In March 1963, the Ba'th ascended to power in Syria and this had revolutionary social and political implications. Perhaps inspired by their Ba'thi colleagues who had just risen to power in neighboring Iraq and as in the Egyptian and Iraqi cases, the army was the driving force of the revolution. But in Syria, even more than in Iraq and in Egypt, the social revolution was more far reaching. Like in Egypt, and Ba'thi Iraq it was a new elite group from the rural periphery that displaced the ruling landowning classes. But in Syria this was also linked to the overlap of sect and social class. The rise of the Alawis, a small minority of just 12% of the population, to power in Syria. It was the Ba'this and Alawis amongst the Ba'this who dominated the new regime. And this was especially true after the Neo-Ba'th, that is, the more radical Ba'th, came to power in 1966. And form then onwards, it was the Alawis who were very much in the driving seat of Syrian politics. The Sunni military leadership was already exhausted by previous struggles. And this paved the way for the way Alawis and the Ba'th party to rise to power. For the Alawis and the Ba'th secularism and secular politics was an important means for overcoming the disadvantage of their religious minority status in the Sunni majority country of Syria. For the Alawis and the Baʻath the army was their vehicle for social mobility and their rise to power, and the regime relied very heavily on the military and the security apparatus, in which they were a dominant force of Alawis and of Sunnis, but from the periphery of Syria rather than the urban Sunnis. The ousting of the urban Sunnis was the key result of this rise of the Alawis and the Ba'th to power. The urban Sunnis were finally ousted from their historical dominant status. And this was a historical and radical change in the balance of power. The Alawis after all, were the historically downtrodden under class at the very bottom of the Syrian social ladder and it was they who had now come to power. And Hafiz al-Asad from November 1970 was the strongman of the Syrian state and who strengthened the regime through the vehicle of a very powerful presidency. According to the 1973 constitution, all power was invested in the President without any real separation of powers. And therefore, the Syrian motto was, a strong presidency, a ruling party affiliated with the regime that is the Ba'th. And a policy, at least idealog-, ideologically of Arab socialism. But rather than ideology, these were tools for regime control, very similar to the Soviet model. The Ba'th party was just an instrument for mass mobilization and government control. It was not about popular representation. There was a special meaning of this rule of the Alawis. In the eyes of the Sunni urban class, the Alawis were these coarse mountaineers who were hardly expected ever to become the rulers of Syria, and what made matters much worse was the fact that the Alawis were not really Muslims in the true sense of the word. Amongst the Sunnis there was a natural opposition to the secularism of the Ba'th and also its sectarian Alawis nature. And the opposition was most forcefully expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria which was banned in 1963 after the Ba'th rose to power. But there was an uprising in Hama in 1964, led by the brethren and suppressed, but armed resistance and repression continued. In 1969, the regime removed from the constitution that clause, which required that the president of the state be a Muslim. Therefore, making it much easier for the Alawis, a breakaway sect from Shia, to be in the seat of the presidency. But this clause, requiring the president to be a Muslim was reinstated by Hafiz al-Asad after he became president. And in the 1973 constitution, this clause on the presidency was reinstated along with a political arrangement with the leader of the Shiite community in Lebanon, al-Sadar, who accepted the Alawis as Shihs and therefore as Muslims eligible for the presidency. These maneuvers obviously did not satisfy the Muslim Brotherhood. And the reaction was a rebellion led by the Brotherhood, a jihad, against the Ba'thi regime that was waged from 1976 onwards. The brethren engaged in the killing of regime officials and supporters. Riots in the cities of Aleppo, Hamah, and Homs. And they were eventually crushed by the Ba'thi regime in 1982. The crashing of the Muslim brethren Hama was done by the shelling of their last redoubt in February 1982, reportedly killing thousands, maybe even tens of thousands. But it was this ruthlessness of the Ba'thi dictatorship that established stable government in Syria for the first time since independence. And until his death in 2000, Hafiz al-Asad ruled with a high head, and then was successfully succeeded by his son, Bashar. For a most unstable state, and one over which others competed, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad was transformed into a regional power with a dominant position in neighboring Lebanon, and a leading role in the continuing conflict with Israel. As for the Syrian economy, since the rise of the Ba'th, economic change was accelerated much more by the demands of population growth and by the sociologist ideology of the revolution. And the population increased from 3 million in during the 1940s to 9 million in the 1980s, to 14 million in the 1990s, and to 23 million in 2013. Syria was in urgent need for greater industrialization. Agricultural reform and nationalization had been effectively employed to destroy the old elites. Rapid urbanization in India, industrialization led to agriculture losing much of its importance in the Syrian economy. By 1971, industry had surpassed agriculture in its contribution to the Syrian GDP. But in the end, Syria's economy could not meet the economic challenge effectively, and there can be no doubt that the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 in Syria, just like in other countries, had powerful economic causes.
