Further Discussion

Loading...

From the course by The University of Edinburgh

Introduction to Philosophy

3207 ratings

The University of Edinburgh

Introduction to Philosophy

3207 ratings

This course will introduce you to some of the main areas of research in contemporary philosophy. Each module a different philosopher will talk you through some of the most important questions and issues in their area of expertise. We’ll begin by trying to understand what philosophy is – what are its characteristic aims and methods, and how does it differ from other subjects? Then we’ll spend the rest of the course gaining an introductory overview of several different areas of philosophy. Topics you’ll learn about will include: Epistemology, where we’ll consider what our knowledge of the world and ourselves consists in, and how we come to have it; Philosophy of science, where we’ll investigate foundational conceptual issues in scientific research and practice; Philosophy of Mind, where we’ll ask questions about what it means for something to have a mind, and how minds should be understood and explained; Political Philosophy, where we'll investigate whether we have an obligation to obey the law; Moral Philosophy, where we’ll attempt to understand the nature of our moral judgements and reactions – whether they aim at some objective moral truth, or are mere personal or cultural preferences, and; Metaphysics, where we’ll think through some fundamental conceptual questions about free will and the nature of reality. The development of this MOOC has been led by the University of Edinburgh's Eidyn research centre. To accompany 'Introduction to Philosophy', we are pleased to announce a tie-in book from Routledge entitled 'Philosophy for Everyone'. This course companion to the 'Introduction to Philosophy' course was written by the Edinburgh Philosophy team expressly with the needs of MOOC students in mind. 'Philosophy for Everyone' contains clear and user-friendly chapters, chapter summaries, glossary, study questions, suggestions for further reading and guides to online resources. Please click "Start Here" and navigate to the "Optional Reading" page for more information.

From the lesson

Morality: Objective, Relative or Emotive?

(Dr. Matthew Chrisman) We all live with some sense of what is good or bad, some feelings about which ways of conducting ourselves are better or worse. But what is the status of these moral beliefs, senses, or feelings? Should we think of them as reflecting hard, objective facts about our world, of the sort that scientists could uncover and study? Or should we think of moral judgements as mere expressions of personal or cultural preferences? In this module we’ll survey some of the different options that are available when we’re thinking about these issues, and the problems and prospects for each.

Objections to Objectivism, Relativism and Emotivism11:23

Further Discussion7:40

Meet the Instructors

Dr. Dave Ward
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Duncan Pritchard
Professor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Michela Massimi
Full Professor
Philosophy
Dr. Suilin Lavelle
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Dr. Matthew Chrisman
Reader in Philosophy
Philosophy
Dr. Allan Hazlett
Dr. Alasdair Richmond
Dr.
Philosophy
Guy Fletcher
Lecturer
Philosophy
Elinor Mason
Senior Lecturer
Philosophy

Hi, thanks for all the very interesting comments on the

discussion forum for my lecture about the status of morality.

I just wanted to pick up a couple of things

that came up and say a few more things about them.

In no way is this going to settle the debate

or maybe even advance the discussion but hopefully it

will give you a little bit more food for

thought regarding some of the stuff that came up.

So first thing some people asked whether

there could be moral principles that

were universal and so that's [INAUDIBLE] objective.

But nonetheless which had different

applications in different contexts, and that

might in some way undermine

the distinction between objectivism and relativism.

Or going the other direction, other people were interested in whether there

might be particular moral judgements that we all almost universally agree about.

But when we try to find their basis, we disagree.

So, And, again, whether that undermined

the distinction between objectivism and relativism.

So, just as some examples.

So, an example of the first kind of thing.

You might think that, some of 'em might say, look.

Here's some evidence of relativism.

Women ought to wear head scarves in public

or men ought to take off their hats indoors.

There sorts of claims are true in some cultures and false in other cultures.

So that's, you might think some evidence for relativism.

But the objectives might come back and say,

no, no no, there's a universal moral principle.

Roughly something like the when in Rome, do as the Romans do principle.

And that just applies differently in different contexts,

so if you find yourself in a culture

where women wear headscarves, you should do that, but

in another culture, you don't have to do that.

That's no evidence for relativism, so that would be kind of an

example of a universal principle that

has differing applications in different contexts.

Or an example going in the other directions is something like, you might

think, we all agree kicking dogs for fun is bad but we might

disagree about why it's bad some people might say it's because of the

pain, some people might say it's because of the disrespect who knows what.

So there might be differing views about why it's

bad even if we all agree that it is bad.

So the question really is what is this have, what

does this tell us about the debate between relativists and objectavists?

And I guess my opinion is that in some sense, these examples are real examples.

And they tell in favor the kind of

objectiveness view if the evidence or relativism is disagreement,

but you can locate the source of that

disagreement in agreement on some higher order principal.

I think it applies differently in a different context Then

that's some reason for thinking that, objectivism's true rather than relativism.

I think what these examples illustrate, and what this issue illustrates, is that

there might be to senses of objective that are at play in this debate.

So there's one sense of objective where it means something like, independent of us.

The objective facts.

Like, the facts you might discover in science.

There's another sense of objective where it means

something like universal, or applies to all people.

And so I guess it's important to distinguish those two senses of objective.

When someone says they are an objectivist

about morality, they might mean either one.

I think when relativists say that they're relativists they

really mean to only be denying the second one.

That there's some moral principles that. Or maybe all moral principles that applied

to everyone equally.

They can agree with the first sentence that

the moral principles are some how independent of us.

Out there like scientific facts.

So that was one issue that I wanted to raise.

Second issue that I want to raise is deeply related.

Is the discussion that several people ask. So what should we even think morality is?

And more specifically with respect to the theories that I outlined in the lecture.

Could morality be, may be some sort of dis-unified

thing, where objectivism is true about some moral principles, relativism is true

about other moral principles, and emotivism's

true about still other moral principles.

So you might have thought like, I was asking in the lecture which of these was

the best theory and I was asking Who's

best, Bayern Munich that Miami Heat, or Serena Williams?

Bayern Munich won the Champion's League. The Miami Heat won the NBA Finals, and

Serena Williams' the top rated player in the Women's Tennis Association.

But you might think it's kind of, those are three different things.

There's, they're kind of incomparable.

You don't really ask which is the best. In that sense.

So what, what's my asking which is the best theory.

Objectivism or relativism, or motivism. sort of like that.

Well I want to admit that I think

moral judgments often come from different places.

Sometimes when people are talking about morality.

Especially when

they're thinking about how to organize society.

They seem to talk about What's best for the most number of people.

So if you're a sort of politician, are you

in a particular policy is the best morally the

best policy to engage in,you might be thinking about

the, what's best for the most number of people.

Whereas other times people seem to be talking about what violates their

conscience or what would be sort of an inconsistent reason to act for.

And that would be something different. And still other people.

Our,

made the same people in other moments seem to be talking about, what would be

warranted or licensed by their religion or the god they believe in.

So, I think that it's true, that they we get morality

and, and these kind of different domains and maybe still other domains.

Still the idea that a lot of lawsuits have had is that morality

kind of hangs together as a subject, or as a, as a domain in

at least two respects.

One respect is what philosophers call agent neutrality.

So the idea is that the reasons that

Rowdy provides for our acting are more agent neutral.

They don't depend on my, or your, particular circumstances

they would apply equally to anybody in the same circumstances.

And so there age and neutral in that way.

Not relative to a particular person's circumstances.

And the second idea that fosters sometimes

appeal to unified morality. Is that moral reasons are overriding.

So the thought is that, look when you're trying to decide what to do.

There might be all sorts of reasons.

There's reasons for You know, this would be good for your family.

There's reasons this would be good for, to make some money.

This might, feel good.

Or this might, be a beautiful act, something like that.

But, if, If we're talking about morality,

whatever the reasons are, they override everything else.

And so morality's, in that sense, overriding.

So, the thought is if, and I don't know if this true.

This is a big if. But if morality is.

Distinguished by these two features.

That the reasons that provides our agent neutral and overriding

then you would expect there to be some unified domain.

and, then, so, it would be a little bit weird if relativism was true about part

of that domain and objectivism was true about

another part of that domain and [INAUDIBLE] holds

true about that third part of that domain.

Reasons that are both agent neutral and

overriding seem like they demand one unified explanation.

That's just a sort of theoretical hunch, it's not an argument, but

that was the theoretical hunch that was behind some of the comments

I made in the discussion forum about how I thought it probably

couldn't be that Each of these theories was right about their own domain.

Like I said in the lecture I don't

think any of these theories is probably completely right.

Each of them need refinement.

And there may only be some successor theory that's the right theory.

But still I would find it theoretically dissatisfying

if there wasn't one theory that covered this domain.

Because I think I'm working from this idea that there

is a unified domain that provide age-neutral and overriding reasons.

But of course, we might think that's wrong too, so that's up for debate.

But anyway, there's been a lot of really good discussion, and I

encourage you to keep discussing the issues from my lecture and also

the issues from the later lectures,

and we'll keep watching those discussion forums.

Thanks so much.

Explore our Catalog

Join for free and get personalized recommendations, updates and offers.

Coursera provides universal access to the world’s best education, partnering with top universities and organizations to offer courses online.

© 2019 Coursera Inc. All rights reserved.

Download on the App Store

Get it on Google Play