7.1.2 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 2

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The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

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Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

272 ratings

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome) Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

From the lesson

WEEK 3

The escalation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1973

7.1.1 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 110:00

7.1.2 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 25:41

7.1.3 From 1949 to the Suez War - Part 37:03

7.2.1 The Revival of the Palestinian Identity - Part 18:14

7.2.2 The Revival of the Palestinian Identity - Part 27:33

7.3.1 The Deterioration to War in 1967 - Part 18:38

7.3.2 The Deterioration to War in 1967 - Part 24:40

7.3.3 The Deterioration to War in 1967 - Part 39:59

7.4 The Palestinian Struggle from Jordan6:16

7.5 Black September8:10

7.6 The War of Attrition, 1968-707:31

Meet the Instructors

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

Israel would not budge on two issues, borders or refugees.

Both of these were the guiding principles of Israeli policy to preserve

the gains it had made in the War of 1948.

But in fact neither Israel nor

Egypt really believed that they could achieve a deal in 1955 when these

western powers were thinking of such an agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Both Egypt and

Israel firmly believed that the other side was actually looking for a fight.

And as a result Israel's Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and

the Chief of Staff at the time, Moshe Dayan, were already beginning to think

of the need to pre-empt a possible Egyptian attack.

Nasser was very popular in the Arab world and he was un, unquestionably

the most popular and charismatic leader in the Arab world of the 1950s, and

perhaps in the Arab world of the 20th century in its entirety.

And Israel therefore was greatly concerned of the development of Egyptian power.

And there was tension on the borders, both with Jordan and with Egypt, because of

these constant infiltrations coming from both of these countries into Israel.

And as a result of the infiltrations, whether it be for civilian purposes or for

attacks on Israelis, they resulted in Israeli acts of retaliation against these

countries, Jordan and Egypt, in an effort to compel the Arabs to accept the finality

of the boundaries that had been created in 1948.

This tension between Israel and

the neighboring Arab states, Jordan and Egypt in particular,

led eventually to the signing of an arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia.

And Czechoslovakia in 1955 essentially means the Soviet Union.

An arms deal between Czechoslovakia, that is the Soviet Union, and

Egypt in September of 1955.

This was an arms deal that changed the balance of power between Israel and Egypt.

It was extremely troubling from the Israeli point of view.

Here there was Egypt with its hostile intentions toward Israel, so the Israelis

firmly believed, arming itself with the most modern of Soviet weaponry,

whether it was in terms of air power or the armored corps of the Egyptian army.

The Soviet Union made a huge political diplomatic

gain by connecting with Egypt, trying to divert Egypt away

from any thoughts of an alliance with the Western powers against the Soviet Union.

And for Abdel Nasser the arms deal from the Soviet Union

was of huge symbolic and historical importance.

Arms from the Soviet Union meant the ultimate liberation of Egypt after

more than a 150 years of subservience and dependence on the West,

the ultimate liberation of Egypt from Western dependence.

Israel was now in a difficult spot.

Israel turned to the United States in an effort to obtain arms from the US

that would balance the Soviet deal with Egypt.

But the United States refused.

Israel in the 1950s was not the ally of the United States as it is in the present.

The United States in the 1950s tended to see Israel

as much more of a liability than an asset.

Supporting Israel, so the US feared,

would push the Arabs ever further into the arms of the Soviet Union.

Israel had to look for the other, other alternatives.

And what was available was the option of France.

And why France in the mid-1950s?

Between Israel and France of the mid-1950s there was a common interest.

The common interest was around the figure of Abdul Nasser and the power of Egypt.

In the mid-1950s,

the French were fighting to suppress the Algerian war of liberation.

The Algerians fighting to liberate themselves from the control of France

were strongly supported by the Egypt of Abdel Nasser.

And therefore Abdel Nasser was seen by the French as an enemy

just as the Israelis saw him as such.

And as the escalation along the border with Egypt continued,

Ben-Gurion's fear only increased that Nasser would attack Israel first.

And therefore in the late months of 1956,

there were very serious French-Israeli discussions about a joint

operation to attack their common enemy, Egypt of Abdul Nasser.

Now in the second half of 1956, Nasser

was suspected of moving very firmly into the Soviet camp.

And on the 19th of July, the United States refused

to supply Egypt with aid for the building of the Aswan Dam.

And the Aswan Dam, as we have already mentioned, was this seemingly panacea for

the ills of Egypt's economy and modernization.

And Nasser retaliated a week later

by nationalizing the British-French Suez Canal Company.

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