[MUSIC] Welcome to the six weeks of our course where we look on the Levant, which is the area comprised of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. But before we do that, let's take a minute to take stock in this video about what we have achieved so far. And before we do that I'd like to talk to you about some of the concerns that some of the students in my physical classroom have had with the approach I'm taking in this course. I taught this course some weeks ago in a summer academy of the German National Merit Foundation. And there, many of these students, or some of them at least, they questioned whether the concepts that I use, like reality, like progress, like irrationality, the development, whether they are. whether it's due and proper to use them, or whether they're just Eurocentric ideas that I imposed from my point of view, but that others might simply ditch and prefer different position. We discussed the Iranian Constitution. So some of them say, well if that's what they want and if that's what they say in their Constitution, that they don't like economic progress or a different notion of social progress, then so be it. Who am I to make a value judgement about this? And some of this is premised on the, on post-modernist, post-structuralist thinking. It's perhaps understandable that these students of mine who have never experienced war or displacement or domestic unrest, and who grew up most of them here in a European Union that sees explicitly, sees itself as a civilian power, as a power that is where warfare between its member states and also between its neighbors should play no role that, explicitly refers to its appeal as an idea. The soft power as my professor, Joseph Nye used to call it. In his book, Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics. So, in a world where military factors don't really matter that much for the living reality of these people. It's perhaps understandable that they consider the emphasis that we've given now, in this course, to wars, to bloodshed, to the ability to exact taxes, etc. They think that this is perhaps a narrow, too narrow view over a situation that should give greater scope to to the subjective positioning. In normative terms of the various actors. And doubting the necessity and utility of rationality, as some of my students have done in this course and that some of you might now do when you look at this course now, is premise on the idea that the world is not readily empirically understandable. That you know, the role of evidence is perhaps overplayed. And the reason why this is attractive to many people is because it's critical and perhaps now it's a good moment to spend a minute or two about what is the notion of critical theory. And the way critical theory, both in a Marxist sense and a non Marxist sense, is premised on the idea of subjectivity. Here's this big word again, subjectivity. But what does it mean in the real, in the context in which it came up. It's making the individual the subject of his life again. We discussed in the first week of this course, the over powering and personal forces of moderrnity. Does it threaten to turn the individual and groups into mere objects of an impersonal historical force that forces them into dramatically changed life situations. And what critical theory tries to do is to understand these historical forces, and trying to give back the subjectivity in the sense of becoming that actor of one's life, to influence events. But what critical theory in a superficial sense means, and that's what I was referring to my French philosopher friends earlier on, is subjectivity and the anti-common meaning of the phrase and the meaning that it doesn't matter which position you take because all positions are equally valid. Because any position is just subjective. And here I think you give up the ability to understand situations and the ability to influence them. And that's the problem I have. And that's why I insist on the possibility to understand the complex reality and ultimately with the aim of influencing it. And the reason I think it's particularly relevant for the study of the Middle East, it's the predilection throughout the area to conspiracy theories. Now we can argue whether the Arabs or the Iranians are more prone to conspiracy theories and the different schools of thought. But nobody who has ever engaged with the region would doubt that conspiracy theories play a very dominant role. In a sense, conspiracy theories are the tool of the man who is overpowered by forces he doesn't understand because it's an easy way to come up with a semblance of an explanation. And as we saw in the historical discussion of Iran but also of Egypt, also of the Ottoman Empire, there is obviously lots of evidence of foreign powers and individuals conspiring to act in ways that negatively affect the national development. But, as we try to do in this course, we try to understand what was actually happening, the interests of individual actors. And that's something very different from simply postulating that there's a group of the elders of Zion who sits somewhere and to decide things. And that's a very common way throughout the Middle East of seemingly explaining complex phenomenon. And the reason why I think it's important for our study of this region, particularly if you're from the region, is because only understanding the reality allows us to accept responsibility for it. And ultimately only that acceptance of responsibility, allows us to affect meaningful social and political change. And that's why I've been insisting on these material aspects. And, The reason why I've been insisting on the wars and the material factors in internal domestic arrangements is because I believe your failure to adapt has very real consequences for your country and your society. And it's not something that can be negotiated away and it's not something up to your subjective positioning or evaluation of a fact. We saw that the failure of countries to modernize their armies leads to battlefield results that negatively affect their territorial borders and economic development. And that's one of the reasons why I believe it's not really a normative choice that countries have and you know if you remember what we discussed in the first and second week, what Professor Waltz's theory of you having to adapt in a competitive environment and that's why I keep insisting on these material facts. Enough of that. With respect to the tool box that we now achieved here I think you by now have got a fairly good understanding of the four response patterns we see in the region towards the challenge of modernity. You have the emulation pattern that we see in Turkey, and in Iran quite actively right up to the Islamic Revolution under the Shah beginning perhaps with the constitutional revolution is a period of emulation of the West. And you have the Islamic modernist approach that you saw in Tunisia, in Morocco, and to some extent in Egypt. The third response pattern was conservatism, that there's no need to change that we saw, perhaps, best exemplified in the Gulf States. And now you have the, as we saw last week, the fundamentalist response pattern, that accepts the dramatic need to change state and society but along a very different normative and practical point of departure than the other three. And as this is your last week perhaps best exemplified in the period after the Islamic revolution in Iran. But now, all these four patterns are ideal types. We see aspects of them in all of the countries we study at and particularly now its the countries that we'll come to study in the remainder of this course. You will see elements of these four response patterns in various degrees happening. So try to pay attention to how you would take certain social features and where you would place them. We have also, by now, learned now these three common pitfalls in the study of our region that we should try to avoid. The first was, as we discussed in the very first lecture I think of the first week, was the problem of Essentialism. The doctrine that among the attributes of a thing. Some are essential and others are merely accidental. And those that are essential, they are necessary to the characterization of a thing and if they don't have it then it's not that thing and the reason we discuss essentialism is because it's often both by people in the region and from people outside the region looking at them, that religion is that essence when we talk about Muslims. I think by now, it should have become clear to you that I don't believe that is the case. And it's some feature I'd like to avoid. The second common pitfall is ignoring path-dependency. As we discussed, a country like Iran or Egypt or the Ottoman Empire is characterized by the way its institutions and its political culture have developed in the years past. And that constrains the ability of political actors at any give moment. So what you inherit, inherit constraints. The scope of possible outcome. So path dependency is something I'd like to draw your attention. As the course unfolds, continue to pay attention to what are the limitations at any given point in the political struggles we look at and the constitutional struggles we look at. And finally is the idea of contingencies, something that Bobby Yonson devoted a whole book on Islamic law about. And it's the notion that certain outcomes are possible but there is nothing inherent in that. It's nothing necessary in that outcome. So as we saw for example, the Iranian Revolution. It could've developed in many different ways, there's nothing that was pre-ordained in the particular form it took. And therefore, we must resist the temptation with hindsight to attribute a logical path of outcome to things that could've developed differently. So these three elements, these three common pitfalls I'd like you to continue to pay attention to as the course unfolds. So, avoid the issue or the problem of essentialism or at least be aware of it. Pay attention to the notion of past dependency and pay attention to the problem of contingency as the course develops. And with that, I invite you to come back for the next video where we finally then do talk about the area comprising Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. [MUSIC]
