[BLANK_AUDIO] In World War I, we come to the end of the Ottoman Empire. And it was at the end of that war that the Ottoman Empire collapses and ceases to be a political body of the Middle East. So how did World War I change things? First and foremost, World War I brought about the end of the Ottoman Empire that had ruled the Arab countries for 400 years. And from the ruins of the empire, the modern Middle Eastern state system was built. When we discussed the Eastern question in previous lessons, it was noted repeatedly that the European powers sought to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for the sake of European peace. The fear was that if the Ottoman Empire collapsed and European powers began a competition to take over the empire, they would clash with each other and create a massive European war. Well, after the outbreak of World War I, the Europeans were at war already, so that logic of maintaining the integrity of the empire was no longer relevant. The Ottoman decision to side with Germany and Austria in the war essentially decided the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Western powers, Britain and France, and initially the Russians too, had every reason and interest now to seek the empire's defeat and its dismemberment. From an early phase in the war, there were secret talks between the powers about carving up the empire. The Russians wanted the Straits, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. The French wanted Syria, especially the coastal area, and Palestine too. The British wanted Iran, because of the Persian Gulf and India, and the connection from there to the Mediterranean, which created a challenge to the French domains there. In early 1916, a British and a French official, Mark Sykes on the British side and Francois Georges-Picot on the French side, signed the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement that divided the Arab parts of the Middle East between Britain and France. France had a free hand in Cilicia, which is in southern Anatolia, coastal Syria and Lebanon, and the sphere of influence stretching eastwards toward Mosul, which is in present-day Iraq. Britain got a free hand in Iraq, including Basra and Baghdad, and a sphere of influence going west all the way to the Mediterranean. In this agreement, Britain also got the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine. And much of the rest of Palestine was put under an international administration, together with France and with Russia in agreement. Russia, however, was overtaken by revolution in 1917 and opted out of the colonial spoils. Along with the Sykes-Picot agreement, there was a correspondence between the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon, and the leader of the Hashemite family in Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, about the future of the Arab provinces. This correspondence took place in 1915 and served an immediate British interest. Because of her Indian interest, where there were millions of Muslim believers, Britain was very deeply concerned by the Ottoman Sultan's appeal at the beginning of the war to Muslims everywhere to join in jihad against the enemies of the empire. The British were, therefore, in search of an Arab Muslim ally, with whom to fight against the Ottomans. And thus began the connection with the Hashemites. And who were the Hashemites? The Hashemites were this Muslim family of very prestigious lineage. They were descendants of the prophet Muhammad. And the prophet Muhammad was himself a member of the house of Hashim. And the leader of the family in the First World War was Hussein bin Ali who was the Emir, that is the ruler of Mecca, the Muslim holy city, as the representative of the Ottoman Empire. But, even though the ruler of Mecca on behalf of the Ottomans, the Hashemites had their own grievances with the Ottomans and had great aspirations for Arab and Islamic leadership on their own, independent of the Turks. In the summer of 1915, they entered into these negotiations with the British, where the Hashemites demanded a Caliphate and the Hashemites Arab rule that would rule over the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. And the areas that the Hashemites demanded in this correspondence with the British was the entire area stretching, as we can see on the map, from the southern border of Turkey all the way to the Indian ocean, and from the Mediterranean in the west to the border with Iran in the east. The demands of the Hashemites from the British did not include North Africa. They did not include Egypt either. These, at that time, were not seen as part of the Arab world. They did not see the Arab speaking peoples of the [UNKNOWN] who were under French colonial rule as part of the Arab world, and Egypt under British occupation was not demanded either. Also because Egyptians were not seen exactly as part of the Arab nation and also because the Hashemites were realistic enough. Not if it wanted the British territory that was under British occupation. So this correspondence conducted between Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Hussein bin Ali of the Hashemites. In this correspondence, McMahon agreed, with certain reservations, to the Arab demand. And the question is, why did the British agree, albeit with various reservations, what did the British want to achieve through this negotiation? The British believed that the Arabs would contribute to the war effort if they rose against the Turks. And if they had a promise of territorial gain, they would indeed rise against the Turks, and thus contribute to the war effort against the Ottomans. The British also believed that siding with the Arab nationalism would serve Britain's post-war interest in the Middle East in their competition with the French. That is if they had the Arabs on their side, it would be much easier for them to exercise British imperial control of the Arab speaking regions in the Middle East. The Middle East was also important for imperial communications, the passage to India. And oil for the great British fleet were found in the Middle East. And this was critical as an area of communication to the backbone of their imperial power, which was in India. [BLANK_AUDIO] So what were the reservations that the British made in their negotiations with the Arabs? The Middle East was also very important for imperial communications. After all, the Middle East was the passage to India. And in the Middle East, the British could also find oil for the great British fleet, the backbone of their imperial power. So what were the reservations that the British made in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence? First of all, certain areas were excluded from the Arab state on the grounds that they were not purely Arab. And this referred especially to the portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. British promises also related only to those portions of the territories wherein Great Britain was free to act without detriment to her ally, France. These reservations were cause for great controversy after the war, especially on the question of Palestine. But it was not that the British had promised the same territories to different layers. As many people often say, Palestine, the Twice Promised Land. It was not so. In fact, there was no real substantial discrepancy between the documents Sykes-Picot and the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and thereafter, the Balfour Declaration. Generally, the British had been quite consistent. The correspondence was just that. That is, it was just a correspondence. It was not an agreement. And there was no final agreement. But just the presentation of positions. The Zionists and the British tended to argue for a long time that the exclusion of Palestine from the Arab state was on the basis of that sentence that speaks of the exclusion of the portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. But to explain the exclusion of Palestine on those grounds is impossible. The argument that the Zionists and their supporters made cannot be sustained by the text nor the reality on the ground. What the Zionists and their supporters did was to argue that by the word districts, the documents meant the equivalent of the Ottoman province, Vilayet. And, if, as we see on the map, the Vilayet of Damascus, stretching all the way down, including what is today Trans-Jordan. If one looks at the portions of Syria west to the Vilayet of Damascus, that would exclude Palestine. If indeed, the word districts refers to Vilayets. But as we can see on the map, Hama and Homs were not Vilayets. And to the west of the Vilayet of Aleppo is only the Mediterranean Sea. So the exclusion on the grounds that districts means Vilayets is impossible, and Palestine could not have been excluded on those grounds. What they did mean in the exclusion of the portions of Syria lying to the west of that line, was to Mount Lebanon and to the Mennonite population in Mount Lebanon, who did not see themselves as Arabs. But then, there is the other resolution. A sentence which says that the promises to the Arabs related only to those portions of the territories wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her ally, France. And it is an accordance with that sentence that Britain could not have promised Palestine to the Arab state without consulting France. After all, as we have seen, in the Sykes–Picot Agreement, Palestine is an area in which the French share responsibility with the British. So the question is, why for years did the British try to explain that the exclusion was on the basis of this impossible Vilayet argument? They could have just said Palestine was excluded because of the previous secret understanding with France. But in the aftermath of the First World War, to argue that the territories were excluded because they were not Arab was in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Whereas to argue in the name of secret deals with the French or other colonial powers were no longer politically correct in the aftermath of World War I. In the aftermath of World War I, with the rise of anti-colonial powers like the United States and the Soviet Union, it was no longer possible to argue in the old, according to the old imperial rules of secret agreements between great powers. Self determination was the name of the game, also according to the principles of President Wilson. And therefore, the argument, rather exclusion or exclusion, had to be made in the name of self determination. Even if in terms of the documentation, they could not make sense. Whatever came of the Arab uprising that the British had hoped for in their correspondence with Hussein bin Ali? Actually, not much. Hussein declared his revolt against the Ottomans in June 1916, accusing the Ottomans of their religious deviation. That is, they weren't Islamic enough. Too secular, too reformist. It was not really in the name of Arab nationals. But the great majority of Arabs did not rebel and they remained loyal to the empire, and were very unwilling to join in an uprising against the Ottoman Sultan, who they still regarded as their legitimate leader. The Arab Revolt therefore was really not a great contribution to the war effort. The contribution was indeed very minor. And in the words of TE Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia, the Arab Revolt was nothing but a sideshow of a sideshow. The British in Cairo had been unrealistic in their views about the attraction of Arab nationalism. They had given Arab nationalism far more weight than the people in the Middle East themselves had actually attached to it. What about the Jews and the Zionists and the new reality created by the First World War? Palestine was not promised to the Jews either. It is true to say that it was not promised to the Arabs, for the reasons that we have already discussed. But Palestine was not promised to the Jews either. [INAUDIBLE] thing in the Balfour Declaration for a Jewish national home in Palestine. But they did not promise Palestine to the Jews. So let us turn to the Balfour Declaration and see why it was issued and what it really said. The very beginning of the First World War and the fact that it meant the impending dissolution of the empire gave the Zionists an opportunity that they had been waiting for. If the empire was going to be dismantled, maybe the Zionists could secure Palestine for themselves. The British had their own interest in Palestine. And as we have already seen, Palestine, as part of the general Middle Eastern area adjacent to the Suez Canal and the passage to India, was very important to the British for their imperial security. Prime Minister Lloyd George was one of those who was quick to recognize the imperial interest that Britain had in Palestine. Lloyd George was also a man with a considerable measure of religious upbringing. And the idea of the British-protected Jewish colony appealed to him, as a person who associated because of his biblical studies. The Jews with the holy land. In 1917, when the Balfour Declaration was issued, the Allies' position in the war was in a rather sorry state. The war was slow and extremely expensive in human life to the participants on both sides. And there was a great hope amongst the British that the United States would become more involved, and that Russia would not withdraw from the war because of its internal difficulties and would stay involved in the war. And the British thought, if they expressed support for Zionist aspirations, this would help propaganda in the U.S. and in Russia to secure greater support in both of these countries for the war effort. So they believed, thanks to the vast Jewish influence that existed in both of these countries. This British belief that support the Zionist aspirations would, thanks to Jewish influence, help propaganda in the U.S. and Russia, and therefore, provide great resistance to the war effort, was a huge exaggeration about Jewish influence in these respective countries. But it was, nevertheless, exaggeration or not, a reason why the British issued the Balfour Declaration. And now, we must turn to the declaration itself and see what it really says. In this letter from the British Foreign Secretary to the leader of the Jewish community in Britain, the leader of the Zionist organization in England, Lord Rothschild. The British government, in the declaration, expressed their sympathy for Jewish Zionist aspirations. Sympathy, not support. This was a word chosen, one may imagine, with great caution. The British were being extremely limited and cautious in their commitment to the Zionist enterprise. His Majesty's Government, as we see in the declaration, view with favor, again, less than after right support, with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. So let's dwell for a bit on that sentence. View with favor, not have right support. The establishment in Palestine, not the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish national home, but the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home. And that could be on a very limited part of the territory of Palestine. But it is, indeed, a national home for the Jewish people. That, on the one hand, is a recognition of the Jewish people as a nation with the right to self determination. But on the other hand, it doesn't speak of the state, it speaks on the of a national home, and it is not at all clear what that really does mean. And the British Government will use their best endeavors, the document says, to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. So let us dwell for a moment on that sentence. Whatever rights may be recognized for the Jews, the British are also saying that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of other communities in Palestine. But for the other communities in Palestine, two points should be mentioned here. They, the other communities, only have civil and religious rights, no national rights are recognized for the other communities in Palestine. And who are these other communities in Palestine? They are defined as the non-Jewish communities, as if they are the minority in Palestine and the Jews are the majority. But these non-Jewish communities were Arabs, Muslim, Christians, having an identity of their own, which was not only to be judged by being non-Jewish. And there is no recognition of their separate identity, nor of any national rights associated with that separate identity. But, nothing shall be done which may prejudice their civil and religious rights. Therefore, there is an obvious restriction on what it is that the Jews can actually do when they do obtain some kind of political presence in Palestine. The Zionists understood this to mean the support for a Jewish state in Palestine, although that is not what the declaration actually says. And as the British historian Malcolm Yapp has said about the declaration, it was virtually meaningless and committed Britain to nothing. Which is indeed so. However, one must add to that, that after the war, when Britain became the mandatory power in Palestine, committed to the league of nations to implement the Balfour Declaration. Then, Britain's commitment to the Jews began to mean a lot more than just this declaration. Now, we come to the question of how the war ended in the Middle East. What was the division of power between the various powers that took over? The, what was in the past, the Ottoman Empire. The British historian and journalist Elizabeth Monroe defined this postwar period as Britain's moment in the Middle East. And indeed, Britain was, after the First World War, by far the superior power in the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire had come to an end. The French who were completely preoccupied at the front in France could spare only token forces for Middle East. Russia was completely preoccupied by revolution and her opting out of the war. So British occupation forces were in most of the Arab areas of the empire. They were in Syria, they were in Iraq, and they were in Palestine. And there was only a small French force in Lebanon. Faisal, the son of Hussein bin Ali who had led the Arab rebellion against the Ottomans. Faisal, at the end of the war, was in control of an Arab state, the capital of which was Damascus, in Syria, which was taken with the assistance of the Arab rebels of the Arab Revolt at the end of the war. And Faisal remained in this Syrian Arab state under his control until 1920, when he was finally evicted by the French with actual British agreement. As for the rest, Britain was in control of Egypt and the Sudan. Britain was also in control of Arabia, under the various degrees of British influence. The French were in North Africa, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, all taken from the Ottomans at various stages well before the war. Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Morocco in 1912. Libya had been under the Italians since 1911. So the great powers, especially Britain, could shape the region now more or less as they wished. And the borders of the Middle Eastern states were now drawn by British and French officials in accordance with all sorts of imperial interests and trade-offs, which eventually shaped the borders of the states of the Middle East. And it was these imperial interests that shaped the borders of the Middle East, very often, imperial officials with rulers in their hands rather than the identities of the peoples in question. Very important French concessions were made to the British in Palestine and in Iraq. According to Sykes-Picot, as we have already seen, Palestine was to be shared between the British and the French. But after the war, the British wanted Palestine for themselves and had no interest in sharing it with the French. And the British wanted Mosul, which was to be part of French-influenced Syria. The British wanted Mosul to be part of British-influenced Iraq. And therefore, the French conceded both in Palestine and in Mosul to the British. And in exchange, the British allowed the French to take over Syria that was previously in the hands of Faisal and the Arab rebellion, and to expel King Faisal from Syria in July of 1920. Why did the British do this? Why did the British allow the French to take Lebanon and Syria? Clashing and defeating Britain's own Arab allies? How could the British have allowed that to happen? To understand why the British did that, one has to understand the very complicated balance between European and Middle Eastern interests in British foreign policy. British foreign policy was made in various places, obviously in London, but in Cairo too. In Cairo, British officials were in great support of an Arab solution. That is, to create a series of Arab states in alliance with the British and not necessarily with much left for the French. But in London, the view was very different. From London, it was indeed very important to give the French what the French deserved, according to wartime agreements with them, even though they had very little power in the Middle East. Because for the British foreign policy makers in London, France's importance was as a European ally against Germany. And as a European ally against Germany, France was much more important that any territory in Beirut, in Damascus, or anywhere else in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the war, important Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into territories that were called mandates, given to the British and to the French. And according to the conference of the victorious European powers in San Remo in April 1920, the mandates were divided in the following fashion. The French obtained the mandates for Lebanon and Syria. The British obtained the mandates for Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. But what is a mandate? And why was the mandate terminology invented in the first place? The mandate was an essential colonial compromise with the principle of self-determination. In the aftermath of the First World War, and the emergence of the United States as a great power, and the principles put forth by President Wilson, and above all else, the principle of self determination. One could not simply ignore the principle of self determination and impose endless colonial rule on foreign territories. The mandate was a colonial compromise whereby the mandate power committed itself to guide the mandated territory to self determination and independence. And thus, it was the commitment of the French to guide Lebanon and Syria towards independence. And it was the commitment of the British to do the same in Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. In reference to Turkey and what was left of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were coerced to signing in their defeat, the Treaty of Sevres with the European powers in August 1920. And the Treaty of Sevres was a reflection of the European desire to punish the Turks, to enhance the prestige of the European powers, and to punish the Turks as an Asian power who had urged Muslims everywhere to rise against their European rulers. They must pay. The Greeks landed in Izmir in May 1919. This was an extreme humiliation for the Turkish people. Not just a foreign power, but a foreign power who, for centuries, had been under Turkish domination. There were demands of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia for an independent state of their own. The Turkish nationalist movement, for its part, demanded Turkish control of all the areas within the national boundaries that were inhabited by a Muslim majority at the time of the armistice that ended the war. The Treaty of Sevres was imposed on the Turks in August 1920, created the following extremely humiliating reality. There was to be an international regime for the Straits. There was to be an Armenian state in the east. There was a possibility of a Kurdish state in the east, too. There were Italian and French spheres of influence in southern Anatolia. Greek control of eastern Thrace and Izmir. And on top of all that, international financial controls over the Turkish economy. This was not only the end of empire, but the conversion of Turkey into a European semi-colonial dependency. The Turks rose in rebellion and waged, what for the Turks would be, a glorious war of liberation. And that Turkish war of liberation changed the reality on the ground to such an extent that Sevres became a dead letter and was replaced by another treaty later on. [BLANK_AUDIO]
