Hi everybody. It's Dr. Pritchard here. Thank you for your discussions and comments on week two on the knowledge of skepticism. I've been following discussion as the, the TA's who helping out with administering this course. And I thought this would be a good juncture to record something. Kinds of things I discussed last time were the nature of Gettier cases, you know, are they artificial? Is this a problem? I talked about, more, a little more about the relationship between knowledge and certainty. I think this is something that's cropped up a few times on the discussion boards this time round, you know. Does it matter that we can know things where we're not completely certain, where we might turn out to be wrong? I'll talk a little more about skeptical hypotheses what what they are. What follows from them. Why we should be worried about them. Related I talked about this idea as skepticism as a paradox. So what a skeptic is trying to do what they're claim to be doing is highlighting a detention within our own fundamental concepts, right. So these are, like, very basic concepts we've got about about reason and about truth and about the relationship between knowledge and truth, knowledge and reason and so forth. And the skeptic says that there's something paradoxical going on there, some deep conflict. That's why they claim it's a paradox, what they're offering. I told you as well about the practical ramifications about skepticism I can see again this is cropping up a lot in the discussion boards. I can see the temptation of the thought, the thought is something like, if we can't tell the difference then why does it matter. So I talk a little bit there about how why it does matter, even though we can't tell the difference and that's undeniably true. And then finally, I talked about lucky knowledge. You know, some people raised that last time. It's cropped up a couple times, this time, why should we care so much about having knowledge which is, is immune to the sort of luck, particularly kind of luck that's implying Gettier star cases. For this, I'm going to post that video again, and then hopefully that will help resolve some of these issues. One thing that's cropped up this time, it's a number of things have cropped up this time, I I kind of hope to cover them all. But one thing that cropped up which I, I thought was quite interesting was this idea that so I talked about how justification requires one to have reasons. Some people have said well, you know people who, like if the prejudiced juror for example, this scenario that I depict in lecture. Well, in a sense the prejudiced juror does have a reason for why they believe what they do. You know, it's prejudiced, right? They can give reasons. But notice when epistemologists talk about reasons we have something quite specific in mind. So when, when we talk about reasons, we can't mean something which isn't particularly epistemic. So we can talk about reasons just simply in the sense of whatever it is that makes you believe what you do. So in that sense, the reason why the prejudiced juror believes what he does is just prejudiced, right. That is in one sense, his reason. It what makes him believe what he does. What we're interested in, as epistemologists when we talk about reasons is, reasons for thinking that such and such is the case, right, reasons for thinking that something is true. So prejudice isn't a good reason for thinking that someone's guilty. And that they were seen by reliable witnesses at the scene of the crime, that they, you know that forensics confirmed the DNA on the murder weapon, those kinds of things. Those are reasons for thinking, that it's true that they're guilty. Those reasons for thinking something's true not just reasons why they believe it. And that's something important to bear in mind here. When we say that justification and reasons have a role to play in knowledge, it's those kinds of reasons that we have in mind. Reasons for thinking that something's true, not reasons merely not reasons why you believe what you do. Which might nothing to do with the truth. Okay, so I'll, I'll close it there. So please do have a look at that other video. And I'll keep a look on the discussion boards. If other things arise or if it looks like certain things aren't you know, you feel like they don't resolve by this video, last video I can always come back and post something more. We're into the next week now but that's okay these discussions often last more than you know, beyond the week that they're, that the videos are played. So thanks again for all your contributions to the course.