9.3.2.2 The "Arab Spring": Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Libya - Part 2

Loading...

From the course by Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

248 ratings

Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

248 ratings

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

From the lesson

WEEK 5

The Middle East from 1967 to the present including the Arab Spring

9.1.1 The Post-1967 Middle East: The Victory of State Interest - Part 110:02

9.1.2 The Post-1967 Middle East: The Victory of State Interest - Part 27:59

9.2 The Islamic Revival8:35

9.2.1.1 The Islamic Revival in Egypt, Syria and Iraq - Part 14:52

9.2.1.2 The Islamic Revival in Egypt, Syria and Iraq - Part 26:34

9.2.2 The Examples of Jordan, Algeria and the Palestinians8:04

9.3.1.1 The "Arab Spring": Modernity and Tradition - Part 15:22

9.3.1.2 The "Arab Spring": Modernity and Tradition - Part 211:30

9.3.2.1 The "Arab Spring": Egypt and Tunisia - Part 15:54

9.3.2.2 The "Arab Spring": Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Libya - Part 211:49

9.4.1 The Non-Arab Countries - The Republic of Turkey : From WWII to the Present11:42

9.4.2.1 The Non-Arab Countries - Iran: From the Pahlavi Dynasty to the Islamic Republic - Part 16:38

9.4.2.2 The Non-Arab Countries - Iran: From the Pahlavi Dynasty to the Islamic Republic - Part 26:45

9.5 Concluding Overview3:40

Meet the Instructors

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

In Syria of the Arab Spring, it is very much a story of sectarian politics.

Syria under Hafiz al-Asad was a country in which domestic stability was secured

from the early 1980s.

For the next 30 years, however, under his successor,

Bashar al-Asad, beginning in June, 2000,

Syria was never as effectively governed as it had been by his father.

And with the arrival of the Arab Spring protests in March 2011,

Syria progressively spun out of control with disastrous humanitarian consequences.

What began as a minor protest by disgruntled peasants and

workers in Syria's rural backwater soon mushroomed into a full-scale

sectarian civil war the end of which is presently nowhere in sight.

The opposition in Syria is,

needless to say, composed mainly of representatives of the Sunni majority.

But not all Sunni's are firmly allied with the opposition and the regime still enjoys

support among urban Sunnis who have largely remained neutral and uncommitted.

A myriad of Sunni organizations make up the bulk of a very desperate opposition.

In the meantime, Syria is no longer the unitary state it once was.

It might recover if Assad wins in the end, and it could disintegrate if he does not,

with a variety of partial and decentralized options in between.

Presently, the country is divided into a number of zones of control.

The regime has lost control of the border area with Turkey, which is divided

into two different zones, one in the northwest controlled by the rebels,

in which Aleppo is still contested territory.

And the other in the northeast controlled by Syria's long marginalized and

newly assertive Kurds.

The rebels also control much of the Jazira area in the east.

Including the towns Al-Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor.

The regime still controls the capital, Damascus, although not entirely, important

sections of the border area with Lebanon, and the northwestern coastal area,

which is predominantly territory populated by the ruling Alawi minority.

In sum, the territorial identities that were cultivated by the regimes in Iraq and

Syria have proved to have been very thin veneers.

Behind the territorialist's facade,

the regimes in question were sectarian to the core.

Just like the Tikriti group that ruled in Iraq,

the Syrian Ba'athi regime was dominated, though obviously not exclusively,

by the Assads and their allies from the Alawi community.

The intimate cohesion of these minorities in power

was a source of great stability and reliability as long as they lasted.

But once they lost their unbridled control,

the sectarian genie was let out of the bottle.

The oppressed and the oppressors changed places as in Iraq, or

fought it out inconclusively so far as it is in Syria.

The Arab Spring had initially emboldened the Jordanian opposition but

the outcomes of the revolutions in countries like Egypt and

especially the bloodbath in Syria, were horrifying to most Jordanians.

Even opponents of the monarchy in Jordan tend to see the Hashemite regime

as the thing that holds the country all together.

The situation therefore in Jordan, remains manageable,

as long as the unswerving loyalty of the security establishment lasts.

The capacity of the regime to continue muddling through will depend more on its

ability to deal effectively with the economy than on any other single factor,

including the pace of political reform.

Yemen and Libya, where tribalism is so deep rooted, and stateness so

extremely long, they are at the other end of this spectrum.

After the removal of Ali Abdallah Saleh in Yemen and the removal of Muammar Qadhafi

in Libya, both countries have degenerated into empty shells of formerly sovereign

entities as competing tribal militias jockey for position, often violently.

Yemen and Libya are extreme cases of countries that might break up.

Yemen might eventually lead to the reconstitution

of the division of the country into north and south Yemen as,

as had been the situation before the unification of the two in 1990.

Libya is very low in components of statehood.

It has most ineffective state institutions and is torn asunder by tribal identities.

Split also between Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.

Those three territories that were thrust together in the creation of Libya

by the western allies in 1951.

Its oil wealth is unequally distributed between the three provinces, very

much in favor of Cyrenaica, another factor which may precipitate the dissolution of

the state, as warring tribes compete for control of the country's resources.

According to some Jordanian ambassadors quoted in the Jordanian media,

Libya remains the tribal society it was in 1951, when it became independent.

As a political concept, they say, Libya for

many of its citizens remains limited to tribes, family, or province.

The notion of a unified system of political checks and

balances remains terra incognita.

So these Jordanian ambassadors claim.

As we look at the Arab Spring in perspective, Arabism and

the Arab state have been challenged in recent years.

More than they have been for the entire century that has passed.

During the 20th century, Arab nationalism and the formation of the Arab state

were the two most important processes that governed Arab politics for

much of the 20th century.

Arabism has failed for the most part, and the Arab state,

presently, is being challenged in terms of its cohesion and integrity, perhaps

more than at any time since the Arab state system was formed a century ago.

Explore our Catalog

Join for free and get personalized recommendations, updates and offers.

Coursera provides universal access to the world’s best education, partnering with top universities and organizations to offer courses online.

© 2018 Coursera Inc. All rights reserved.

Download on the App Store

Get it on Google Play