Israel would not budge on two issues, borders or refugees. Both of these were the guiding principles of Israeli policy to preserve the gains it had made in the War of 1948. But in fact neither Israel nor Egypt really believed that they could achieve a deal in 1955 when these western powers were thinking of such an agreement between Israel and Egypt. Both Egypt and Israel firmly believed that the other side was actually looking for a fight. And as a result Israel's Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and the Chief of Staff at the time, Moshe Dayan, were already beginning to think of the need to pre-empt a possible Egyptian attack. Nasser was very popular in the Arab world and he was un, unquestionably the most popular and charismatic leader in the Arab world of the 1950s, and perhaps in the Arab world of the 20th century in its entirety. And Israel therefore was greatly concerned of the development of Egyptian power. And there was tension on the borders, both with Jordan and with Egypt, because of these constant infiltrations coming from both of these countries into Israel. And as a result of the infiltrations, whether it be for civilian purposes or for attacks on Israelis, they resulted in Israeli acts of retaliation against these countries, Jordan and Egypt, in an effort to compel the Arabs to accept the finality of the boundaries that had been created in 1948. This tension between Israel and the neighboring Arab states, Jordan and Egypt in particular, led eventually to the signing of an arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. And Czechoslovakia in 1955 essentially means the Soviet Union. An arms deal between Czechoslovakia, that is the Soviet Union, and Egypt in September of 1955. This was an arms deal that changed the balance of power between Israel and Egypt. It was extremely troubling from the Israeli point of view. Here there was Egypt with its hostile intentions toward Israel, so the Israelis firmly believed, arming itself with the most modern of Soviet weaponry, whether it was in terms of air power or the armored corps of the Egyptian army. The Soviet Union made a huge political diplomatic gain by connecting with Egypt, trying to divert Egypt away from any thoughts of an alliance with the Western powers against the Soviet Union. And for Abdel Nasser the arms deal from the Soviet Union was of huge symbolic and historical importance. Arms from the Soviet Union meant the ultimate liberation of Egypt after more than a 150 years of subservience and dependence on the West, the ultimate liberation of Egypt from Western dependence. Israel was now in a difficult spot. Israel turned to the United States in an effort to obtain arms from the US that would balance the Soviet deal with Egypt. But the United States refused. Israel in the 1950s was not the ally of the United States as it is in the present. The United States in the 1950s tended to see Israel as much more of a liability than an asset. Supporting Israel, so the US feared, would push the Arabs ever further into the arms of the Soviet Union. Israel had to look for the other, other alternatives. And what was available was the option of France. And why France in the mid-1950s? Between Israel and France of the mid-1950s there was a common interest. The common interest was around the figure of Abdul Nasser and the power of Egypt. In the mid-1950s, the French were fighting to suppress the Algerian war of liberation. The Algerians fighting to liberate themselves from the control of France were strongly supported by the Egypt of Abdel Nasser. And therefore Abdel Nasser was seen by the French as an enemy just as the Israelis saw him as such. And as the escalation along the border with Egypt continued, Ben-Gurion's fear only increased that Nasser would attack Israel first. And therefore in the late months of 1956, there were very serious French-Israeli discussions about a joint operation to attack their common enemy, Egypt of Abdul Nasser. Now in the second half of 1956, Nasser was suspected of moving very firmly into the Soviet camp. And on the 19th of July, the United States refused to supply Egypt with aid for the building of the Aswan Dam. And the Aswan Dam, as we have already mentioned, was this seemingly panacea for the ills of Egypt's economy and modernization. And Nasser retaliated a week later by nationalizing the British-French Suez Canal Company.
