5.4.2 Lebanon's Civil Wars - Part 2

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From the course by Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

284 ratings

Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

284 ratings

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome) Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

From the lesson

WEEK 1

Independence and revolutionary politics in the Arab world

V. Arab Independence and Revolution1:48

5.1.1 Egypt: Crisis and Revolution - Part 18:25

5.1.2 Egypt: Crisis and Revolution - Part 26:21

5.2.1 Iraq from the Overthrow of the Hashemites to Saddam Hussein - Part 18:18

5.2.2 Iraq from the Overthrow of the Hashemites to Saddam Hussein - Part 27:29

5.3.1 Syria's Prolonged Instability - Part 18:29

5.3.2 Syria's Prolonged Instability - Part 28:15

5.4.1 Lebanon's Civil Wars - Part 17:28

5.4.2 Lebanon's Civil Wars - Part 29:55

5.5. The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies3:37

5.5.1.1 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Jordan - Part 19:06

5.5.1.2 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Jordan - Part 27:57

5.5.2 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Saudi Arabia8:13

5.6 The Arab Cold War2:16

Meet the Instructors

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

Demographic changes continued to undermine the Christian communities, while

the system preferring the now nonexistent Christian majority remained unchanged,

much to the disaffection of the Muslim community, both Sunni and Shiite.

The Palestinian refugee population, which had arrived in Lebanon in 1948.

At that time, some 150,000,

whose numbers steadily increased with time to over 300,000.

And who were kept in refugee camps and were not integrated into the Lebanese

population, contributed further to the destabilization of the Lebanese system.

In the late 1960s, Palestinian armed groups concentrated

in Lebanon's refugee camps and established basis of operations

against Israel in Southern Lebanon leading in turn to Israeli,

Israeli retaliation strikes against targets in Lebanon.

After the civil war in Jordan, in 1970, 71, and

the consequent expulsion of Palestinian fighting forces from there, Lebanon became

the Palestinian's sole semi-autonomous base of operations against Israel.

[SOUND] This created internal Lebanese tensions.

Between the Sunnis, who prefer to see Lebanon as an Arab state,

deeply committed to the conflict with Israel,

and therefore supportive of the Palestinian struggle waged from Lebanon.

As opposed to the Maronites, who saw Lebanon as a Christian-dominated,

pro-Western state that had no real interest in the fight with Israel.

[SOUND] Thus, a combination of domestic tensions and external factors contributed

to the eventual outbreak of civil war, yet again, in Lebanon.

In April 1975, clashes erupted between Palestinian forces and

the Maronite, Phalange militia which rapidly degenerated into

a more general conflict between Christians and Muslims.

The Lebanese army could not be counted on to restore order.

The Lebanese army collapsed as many of its men joined the rival forces in

the civil war according to their respective sectarian origins.

[SOUND] Syria however, was now strong and stable under Hafiz Asad.

And it was Syrian intervention that brought the first phase of the war to its

conclusion.

More surprisingly, Syria intervened in May 1976 on behalf of the Christians,

who were facing defeat by the Palestinians and the radical Sunni Muslim alliance.

After all, Syria as a radical state in the conflict with Israel,

could be expected to side with the Palestinians against the Maronites.

But in May 1976, the Syrians did precisely the opposite.

[SOUND] Syria took advantage of the war to enhance its regional clout and

prestige by assuming virtual control of Lebanon.

Syria was presumably also concerned that a radical takeover of Lebanon

would expose Syria to possible war with Israel at a time not of Syria's choosing.

Syria could hardly allow the Palestinians in Lebanon the leeway to make

decisions that could have far reaching effect on Syria's national security.

[SOUND] As a result of the civil war, Lebanon was now

informally divided into its various sectarian strongholds.

The Maronites, under the leadership of Bashir al-Jumayyil,

sought to reassert Maronite supremacy in an alliance with Israel.

Israel, like the Maronites,

was opposed to the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon.

Israel and the Palestinians frequently traded blows, and in the summer of 1982,

Israel invaded Lebanon with the objective of removing

the Palestinian fighting forces from their stronghold there.

Israel also sought to revive Maronite supremacy in Lebanon.

And seem to be achieving its objectives when Bashir al-Jumayyil was elected

president in August 1982 as Israel occupied Beirut.

[SOUND] The bulk of the Palestinian fighting forces were compelled

to withdraw from Lebanon in early September, to be dispersed in

various distant Arab states and Israel seemed to be having its way.

But Syria would not let that be.

Bashir was assassinated by operatives on Syria's behalf

in mid-September resulting in the notorious Maronite massacre of revenge,

against Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut.

Since the Israeli military was still present in the area,

many accusations were leveled against Israel for not doing what

it was believed that it should have or could have done to prevent the massacre.

Bashir al-Jumayyil was replaced by his brother Amin as president of Lebanon.

But Amin and Bashir, though brothers,

were similar in their divergent outlooks to Bishara al-Khuri and

Emile Edde of the 1930s and the 1940s.

[SOUND] Amin Jumayyil, like Bishara al-Khuri before him,

believed in the securing of the Maronites in an agreement with the Arab world,

which in the new circumstances meant subservience to Syria.

Bishir had sought an alliance with Israel,

which replaced France as had been the case in Edde's formula of old.

But the assassination of Bashir, and the massacre in Sabra and

Shatila had emptied the Maronite Israeli alliance of any practical content.

[SOUND] Israel wanted no more to do with Lebanese domestic affairs, and

restricted its interest in Lebanon to the defense of its northern border.

Israel therefore withdrew from Lebanon in 1985,

except from a narrow security zone in the south.

And it finally withdrew from there too in 2000.

In the meantime, as the Maronites continued their political decline,

the Shiites shifted from the periphery to the center of Lebanese politics.

[SOUND] Syria was now the hegemonic power in most of Lebanon

until it finally withdrew its forces in 2005.

Socioeconomic developments of the 1050s and

the 1960s led many Shih's to migrate from their traditional locations in the South.

And in the Boecker that is Eastern Lebanon to the capital of Beirut.

Their rate of natural increase outstripped that of other communities, and

they displaced the Maronites as the most populous community in the country.

[SOUND] By the mid 1970s, all Christians, Maronites and

other Christian minorities, were hardly 40% of the total.

And under the charismatic leadership, in the 1960s and 1970s,

of the Shiite cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the community became considerably

more assertive in demanding their fair share of the Lebanese pie,

in accordance with their increasing demographic weight.

[SOUND] The civil war further enhanced Shi'ite political assertiveness,

as they formed their own militia's, first Amal, and then Hizballah.

Which became the major Shi'ite force, politically and militarily in the 1980s.

In April 1985, the Shiites took over West Beirut, thus physically

cementing their growing power at the very center of Lebanese politics.

The civil war finally came to an end in 1989 with the signing of the Ta'if Accord.

Ta'if, that is, the city in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia and other Arab States

were those who gave their auspices to the new agreement on peace in Lebanon.

The Ta'if Accords formalized the ascendance of the Shi'ites.

In the 1943 national pact, they were only third in line, as we remember.

And received the crowns left to them by the Maronites and the Sunnis.

But now, they were formally underpowered by the Maronites and the Sunnis.

And that was only formally, because in fact,

they were the most powerful community in Lebanon.

Both demographically and politically.

Backed by the punch of their armed militia.

For which the Lebanese army is no match and for

which no other community had any answer.

And to that, one must of course add,

Syria's managing influence over Lebanese politics at the time.

[SOUND] Christian dominated Lebanon, under the hegemony of the Maronites,

as established in greater Lebanon of 1920, does not exist any longer.

If the quest, if the question once was, is Lebanon an Arab state or

a Christian dominated pro-Western country.

The question now is, is Lebanon still part of the Sunni Arab world?

Or is it becoming a client or an outpost of non-Arab, Shiite Iran?

Thanks to the preeminence of Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanese politics.

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