So what were the reservations that the British made in the McMahon correspondence? First of all, certain areas were excluded from the Arab state on the ground that they were not purely Arab. And this referred especially to the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo. British promises also related only to those portions of the territories wherein Great Britain was free to act without detriment to her ally, France. These reservations were cause for great controversy after the war especially on the question of Palestine. But it was not that the British has promised the same territories to different players, as many people often say, Palestine the twice-promised land It was not so. In fact, it was no real substantial discrepancy between the documents [FOREIGN] and the Hussein McMahon correspondence and thereafter the Belt of Declaration. Generally, the British had been quite consistent. The correspondence was just that. That is, it was just a correspondence. It was not an agreement, and there was one final agreement but just the presentation of positions. The Zionists and the British tended to argue for a long time that the exclusion of Palestine from the Arab state was on the basis of that sentence that speaks of the exclusion of the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hana, Homs, and Aleppo. But to explain the exclusion of Palestine on those grounds, it is impossible. The argument that the Zionists and their supporters made cannot be sustained by the text, nor the reality on the ground. What Zionists and their supporters did was to argue. That by the word districts, the documents meant the equivalent of the Ottoman province, Vilayet. And if as we see on the map, the Vilayet of Damascus, stretching all the way down, including what is today Transjordan. If one looks at the portions of Syria west to the Vilayet of Damascus, that would exclude Palestine if indeed the word districts refers to Vilayet. But as we can see on the map, Hama and Homs were not Vilayets. And to the west of the The Vilayet of Aleppo is only the Mediterranean sea. So the exclusion on the grounds that districts means Vilayet is impossible. And Palestine could not have been excluded on those grounds. What they did mean in the exclusion of the borders of Syria, laying to the west of that line, was to Mount Lebanon, and to the Midianite population in Mount Lebanon, who did not see themselves as Arabs. But then there is the other resolution. The sentence which says that the promises to the Arabs related only to those portions of the territories, where in Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her ally fronts. And it is in accordance with that sentence that Britain could not have promised Palestine to the Arab state without consulting France. After all, as we have seen, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine is an area in which the French share responsibility with the British. So the question is why for years did the British try to explain that the exclusion was on the basis of this impossible vilayets argument? They could have just said that Palestine was excluded because of the previous secret understanding with France. But in the aftermath of the first World War, to argue that the territories were excluded because they were not Arab, was in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Whereas to argue in the name of secret deals with the French, or other colonial powers were no longer politically correct in the aftermath of World War I. In the aftermath of World War I, with the rise of anti-colonial powers like the United States and the Soviet Union, it was no longer possible to argue according to the old imperial rules of secret agreements between great powers. Self determination was the name of the game. Also, according to the principles of President Wilson. And therefore, the argument to add exclusion or exclusion had to be made in the name of self determination. Even if, in terms of the documentation, they could not make sense. Whatever came of the Arab uprising that the British had hoped for? In their correspondence with Hussein bin Ali. Actually, not much. Hussein declared his revolt against the Ottomans in June 1916, accusing the Ottomans of their religious deviation. That is, they weren't Islamic enough. Too secular, too reformist. It was not really the name of [INAUDIBLE]. But, the great majority of Arabs did not rebel and they remained loyal to the empire and were very unwilling to join in an uprising against the Ottoman Sultan, who they still regarded as their religious leader. The Arab Revolt, therefore, was really not a great contribution to the war effort. The contribution was, indeed, very minor and in the words of TE Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia, the Arab Revolt was nothing but a side show of the side show. The British in Cairo had been unrealistic in their views about the attraction of Arab nationals. They had given our nationalism far more weight than the people in the Middle East themselves, and actually attached to it.
