[MUSIC] Anna, hi. >> Oh hello. >> Here we are again for our third office hour. I've been looking through the discussion forums and I know you have too. There's lots of material out there. Very interesting questions. So. Why don't we get started? >> Okay, great. So the first one of the hot topics on the forums is about people want to know about the students that were in the lectures and I know we might not disclose their identities per say, but maybe you can tell us a little bit about the students because people are very curious. >> Sure. They were both people who had undergraduate degrees in political science, neither of them from Yale. Okay. >> One is from Eastern Europe and one is from, the U.S. as they could probably tell from their accents. But, we, we selected them partly to have them be at sort of an equivalent stage of many of the people who would be taking the course. And we thought it was important to have representation from not just the U.S. obviously given in their. International character of this course, but somebody who would bring a different perspective, as well. >> Great. So I have a question that we got about the last office hours. So during the office hours, we were talking about we were talking about Marxism, and different alternative. Political economies that have, have arisen in like, you know, last years of the world order. And, and you said at some point that, we were talking about whether Islamic, Islamic, there's like an Islamic political economy. >> Mm-hm. >> And you said that there wasn't, or there, you said. You literally said there's no Islamic fundamentalist political economy. So somebody pushed back on that a little bit in the forums and I was wondering if you wanted to respond. >> Well, I mean, there's certainly economic debates within Islam and it's certainly the case that, that different people have different views about what they. The you know, the implications for the economy would be of, of a commitment to Islam. And huge debates about that. But if you look at, at the real world, which is what I had in mind. If you look at countries like Afghanistan or Iran where Islamic movements have come to power. They've not fundamentally re-ordered their economies of those countries. They have private property, they have accumulation of capital, they have wage labor. They've not attempted anything like the economic transformation that we saw when communism came to power. So it's in that sense they are attempting basically to operate market based capitalist systems. >> Mm-hm. >> However, success rate is another matter. >> Okay. Good. So another more general question that I have is that students were also curious. Something that happens a lot in the forums that I see is that. There is debate and sometimes confusion about political terms. There's so many, there's so much terminology we use in this course and any political theory course is going to be using terms that in the mainstream often get abused. And there's a lot of confusion around them. So. Is there like a place people can go for a glossary of, of, you know, the terms of political theory? Is there a place that people can find? Where is a good place to go as a resource? >> You know, I think there really isn't. And, and if you, if you think about the, the traditions we've looked at so far. The utilitarian tradition, which revolves around the idea of, of happiness. The Marxist tradition which revolves around the idea of exploitation. And the social contract tradition that revolves around the idea of consent. Part, part of what we're showing as we work our way through these traditions is. The evolution and the meanings of these terms since their classical formulations way back when. And that they, there's no standard definition of consent any more than there's a standard definition of exploitation. Rather part of what makes these traditions, traditions. We'll see this when we get to Alistair McIntyre in a little while. He, he includes this in the very definition of the idea of a tradition is that people argue over the meanings of its constituent terms. And so it's just not the case that you can, you can look it up in a, in some place and, and have the definitive account of what it means. And I think. You know, that comes with the territory here. >> Mm-hm. [CROSSTALK]. >> If, if anybody can find a glossary out there. >> Let us, let us know. >> They, well, I think they should be pretty skeptical of it. >> Oh, I see. Yeah. >> Yeah. Don't trust it cause it's always going to come from a certain perspective. >> Yeah. >> So a couple questions about, we talked about Locke, we had talked about Locke in the first lecture in the social contract, segment of the course, and you talked about issues of obedience, so we got a few, questions on that. So. According to Locke in the lectures you talk about the fact that obedience to the government is conditional. But then there's also the fact that we can't know for sure if we really, if we're right about our obligation to revolt in a certain situation. And so it seems like. Because we can never know for sure, we, we can't really with justification revolt, or this is question that I, that I got from a student. So on a practical level it seems like the ob, obedience to the government is very in. In practice, it is close to absolute for Locke. So wa, what would you say to that or what might Locke say? >> Well I think that's not right. >> Okay. >> I mean after all Locke, at the end of the day, did support the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which was about overthrowing the government. And there's clearly. Not only a philosophical right to revolution that he affirms but that he actually believed in real politics. There was a political right to revolution, and he acted on it. So that, that, let me just back up. The, there are two different reasons why one might want to withdraw allegiance to the government from Locke's point of view. One is if the basis for your having giving consent has been destroyed. And so you feel that the state is violating its ob-, fiduciary obligation to you. The second is if, if you think if you conclude that the state is actually violating natural law. In which cause, you not only perhaps have the right to resist, you might even have an obligation to resist. Okay? Now in the first case you a, you are sovereign over your own. Consent. >> Mm-hm. >> So there's no question about who might be in a position to second guess that you, you face the risk that others might not agree with you. And, and then you're going to be in a minority. And if that happens you have to internalize that cost and you may be tried for treason and executed. And so that's, the sort of prudential reason why Locke says don't do it unless there's been a long train of abuses all tending the same direction. Partly because that's main, it's going to make it more likely that others are going to feel oppressed as well and you'll turn out to be in the majority. As far as the the decision that the state, the sovereign is violating natural law where you might have not only a right, but an obligation. It's based on your reading of the scriptures. You know that I, I, I went on at some length about locke's. You know, completely clear that there are points of ambiguity in the scriptures and when there are God speaks di, directly to each reader about, through the text. And if you read them to say. We have to resist the state and I read them to say, no we don't. He's, you know, the revolutionary thing, ro, Locke says is there's no earthly authority who can settle out disagreement. If I'm, if I get it right and you get it wrong but I'm in the minority, it's going to play out the same way as with, with withdrawing my consent. I'm going to lose. You know, Locke says, not so bad, this life is short, you'll get your reward in heaven but you know, that is his view. He's very clear that, that people can withdraw consent. >> Okay. >> Okay. Yeah. >> So this minority, majority question that the. >> Mm-hm. >> Kind of feasibility of the revolution is interesting. And that, this came up as well. So we had a student bring up an example that recently, there was a social movement in Pakistan demanding electoral reforms and the res, resignation of the Prime Minister. But it, it fizzled out. >> Mm-hm, mm-hm. >> Pretty quickly. And so the student brought up the idea that the majority may have actually supported this movement but not actively. They were kind of an implicit part of the majority. >> Mm-hm. >> And so, so the, the movement wasn't successful. But it might have still been that most of the, most of the country actually wanted what they wanted. So then what does Locke say in such a case. So, does the fact of how many people are in the movement make it more legitimate or not? So the fact that it's a minority because you were just saying that somebody might be right but be in the minority which I think it actually answers this question. It doesn't matter how many people are part of the revolt. That's so the feasibility question is different from the legitimacy question of the revolt. In these cases because they fizzle out because there aren't enough people. Does that make them less legitimate? It's, even if there are people supporting it who aren't actively participating. >> Well, let's, let's put it this way. They're two different questions for Locke. One is he's speaking to you as an individual, and you're trying to decide whether or not to act on your belief that you, you're entitled to overthrow the government. He's saying if you're convinced you're right there's nobody who's entitled to tell you you're wrong. You may lose politically in this life, but you'll get your reward in the next life. So, it's not so bad. You know, that, that's what he's saying to you politically. Then he's also saying if, if you're worried about prevailing in this life, you better think long and hard, because unless others agree with you enough in order to man the barricades with you, you're going to lose. Or so, and that's the point about the long train of abuses all tending in the same direction. If, if that hasn't happened it's probably unwise. To make that move that's a prudent, you know. But if your morality tells you, you know, like sort of like, in a way, Locke is a kind of Lutheran. Here I stand, I can do no other. Then so be it. The political legitimacy I want to defer that question because when we get into the democratic tradition and, and different arguments for majority rule we'll look at why Locke believes majority rule is the only basis for political legitimacy in this world. And it's one argument for majority rule, not the only one, but it, we will unpack his account of that next week. >> Okay, great. So, now I want to move to some questions about Nozick. >> Yeah. >> Especially, there was some confusion surrounding his arguments about how independents are incorporated. >> Yeah. >> And if they are compensated, and how. So we had one of the quiz questions was about it was question 13. And I'm just going to read it. . >> Mm-hm. Because it might help us if you can explain the answer to this question in order to get into the topic. So the question was, in Nozick's theory of the minimal state how are independents compensated for having their rights violated by being forcibly incorporated into the state. And the options were money, tax deductions, special laws permitting militias or none of the above. And the, and the correct answer was none of the above. So if, so maybe you can explain why it was none of these things or how people are compensated and then how, how are they compensated then if it's none of those things. >> Okay so, so let me walk through this, his discussion of compensation is very contrived. And, it doesn't solve the problem he's hoping that it will solve. And it, the reason for playing it out is, is simply to see the limits of trying to derive a justification for the minimal state in a way that he tries to do it. What he's, what he's, let me first of all say I think the thing that, that isn't contrived in his argument and the, the important thing the, the important claim that he's making he's saying if you have a state which some people refuse to recognize. That imposes costs on, on the members of the state because those people they might be harmless, anarchists living in the woods talking to their horses and reading Tolstoy but they might not. They might be terrorists who are going to blow it up and, whether they live, you know whether they are citizen in the sense that, well, we shouldn't say citizen. But they might be living within the country as the, as the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City bombing, were or they might be living elsewhere as people who flew airplanes into World Trade Center were. In either case, they clearly don't recognize the legitimize of the state and they pose a real threat. And so, he, he says well since legitimacy is based on consent these people clearly do not consent. What do we say about them? Okay. And what he wants to do is say two things. One is empirical and one is normative. So his empirical point is, to say they will not be tolerated. And why won't they be tolerated? Because of his argument about power being a natural monopoly. That the state cannot function as a state unless it exercises a monopoly of legitimate coerce of power within a given territory. So these independents as Nozick's calling them which we, we might say could be harmless, could be terrorists, we don't know, are essentially making it not possible for the state to function as a state and, and no state will tolerate that, and that was my point in the lecture. Okay. And so those people are going to be either incorporated or neutralized, or in some way made to not any longer be a threat. There's, there's no government that's going to let them carry on being out there. And so then he has the normative question, because he want's to base his whole theory on consent and nothing other than consent. So, he, he says how can we square that circle. That's what causes him to reach for this compensation literature. And the, the, the take away points are two. One is nobody is actually compensated. >> Okay. [LAUGH]. >> So that's why the answer to the question is what it was. Okay, whether he, it's, it's a little bit analogous to Mill's Harm principle in the sense that Mill says, first figure out whether there's a harm, and if there is a harm, then do the utilitarian thing. It's, it's a cousin of that in the sense he's saying, okay, so first figure out where there's a harm. There is a harm in the sense that these people are forcibly incorporated, and their rights are violated, so in that sense there's a harm. Their ri, you know, they essentially made to accept the, the rules of the state regardless of whether they're threatening or not because of the risk that they pose so, so then he says, well what could make this right? Okay? And so the, the claim in the, in the compensation in literature and welfare economics going to back to and so on. It was never about actual compensation, it's about hypothetical compensation. The argument was is there some way to say that if, if people could in principal be compensated for a harm and the compensators would still be better off than not having compensated them isn't that in some ultimate sense of Pareto improvement. And so that was, you know, it's a very contrived question, and they, they spent 25, 30 years toying with it, and they concluded there's no way to do it. Okay, so so there's no way to say that they could in principle be compensated and everybody would be better off, because there's no metric along which to measure, you, you would have to reduce it to money. But once you do that you're making interpersonal comparisons of utility which is ruled out in neoclassical theory and so you're kind of stuck. So I think this is a long winded answer for which I apologize, but it's because went about it in a long winded way. But the, the basic point I think he's right to say that states will inevitably incorporate such people because they can, I think it's a natural monopoly, power argument is all a good argument and that's what's worth reading him. And it also shows the limit, ultimately, of consent as a basis for legitimacy because there's no way to deduce some implicit consent from this idea of compensation that comes out of the welfare economic signature. >> So that's helpful because so, so some of the, this forcible incorporation of independence really is just that. They just have to be forcibly incorporated because. >> They will be. >> And they will be. >> They will be or they'll be killed. >> Because of the risk that they. >> I mean in the limiting case, you know, they'll be killed. >> So what about, I mean, if we compare this to states that we have today, there, people travel to different countries all the time, but they're not forcibly incorporated into states, you know, people can be guests in territories, so why, why are those people not independents? What makes you an independent? Do you have to be a non-consenter? >> You have to, yeah, what makes you an independent in his mind is that you refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state and you say I'm not going to therefore be bound by any of its laws, and, and I don't recognize it. You can't come here as a tourist on that basis. >> Okay. >> You know I mean interestingly we, I, I grew up in South Africa. And when I got my citizenship here, one of the interview questions was, well, what would happen if the United States became involved in a war with South Africa? This was 1986? Where would your allegiance be? They wanted to know. >> Oh really? [LAUGH]. >> Uh-huh. >> I can't believe they asked that. >> Yeah. >> There are questions about whether you were part of the communist party, I became I was naturalized into American citizenship as well. And they ask if you were ever a part of communist party and also if you were in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. >> I'm not that old. >> I, I could answer no to both of those as well. >> Yeah. >> Okay, so that kind of takes care of the question then about real world examples of compensation, because. >> Yeah. >> It's just, there is no actual compensation. >> Yeah. >> And I really do think the only reason to go through tha, it all is A, his argument on power is valid. >> Mm-hm. >> And B, I think it does show the limits of consent as a basis for political legitimacy. It doesn't work. >> Mm-hm. >> The fact that it fails is itself illuminating it. >> So the next question is about the minimal state. >> Yeah. >> That he, he comes to at the end of this invisible-. >> Yeah. >> Hand argument. So is this? There was, there was discussion in the forums which I think is very interesting about how realistic it really is to have a minimal state. When you start to think about there was discussion about things like externalities of citizen transactions that sometimes have to be regulated by states. And, or things like think about utilities. I mean, you know, life, if monopolies get, if, if-. >> Mm-hm. >> Utilities get monopolized in a certain way, that, that can create huge problems or certain-. >> Mm-hm. >> People couldn't get electricity or something, and states step in. So it seems like the, the minimal state for Nozick wouldn't be able to perform functions, which would make it hard for citizens to even continue to have free transactions, so is it realistic to really have such a minimal state? >> Well so there are two, there are two triggers here in Nozick's thinking, and it's probably important to keep them separate. One is his claim that power's a natural monopoly. And there he doesn't only say power's a natural monopoly, he says it's the only natural monopoly. And that's why the basic functions, coercive functions of the state are different for him than anything else. So in other words, he's saying because it's inevitable that the, the state is going to force these people, these independents, to join which flows from the nature of power, we have to think about what can make it legitimate because it's going to happen. So it's a version of or ten tales can, right? It, you can't, you can't think about a concept of legitimacy, which excludes this amount of coercion because this, in, in the nature of power there's going to be this amount of coercion. But then sec, so I think, you know, that's why I think he thinks he can put a fence around the justification for the minimal stake that doesn't extend to anything more extensive. The difficulty is that that doesn't get him the whole way there, it gets him part of the way there. What he needs also is this argument about externalities. You started talking about externalities, after all, the whole idea of compensation is triggered by the idea, the externality, which is we all experience fear from their in, independence assertion of their freedom, it's the externality it's the fear, the lose of utility we all experience as members that triggers the whole set of considerations. But, you know, as I think I said in, in a lecture, the trouble with going down that path is exactly what you just brought up, which is well, okay, you can take some other example like fear of unemployment. There's always some unemployment in a market system. If enough people are afraid of being unemployed you could say well, if there's unemployment insurance, that will reduce their fear, right, and if we could pay for the unemployment insurance and, and compensate the people who didn't want it. And everybody, and still have the, the overall numbers add up being better off, for the society then, we might as well have unemployment insurance on exactly the same logic. So I think once you, once you have the heavy lifting being done by externalities. All bets are off. And then the minimal state's no longer unique. And I, I think he sort of, he played a little bit fast and loose between this natural monopoly argument, and the externalities argument. But he really needed both. And, and that opens the door. And once you're dealing with the externalities. You have, you, you could, you could scale up the state on his, on his logic without being re-distributive, in a sense of pursuing a pattern theory of justice. >> And it seems like a lot of states have done that so that the next question is. >> Well, his idea was. >> If there are actual existing minimalist, and like had, is, are there any examples of this in the world? >> Well, yeah I think that's less powerful as a critique of him beca-, first of all, he, you know, he, he gives he says the classical, the, the night watch state of classical liberal theory. And what he's meaning is basically a state that doesn't do. Doesn't have any welfare functions and, and doesn't affirmatively try to produce any particular patterned outcome. Of distribution. And so I think he's thinking of sort of 19th century you know, pre-welfare state democratic, somewhat democratic capitalist systems. And furthermore, I think that, that he would certainly not disagree with the proposition that you can put them on a continuum. And so, you know, we can go from well, I, I'll talk more about this in, in, in upcoming lectures, but this sort of. World where there's, there's really no s-, very few social supports to, you know, what we had in Sweden it, high point of the Swedish Well Fest thing in the 1980s or 1990s where this essentially cradled to the grave. You know, maybe there's no purely minimal state >> Mm-hm. >> but there's still, there's a lot of distance between those two things. And so. We can talk about, what's closer to the ideal and what's further from it from his point of view. >> One of the comments re-, regarding that question was that the, the ones that are the most re-distributive and have the most, you know, the more. Welfare programs they have or the bigger the welfare state that they often rate higher on the best places to live. You know we get that all the time, they rate countries in terms of where's the best place to live? Who has the highest standard of living? And those countries are actually the ones that often get the first spots which, you know, raise the questions of. Do, do we want to live in anything on more of Nosic's end of the spectrum? Does it, maybe we would, we, maybe, would we really feel more free in those, you know, societies? >> Well, you know, Nosic would say who's we here? >> Okay. >> And, you know, you, some people might. But others won't. And why should the ones who want to be able to impose their view on the. Than people who don't, you know? He wants to put the burden of persuasion on the people who want to grow the state. >> Mm-hm. >> Rather than on the people who want to shrink the state. So I mean, you know, another way of looking at this. I-, of all social contract arguments. Have a kind of garbage in, garbage out quality. So he, you know, know, in, in, in Hobbes' case, you made the state of nature look so terrible that any, any state no matter how Draconian is better. In Locke's state, you have it look more benign, and therefore, there's circumstances in which you might want to. Get rid of the government but yet, you know, if it becomes sufficiently tyrannical. No sick it, you know, in a way he's doing something comparable but he's, he's presenting what looks like an argument against anarchism which is and it's really an argument against big government. >> Mm-hm. >> Right? But so he gives, he, he says, I'm, I'm going to make it hard for myself to derive. The state by making the state of nature appealing. >> Mm-hm. >> Right, but so he's shaping the outcome, the out, you know, I, I, you know, my own view of this is you can't derive something from nothing. And all of these, all of these social contract arguments end up. Embedding the normative conclusions in the premises that they start from. >> Which brings us to Rawls, who definitely-. >> Yeah. >> Did that in his original position. So on the question of re-distribution and welfare state. One question that we got was exa-, what would the district, how would Rawls actually see the distribution? A primary good's happening. Like, how would that function? What would, how would we do it? Taxes? Or? How would primary goods get distributed in a, in a fair scheme? >> Well they're not all material in the sense of taxes. I mean there's, there, you know, at least three tiers of primary goods. There are liberties and opportunities. Which it essentially distributed by, through constitutional provisions, right? So the, those are the things protected by the first principle, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, those sort of things. They are th, to be distributed in a way to give people as, as extensive possible a freedom consistent with giving the same freedom to all. >> Mm-hm. >> Work through that. So that the mechanism there is essentially the Constitution. Then the second and, the second is equality of opportunity, how do you achieve equality of opportunity? And the third is the difference principle maximum in, maximizing the minimum share. And the third would clearly be done through the tax system. You would have ta, you would have. Systems of re-distributive taxation get to, to that result. The, the middle one equality of opportunity, it depends you know, that would be up for policy, you know. It's not a philosophical question, Rawls would say ho-, how to achieve equality of opportunity. You know, should there be affirmative action? >> Mm-hm >> Well we had 25 years of debate about that here. They had 100 years of debate about that in India. And some policies have worked, some haven't. And we've used different criteria for affirmative action that are more or less dependent on taxes. So it wouldn't necessarily be a. And, and people may conclude that, you know, affirmative action is not the way to achieve a quality opportunity because it comes with the costs. But those are all things for policy and politics and trial and error, you know, Rawls would say. The principle is that there should be equality of opportunity. How, how that's implemented is a matter for policy and experimentation and so on. The only other principle you would insist on is that, because the, the freedom is protected by the first principle. Are lexically prior to the, to the equality of opportunity, that yo-, your policies for advancing equality of opportunity couldn't violate principles protected, you know, freedoms protected by the first principle. So, for instance, if you had a program to integrate. Neighborhoods, segregated neighborhoods. You know, opponents of that program would come into a court and if we had a Rawlsian constitution saying no, this interferes with my freedom of association that's protected by the first principle, even if it would achieve a better equality of opportunity if we had integrated neighborhoods. So they'd say we don't, you know it would trump, so the first principle would trump, and then the second principle is do what you need to do. And what do you need to do? Well, that's for the politicians and voters to figure out. >> Okay, so a lot of the questions about Rawls were about moral arbitrariness. This seemed to be the most provocative part of his theory. And some of the students even felt like it was his, the, his most significant contribution, the people who are liked the arguments, and then of course, there's push back from the people who don't. So one question I thought was really interesting. How would Rawls have responded to an argument by a eugenicist who thinks that you can actually avoid the arbitrariness of genetic makeup by, by actually, you know, choosing, you know, by how people are allowed to reproduce, and things like-. >> We could give everybody the same. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. >> Like what if we could control what our genetic talents are and our gifts? What would he say to that? >> You know, Rawls never squarely confronted that, although Bernard Williams did, interestingly, many, you know, two decades before Rawls wrote. And he, Bernard Williams, you know, when genetics was really only dimly on, on people's scanners. He, Williams was writing about the difference between equality and equality of opportunity. And he said, you know, everybody says equality of opportunity's a less radical idea than substantive equality. But if you really dig into equality of opportunity, of what, you know, if you really want to equalize opportunities and start taking seriously the possibility of genetic engineering, it becomes a very radical idea. And, you know, Williams didn't take it further than that except to say this notion of starting-gate equality, or leveling the player field, playing field doesn't unpack into a convincing notion of equality of opportunity once you put people's capacities on the table. >> Mm-hm. >> Right? So I don't know what Rawls would have said about that. Ronald Dworkin has the same issue-. >> Mm-hm. >> In and anyone who wants to, it, you could do a whole course just on this subject. >> Yeah. >> And he doesn't resolve it well, either. But that, I think, so, I think that's, I just don't know what he would say about that. But I, I think there was a confusion about Rawls and the extent to which he embraces moral arbitrariness that I should clear up. Well, I looked at, on some of the forums. So some people said well, Rawls is not a Locke egalitarian. And so, so here I think we need to separate out two things. It's true he tries to avoid that position. >> Mm-hm. >> But I think it's built into the logic of his argument. In other words, I think once you start down the road he starts down, the way he tries to avoid that implication doesn't work. Okay. So he start, the, as we, we said in the lectures, once you say whether or not it's, whether it's nature or nurture, in both cases, it's arbitrary. And why should the, the person who's more able or less able either get the windfall or internalize the costs of that since it's nothing to do with what they did? It's where they happen, what kind of society that, or family that they happen to be born in, or it's what genetic structure that, what genes they happen to get. But in neither case has it got anything to do with anything they did. That, that's the starting point. And then there's a lot of hand-ringing because of all of the implications of that, that people talked about in the forums, very illuminatingly, I think, and we talked about it some in the lectures. And so what's Rawls' answer? Rawls' answer is well, the differences among us are morally arbitrary, but not the uses to which we choose to put them. Okay, so effort is different, in other words. And so if you and I are equally abled but you choose to get up and go to work hard every day and I sit on the couch and watch ESPN and you get ahead, that's your effort, and if you end up doing better than I do because of it, so be it. Right? And what I said in the lectures when I said, I said this doesn't work, it's that weakness of the well is itself morally arbitrarily distributed, and maybe you had the work ethic pumped into you as a little kid and my parents were stoned all day long, and paid no attention to me. And that's why you get up and work at it. So I, I didn't think that it was very successful. I didn't think it successful at all. And so I think that while Rawls himself says no, I'm not a Locke egalitarian, I think the logic of his position drives you there if you start where he started. >> And it also seems, it seems like if you go all the way down the moral arbitrariness road, even if Rawls wanted to try to avoid that, some of the students brought up that it seems like you end in a bit of a bind. Because it's kind, it's a very determinist view of humans in the world. >> Mm-hm. >> That they are completely determined by their circumstances, their genetic makeup. >> Mm-hm. >> Their inherent capacities. So, but Rawls is also, you know, he's in some sense, he's also an enlightenment kind of thinker. He wants to espouse freedom and-. >> Mm-hm. >> And these types of values. So, but aren't those, don't you lose, an, your freedom of the will if the, if the moral arbitrariness argument is taken to its end? >> I think, I think that's why he's, he's so troubled by where his argument's leading him. You know. >> Mm-hm. >> I mean this is a secular replay of what we did right at the beginning of the course, of, of Locke worrying about whether or not natural law is timeless, because it seemed to, it seemed to threaten-. >> Mm-hm. >> The idea that God is omnipotent. You know, if natural law is timeless and it's even binding on God, that's determinism, then God doesn't have any power. And he, Locke struggled with this endlessly and threw up his hands in his essays on the law of nature, saying I don't know how to resolve this, so I'm going to come down on the omnipotence side because, for, for his own reasons. So Locke struggled with that and threw his hands up and ended up coming down on the omnipotent side for his own reasons. >> Mm-hm. >> And I think it's exactly the same with Rawls. He struggles with this, and he wrings his hands, and he comes up with this argument that we just saw is not very convincing. But so, so I think that's true. I think it's a deep tension in the enlightenment tradition between the commitment to deterministic principles in science on the one hand, and the insistence on individual freedom as the highest good on the other hand. And every one of these thinkers at some level is wrestling with the, with the tensions that come out of that. What I, but I did think, and I think somebody made this point in one of the forums, very sharply, and I think it's dead right. That you know, one of the things that's interesting about Rawls is that. When you play all of this out you see that, that the problem with the workmanship ideal, that and it, it does have this kind quality of, you know, can't live with it, can't live without it. And you might say that's just for consequentialist reasons, that if, if, if, if we don't affirm some version of workmanship, we can't hold people responsible for their actions, and we don't give people incentives to work, the economy would fall apart and so on. So we better, we better create the fiction, even if we know it's a fiction, just to, to, you know, to keep our society going. There's some people who say that. Or people who want to say, we shouldn't go down this path in the first place, right. And I think that's Susan Hurley's point- >> Mm-hm. >> That I talked about in the lectures. And, and that's sort of another path that one could take. >> So another question that comes out of this discussion is, is what, so in the end, how much, so what, so I think you kind of answered it with the effort, the comment you made about effort. So what does Rawls think we're entitled to? What, how much of the fruits of our labor are we allowed to keep regardless of whether we can draw out? >> Well, that-. >> Is it whether they come from effort or is there a different answer? >> Well that, so that you know, and other philosophers have, because they, everyone who goes down this workmanship path that actually I think Bernard Williams starts, but Rawls certainly gives impetus to in his book ends up with this problem. And there's a, another political philosophy we didn't spend any time on to speak of, Jerry Cohen, who is a kind of Marxist of theorist of justice, that ends up with the same thing. And he says well, at least, at least some of what we do is the result of effort, as opposed to capacities. And we shouldn't, we should reward people or punish them for effort or lack of effort. And that should some, at least it's, in principle, separable. >> Mm-hm. >> So my answer to that is well, even if it were in principle separable who's going to figure it out? How are you going to figure it out? Because you don't have, you know, starting-gate equality won't do it, or leveling the pl, playing field won't do it, because people have different capacities. And it's not even clear, by the way, you know, how you would do it, even if you could identify the differences. You say, you know, use genetic engineering. Probably most people don't want to go down that path. So then you're going to, you know, compensate people for IQ differentials, or, or what is it you're going to do? It's not clear how you would do it, right, even if you could do the arithmetic and figure out what's effort and what isn't. But I don't think it's even an answer in principle, because I, of what I said before. I think effort, if it's, efforts, this sharp distinction between people's capacities and then what they choose to, how they choose to use them, I think, just isn't viable. >> Mm-hm. Although the emphasis on effort, I think definitely, ca, what you talk about, that we can't live with it and can't live without it. That's the can't live without it part, I think that people are trying to isolate. >> Yeah. >> But all of the, the, results of our labors are capped at some point by the difference principle, right? So there's only so much you can accumulate, you know, even if you really earned it, let's say. >> Well I, I, I would-. >> At some point if it's hurting other people, you can't keep accumulating the fruits of your labor. >> Well, I would put it a little differently. I think the difference principle, Rawls thinks of the difference principle as a, as, as a response to this problem. So he's saying since distribution is, is morally arbitrary, we should organize it to work to the greatest benefit of the people at the bottom. And the way to do that is to organize our economy such that it will drag up the bottom. And how much redistribution that requires is a question for policy. So maybe, maybe a pure market system with no redistribution works to the greatest benefit of the people at the bottom, you know. If trickle-down is true, and that's the best way to pe, help the people at the bottom, then you should have trickle-down. And then, the differences between him and the libertarians become trivial. If, however, the Swedish welfare state is the way to best help the people at the bottom, then you should have the Swedish welfare state. And, but he wants to say, anyone who thinks the difference between those two is a question for political philosophy to settle is wrong. The question for political philosophy to settle is what should the, what should the normative goal be? The normative goal should be a system that works to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. And the political economists and policymakers must figure out whether that's an unbridled market, a Swedish welfare state, or a mixed economy of some sort, of some different sort. >> So kind of switching gears a little bit. We got an interesting question from somebody who lives in a country where they were drafted into, you know, mandatory military service. So what can the social contract tradition tell us about the question of, of, of you know, drafting citizens into service. Is, do states have a moral right to make their citizens fight for them, and to make them, you know, be the executors of the force of the state? >> So it's a very fraught issue in the social contract tradition. And, because you would think if you can withdraw your consent over anything, you can withdraw your consent over that. Right? And actually, Hobbs basically takes that view, surprisingly. You would think Hobbs, of all people, but Hobbs says the, the justification for the state is that, is people's fear of death, that their fear of death is going to cause them to do so many terrible things, that the state comes and gives them security from that fear. So he sort of equivocates about whether it's justifiable for them to refuse to fight. But he's, what he says in the, in the motive, ad, advising the sovereign, he says you better not tell people to go to their deaths in war, because they won't, okay. >> Well, doesn't he say you can pay someone else to do it for you? >> Well that, sure, and there's a long tradition of that, of, of buying your way out of the military. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. But his advice to sovereigns is don't push them too hard because, you know, the, the, the basic reason for their obedience is you're giving them security, and now you're going to take it away. You're going to tell them to go and die in war? They, they're not going to do it, and you, you shouldn't be surprised. >> Mm-hm. >> He sometimes verges on the idea that they're actually justified in refusing, but. >> And there's interesting social science research, research as well that shows that there's huge changes-. >> Yeah. >> In, you know, obligations of citizens that happen policy wise-. >> Yeah. >> During times of war exactly because, if you have-. >> Yeah. >> Conscription it can throw, they, the citizens might start to demand other things more. >> Yeah. Yeah. >> Which is interesting. >> Yeah. Now Locke's view is actually in some ways even more interesting, bec, and, and so because you'd think Locke would say, sure. You know, we just went through it all day, you have a right to resist a state. But Locke is very clear that you have to be obedient to your officer during war time, including being ordered to go and fight to the death. So how does he square that circle? And the answer for Locke is, you can't have selective withdrawal of consent. So, putting aside conscription for a minute. When a government passes some law you don't like, you can't say I, I, I withdraw my consent from obeying that law. Unless you're willing to go the whole hog and have a revolution, and try and overthrow the state, you're bound by the laws. So, if, if the, the existing legitimate state creates a military with conscription, you've got to participate, unless you're really willing to go the whole hog and, and, and refuse the, and you know, try and overthrow the state. So there's not really a space for conscientious ejection in Locke's thinking in, in that, in that sense. Nozick and Rawls I, I, I. I mean, Rawls has a discussion of contention objection somewhere. I think he would create a, he creates a space for it. No, I know, No, Nosich never explicitly talked about it. >> Mm. >> Yeah. >> So, well, the last question, we always have to do one question of, why not this person? [LAUGH] >> Yeah. >> That's, kind of, a tradition of the office hours. So the question this week is, why not, why, we are going to read Rousseau. But why aren't we reading Rousseau for the social contract part of the poor, course. Why does Rousseau, because I mean, his you know, his famous book is called The Social Contract. >> Mm-hm. >> So why wasn't he in this section? >> Well, we certainly could have been. And I, I think I did mention his critiques of Hobbes. >> Mm-hm. >> Particularly his view of the state of nature and so on. But, you know, as you intimated, we argue, just wait up for Rousseau in a sense that we're going to pay attention to his idea of the general wealth. Which I think is the most enduring, argument in the social contract. And has had a huge influence on modern democratic theory. >> Which, for a very long time revolved around the idea of trying to identify the general will, and when Rousseau talks about the general will as, he says take all the individual particular wills. And then cancel out the pluses and minuses that, neutralize one another. And the sum of the differences is the general will. People have tried to make sense of that idea for 200 years and we're going to talk about that when we get to the democratic traditions. So >> So we're still coming up >> So we'll be coming up. All right. Well, that's it for me. So then we'll be, we'll be back next week with the anti-enlightenment. >> Okay, see you then. >> Okay.
