This course we will explore the foundations of software security. We will consider important software vulnerabilities and attacks that exploit them -- such as buffer overflows, SQL injection, and session hijacking -- and we will consider defenses that prevent or mitigate these attacks, including advanced testing and program analysis techniques. Importantly, we take a "build security in" mentality, considering techniques at each phase of the development cycle that can be used to strengthen the security of software systems. Successful learners in this course typically have completed sophomore/junior-level undergraduate work in a technical field, have some familiarity with programming, ideally in C/C++ and one other "managed" program language (like ML or Java), and have prior exposure to algorithms. Students not familiar with these languages but with others can improve their skills through online web tutorials.
Flow Analysis: Scaling it up to a Complete Language and Problem Set
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From the course by University of Maryland, College Park
Software Security
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From the lesson
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
Static Program Analysis
Meet the Instructors
Michael HicksProfessor
Department of Computer Science
[SOUND] Okay, so
let's finish up this discussion of our tainted flow analysis by seeing how to
scale it up to a more complete language and problem set.
So far we've considered scalar values or pointers treated as blocks.
But we haven't considered dereferences through pointers and
how those affect the tainting.
In this example, we have character pointers a and
b, which were assigned strings as normal.
But we also have p and q, which are pointers to pointers.
That is, p is a pointer to a string, as opposed to a string itself.
What the example is going to do is assign, hi to a, p will point to
a variable, q will alias p, that is, it will also point to a the variable.
Then via q we assign b, which is a tainted value we read from fgets,
and then we print through p which aliases with q.
So what we can see here is because of the aliasing of p and q,
that is, because they both point to the same memory,
when we assign through q the value in b, we effectively make p tainted.
But what we're going to see is that without care our analysis won't
realize this.
So here on the first line, we have the assignment as usual.
Here on the second line, we're going to take the address of a.
And so now we're concerned with beta, which is the taintedness of
the contents that p is pointing to, rather than of p itself.
So we're going to create that flow constraint, and
likewise that flow constraint, and here's another one that we do as normal.
And finally, we do the assignment through q.
Now, star q refers to the character pointer that q points to, whose
label is gamma, and b refers to what is returned by fgets, whose label is omega.
So omega will flow into gamma through this assignment.
And then we print via star p.
So once again, what p points to,
that character string, it has beta as its label.
And so it is going to go to untainted.
Okay. Well, here's a problem.
A solution exists,
even though the assignment to q of p is going to affect the contents of p.
And therefore, this is actually an error that our analysis will fail to uncover.
So what do we need to do to fix this.
Well, we need a way of identifying when flow can
happen through assignments via aliases.
And we do this by, when we assign pointers to pointers, we create edges
that go both ways between the flow labels of the things that they point to.
So here we show the constraint gamma goes to beta when we assign p to q.
So not only do we go beta to gamma, we also go gamma to beta.
And actually, we should do the same thing with the assignment on the second line.
That is, we should have an edge from beta to alpha, but I just haven't shown it
here to keep one fewer constraint from cluttering the slides.
Okay, with this extra constraint, a solution no longer exists.
We can see now that tainted can flow to untainted, and so
therefore, we've caught the error.
So again, the idea is that an assignment via a pointer flows both ways.
That is, it anticipates that this, through an alias,
we could assign a value that would create a flow later on.
And the flow both ways allows that assignment to be captured.
Unfortunately, this can lead to false alarms.
So we have a couple of choices for reducing them.
One is, if we know that an assignment through an alias can never happen, for
example because the alias is labeled as const,
then the backward flow is not needed and we do not need to include the edge.
Or we could just drop the backward flow edge anyway,
anticipating that an assignment will not happen.
That's problematic, whether or not that's guaranteed by the type system.
So effectively, this is trading a false alarm for a missed error.
And different analyses make different choices about this question.
Another sort of hidden flow that might happen is what's called an implicit flow.
And that's illustrated by an example we'll develop now.
So, here's a copy function that takes a tainted character pointer source, and
copies it to a destination character pointer.
And we can see that this is illegal, because the tainted characters in src
should no be able to flow to the untainted expectations of the characters in dest.
So this flow is not allowed, and therefore the analysis should flag that.
Okay, now let's look at this program, which, as it turns out,
implements exactly the same function, though in a very inefficient manner.
What it does is for each character that's considered in the source array,
it will iterate through all possible values that character could have.
So j will consider all possible character values.
If that value matches the one that's in the source, that's the if statement of
source sub i is equal to j, then we simply assign j to dst.
This will be legal because j is untainted.
But then we've missed a flow, because even though the character was not
directly assigned from src, the same value of that character was.
And so the information contained inside of src is certainly copied to dst, and
therefore the information is leaked.
So, we can perform what we call information flow analysis
to discover when such implicit flows happen.
Data did not flow, but the information did.
We can discover this by maintaining a second label that we
call the program counter label.
And it represents the maximum, in the lattice,
taint, affecting the current position of the program counter in the program.
Assignments will generate constraints involving the pc.
So x equals y will produce two constraints,
one between the labels of y and x as usual, and another saying that
the pc label must be able to be upper bounded by the label of x, so
that a flow does not leak through the assignment of x.
And this will allow us to track information flows like
the one we just saw.
So here's a, an example with an implicit flow in it.
It resembles the prior one,
but it's simpler, it doesn't have the loop and so on.
Here, we have a tainted source and an untainted destination.
Actually we'll infer what the taintedness is of the destination.
So we branch on the source, which is tainted, and
then based on whether the source is zero or not, we assign to dst.
So if the source is zero,
then dst will contain the same value as the source, otherwise it will contain one.
So information is clearly flowing from src to dst,
though data is not, because information about src can be recovered by looking at
the value of dst after the program runs.
So let's see what the constraints look like that we would generate.
At each of the assignments, dst equals 0 or
dst equals 1, we just have an untainted constant 0 flowing into alpha as normal.
And also for 1.
And also here for the 0 portion of the dst plus equals 0.
Okay, now let's consider the constraints according to the pc label.
We've labeled each of the lines in the program with a relevant pc.
The first line that can be executed is guard.
Then either the then branch, or else branch, or pc 2 and 3.
And then finally, the final assignment, pc4.
Now, the first thing that we will consider are the extra constraints that result from
the assignment statements due to the pc.
In particular, here, we have to create a constraint, alpha is less than or
equal to pc2, because alpha is the variable to which we're assigning and
the current program counter at that assignment is pc2.
Likewise, for the else case, we do alpha is less than or
equal to pc3, the program counter there.
And then finally, the last assignment is alpha is less than or equal to pc4.
So what are the program counter values at these different locations?
Well, pc1 is the first line that's executed in the program and
has not been influenced by any tainted data, so it starts as untainted.
However pc2 and 3 are result of branching on src.
That is, they can only be reached because we have branched on the src variable, and
src is tainted.
And therefore, we need to bump the program counter label to tainted in both cases.
Once we have exited the conditional and we're back on the line with pc4,
the program counter label can be untainted again, because it doesn't make any
difference which direction we took when we branched on src we will always reach pc4,
and so the value of the guard src has no influence on it, and it can be untainted.
Looking at all of these constraints, we can see whether there is a solution to
them, and we can see that the solution requires alpha to be tainted.
So this is discovering the implicit flow,
that is that the tainted source is tainting the destination.
So, should we always track information flow constraints?
Well, tracking them with a pc label can sometimes lead to false alarms.
In this program, the dst value is always going to be 0,
no matter what the value of src is, and so there is no information leak.
And yet, the assignments to dst will be tainted according to the use of
the pc label, and therefore it will produce a false alarm.
Extra constraints due to the pc label can also hurt performance.
As it turns out, the copying example we saw before is pathological.
Developers typically don't write programs like this, and generally,
implicit flows have little overall influence in well written programs.
So as an engineering question,
oftentimes implicit flows are not tracked in industrial analyses.
One point though, is that if you're analyzing untrusted programs, for example,
mobile code that's being downloaded by your browser or some other system, that
you run locally, there is a greater chance that an adversary will maliciously exploit
this weakness in your analysis to try to taint information, or perhaps leak it.
However, this situation aside, tainting analyses tend to ignore implicit flows.
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