So where have we got to? Well, we've looked at the history of why philosophers and psychologists have come to think of minds in computational terms. We've seen how it grew out of a rejection of Substance Dualism. And then looking into identity theory as a particular physicalist account of the mind and the problem with multiple realisability that seems to afflict the identity theory. We then looked at functionalism as a way of addressing. If you like embracing the problem of multiple realisability, of saying hey, it doesn't matter that psychological states can be realized by lots of different physical things. What matters is what those psychological states do. We then saw how this led into the idea of minds being like computers, because we start to get this division between what something is made of and what it does. What it does, being the program that we give a computer to do. And what it's made of, be that silicone, metal, bits of wood, provided it can run the program it doesn't really matter. But there are some tricky problems that still face the computational view. One is the problem of aboutness that we introduced at the very start. When we want to give an account of what human minds are like, we want to give an account of how thoughts can be about things, how thoughts can have meaning. And it's not entirely clear where we get this aboutness in a particular computational view. Secondly, we have the gaping hole of consciousness, and I've not really addressed answers that philosophers have given to this question in this particular lecture. But I'll put some resources on the reading list ,if you would like to look it up. In particular, we're still left with what's know as the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is this. What makes this particular lump of material, this particular lump and mixture of chemicals and hormones conscious, and another lump not. Because it's clear, that as human beings, we have brains and we have consciousness. So the chemical mixture that is me, has consciousness. But the chemical mixture that is something else, might not have consciousness. Although we can give a functional analysis of how psychological states work, philosophers have argued that this won't get us any closer to the question of what it's like to be in particular states. So although we can give an analysis in terms of inputs and outputs, we haven't really gotten any closer to the question of analyzing the awareness or the sense of experience that we have. Finally, we might to question the metaphor computation itself. You have to remember that a lot of these papers were coming out at a time when computers were really hitting it big time. Computers were said to give us all the answers to everything. So philosophers thoughts have been shaped by the movements of the times, particularly in computer technology. And some people have argued that maybe that's restricted the way in which we're thinking about the mind, just to what the most appropriate metaphor of the day is. And it so happens that the most appropriate metaphor of the day is computational analysis. So some philosophers and psychologists are suggesting that we step away from the computational metaphor. And start to think of minds in other terms. So that's a brief tour of some of the core issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. If you'd like to find more about any of these topics, there will be a reading list on the handouts for you to followup. Philosophy of mind is a really exciting, contemporary, new field. Particularly as philosophers are now working with psychologists and neuroscientists, to try and find out more about the relation between the functional description of psychological states, the inputs and outputs. At the physical realizes in humans, if you like the neural stuff, which runs these functions. I hope that this talk has whetted your philosophical appetite to find out more. And watch this space for more exciting news on philosophy of mind. Thanks for listening.