The disappointment with Arab Nationalism that lent its impetus to the emergence of territorial identities and their promotion in some of the Arab states, was also the background for a very different development and that is the revival of Islamic qualities. The disappointment with secular nationalism and of Nasser's defeat was also the background for the emergence of the Islamic political revival. The panacea that Nasser's improved not to be the huge political setback as a result of the war in 1967. If added to the economic Malays, that developing the Arab country as a result of the process of development and modernization, population grows and massive urbanization were all at the background to these rise of the political Islam. As James Piscatori has mentioned, most rural migrants to the Arab cities, quickly became the urban poor, victims of their own hope, swallowed by the very process which they believed would liberate them. This sense of not belonging, was clearly connected to the turn to religion. Migration from the countryside generally help to spread rule attitudes in the cities and this meant particularly the greater emphasis on religious tradition amongst other classes too religious instinct ran deep. And this was especially so after the second ideologies like Nasserism and Baathism had failed to deliver. The ideological Underpinnings of the Islamist Trend were related, first and foremost, to the opposition to secularist modernization and secular nationalism and territorialism. What it was that they were after it was not against modernity and nationalism, but modernity and nationalism without their secularist thrust. The Islamist sought modernity, raft in the preservation of traditional identities, norms, and values, the need to base society on Islamic law. Since the late 19th century, there were three main theories that came to explain the relative weakness of Muslim societies in comparison to the west. The one was that the decline was the result of the deviation from true Islam. And that true Islam correctly interpreted did not conflict with Western ideas, and rationalism, and science. These were the Islamic reformers of the late 19th century. Like [UNKNOWN], and Mohammed Abdu. Those to whom we referred at great length earlier on in our course. A second explanation was that the relative weakness of the Muslim world was the fault of Islam, itself, and that Islam, itself, was used as an obstacle to change and revival. This is the attitude we could directly relate to secularists like Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of secular Republic of Turkey. And then there was the third school, those who argued that the retreat of the Muslim world was because of the intoxication with the West. That is not because they were not western enough but that the Muslims have gone too far in the process of westernization as Hasan al-Banna the founding father of the Muslim Brethren or the revolutionaries in Iran would argue. In their view, the Islamic modernists had failed because they themselves were too Western-oriented, seeking to establish Islamic justifications for Western-inspired reform. These new critics of Westernization thought in terms of a return to the idea of Islamic self-sufficiency, that which the modernists like of Ani and Abdu have begun to doubt. Islam is the solution claimed Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brethren 1928. But it was perhaps the key ideological Muslim Brethren in Egypt Sayyid Qutb who lived from 1906 to 1966. The year in which he was hanged by the Nazarite regime in Europe. Qutb wrote considerably more than Hassan al-Banna, and it was he who became the main ideologue of the Muslim Brethren in the second part of the 20th century. Qutb expanded on the theme of the new Jahiliyya. The new Jahiliyya was a term that was coined by the Pakistani Muslim thinker, Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, who lived from 1903 to 1979. And it is he who developed the concept of what was called a Jahiliyya society. And what did all this mean? The Jahiliyya is that period of barbarism and ignorance in the Muslim belief that preceded the advent of Islam. Therefore, societies that were described in the present as Jahiliyya societies were societies that were un-Islamic, societies that were not governed by the Sharia, by Islamic religious law. The new Jahiliyya therefore, was about the present not the past that preceded the advent of Islam. Jahiliyya therefore according to Mawdudi and followed by Kudu was not a period of history but a condition, a state of affairs which could apply to the present as well. They could be no coalescence and compromise with western thought. But the west should be rejected because of it's secular permissive and materialistic ways. Cotum went through a process of radicalization during his imprisonment before his execution by the Nasserite regime. And according to Cotum's more radical thinking, he justified the use of jihad, holy war and revolution, to overthrow these infidel regimes, that is, regimes that did not implement the Sharia. They were jihadi regimes or infidel regimes, those that because of their unbelief should be overthrown even by revolution. And Cotum therefore, for these beliefs, was imprisoned under the Nasserite regime, and as we have mentioned, hanged in 1966. According to James Gelvin, these new radical Islamists were able to counterpose their own brand of cultural authenticity as represented by Islam to the imported secular nationals: creeds, which, they argued, brought nothing but oppression, economic stagnation, and defeat to the region. So what were the specific complaints of these new radical Islamists? They argued against the marginalization of religion, politics, law, and society. They dismissed and disagreed with what they called the cult of the nation-state and its leadership. Nothing less than a form of heresy that is the cult and the belief in the leadership of the state rather than belief in religion and God. The state monopoly over education was unacceptable because it was devoid of Islamic values. The mass media that were controlled by the state spread permissiveness and generally on Islamic valued the countries like Egypt and others were open to the Western Economy and globalization. Leading to corruption and to a consumer society that began to look like the dismissive societies of the west, that they referred to as Coca-Cola societies. The real enemy, they argued, was from within. That is, the regime itself. This infidel regime that had to be removed even before the struggle against Israel. And these new radical Islamists had an ever increasing influence on the Islamization of Arab societies in the latter part of the 20th century.
