was another sign of Ottoman resilience. The 17th century was a period of growing decentralization and empowerment of local potentates and rising urban social classes. Some historians argue that this was a negative force, that it was an indication of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. But others would argue quite the opposite, that it enabled an often effective, albeit indirect form of control, and that it wasn't a sign of decline at all. Hugh Nolan, an Irish historian, not writing about the Ottoman Empire but made a general comment. Aye, he said, the two things happen at one time. Things get better, and they get worse. So what difference does all this discussion make? Did it all begin with Napoleon or not? What is the correct periodization of this modern era? Was change all initiated from outside by the enlightened, progressive West, or a dormant, stagnant, and backward society? Did nothing change in the Middle East until Napoleon? Well, the answer to all these questions is that it was obviously not so. The picture is much more complex. The European input added great momentum to a process that had already begun. Some go even as far as to argue that Napoleon interrupted a local process of modernization, which could have been a successful alternative to the Western model. Had it not been for Western impact they say, the Middle East would have established its own model of modernity. Maybe, but equally, maybe not. But no one has really offered an alternative periodization. People have questioned whether it does all begin with Napoleon, but no one has been able to say, if not Napoleon, then when does it begin exactly? So the bottom line of the debate is to come to a balanced conclusion, which would say the Napoleonic phase was a key to a new period of rapid change, but one that added a quantum leap forward to an ongoing process. The colonial interaction, with all its obvious negatives, created an unprecedented measure of rapid change in politics, the economy, and perhaps, most importantly, in the sphere of ideas and the erosion of tradition. Ideas are more dangerous than occupation. Ideas erode beliefs and traditions. Occupation comes and goes.
