7.19.2.The 1943 Offensive and Relations with the Western Allies

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From the course by National Research University Higher School of Economics

Stalin and Stalinism in Russian History

60 ratings

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Stalin and Stalinism in Russian History

60 ratings

The course presents the life and deeds of Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union from 1924 till 1953. It analyses the reasons for his actions and their results, as well as the causes of his popularity in Russia today. It offers an analysis of the phenomenon of Stalinism and of its significance for Russia and beyond. In the late 1920s – early 1930s Stalin directed the massive and rapid industrialisation of the country and the forced collectivisation of its agriculture. The industrialisation was based on forced labour, and collectivisation on repression, but both helped to create the material base for the Soviet defence industry. In the late 1930s Stalin unleashed mass terror against the Soviet people, in which millions perished. In his view this helped to rid the country of any potential internal enemies on the eve of the coming war. The USSR, together with its allies, won the Second World War, but at the cost of dozens of millions of lives. Stalin was instrumental in creating the post-war order. The system which he created in the 1930s shaped the USSR as it was during his lifetime and for decades after his death. It also influenced the lives of millions of people beyond the Soviet borders. The course will enable those who take it to develop an informed understanding of the Stalin era and of the phenomenon of Stalinism.

From the lesson

Stalin's Victory

Lecture 7 covers the period from the 1943 offensives and victories to the Red Army’s final dash to Berlin. It analyses Stalin’s military tactics and assesses his role in the war and in the making of the post-war order.

7.19.1.From Stalingrad to Leningrad6:20

7.19.2.The 1943 Offensive and Relations with the Western Allies9:27

Meet the Instructors

Irina Filatova
Professor
Faculty of Humanities / School of History

[MUSIC]

The Soviet Army was gaining experience, and so was Stalin.

Marshal Vasilevsky said about him,

Stalin rose to the height of strategic leadership, and

was now thinking in terms of modern warfare.

The example was the Battle of Kursk.

Stalin agreed with his general's idea to wait for

the German attack on well-prepared defensive positions,

instead of attempting to preempt such an attack, which was his own original plan.

And this proved correct.

The Battle of Kursk on 5 July- 23 August 1943.

You can see, from the map, the German plan to

use the bulge of the Russian forces, and

to go behind them, and then again, straight to Moscow.

This did not work out, because now the Soviet Army understood exactly

what they were going to do, and attacked again from the flanks.

They wore out the Germans from the defense positions,

and then went on a well-prepared offensive.

This was a huge battle.

About 4 million people participated on both sides, and

it was the biggest tank battle in history.

About 250,000 Soviet Army men were killed,

about 600,000 wounded, but

the battle was a complete victory for the Soviet Army.

According to German sources, about 100,000 of Germans were killed,

according to Soviet sources, about 500,000.

Stalin often wrote to his allies,

I'm going to the front, or I have been to the front.

In reality, he went to visit

the frontline or an area close to the frontline only once.

The visit happened on 1 to 4 August 1943,

in the middle of the Battle of Kursk, but he did not go to that front.

He went by train to Rzhev, via Gzhatsk.

On 3 August, he met Vasily Sokolovsky,

Commander of the Western Front.

Then, by train, he went to Khoroshevo, a small village in the suburbs of Rzhev.

And on 4 August, he met Andrey Yeryomenko there, Commander of the Kalinin Front.

Just as they met, at night,

Stalin learned about the recapture of Oryol and

Belgorod during the Kursk battle.

And from that small house where Stalin spent a night,

and which is now his museum, he ordered a salute,

a first salute in honor of the recapture of Oryol and Belgorod.

He was happy.

The strange thing about this visit to the front was that Stalin

allowed no pictures to be taken.

There was no propaganda material, nothing.

It is not clear what the meaning of this visit was, but it did happen.

Soviet victories made Western allies realize

the importance of the Eastern Front.

They did know, even before then, even when the Soviet Army was in retreat,

that they had to maintain, assist, and keep that battle going.

But when the Soviet Army started to win, from that time on,

the alliance attained a particular meaning.

Harry Hopkins was Roosevelt's representative in Moscow.

He was his closest associate, in many respects.

Hopkins came for the first time in July 1941.

And he reported back to Roosevelt that despite the retreat,

catastrophic retreat, the Russians were fighting, and they were worth supporting.

In September, early October 1941,

concrete plans of this support were formulated.

Stalin himself managed the negotiations.

The Western supplies included tanks, planes, trucks,

communication equipment, rail cars, locomotives, food.

The scale was enormous, it amounted to billions of dollars.

In 1945, Stalin admitted to Roosevelt that without Lend-Lease,

Lend-Lease was the form in which that assistance was offered,

without Lend-Lease, a victory would have been impeded.

But more than anything, what Stalin wanted from the Allies

was the second front, and the second front was not coming.

It was first promised for autumn 1942, but it did not happen.

So British Prime Minister Winston Churchill came to Moscow

in August 1942 to explain to Stalin why the second front was not opening.

The meeting was tense and acrimonious from beginning to end.

Only on the last night, somehow, they managed to find a common language.

Then it turned out that there would be no second front in 1943.

Stalin reacted very sharply.

He wrote to Roosevelt, I must inform you that

this is a matter not of just disappointing for the Soviet government, but

of preserving its trust in its allies.

Stalin could afford to be sharp.

Now the Soviet Army was on the offensive, and

it moved hundreds of kilometers, both to the west and to the south.

The Soviet advance in 1943 brought the liberation.

You can see the first brown line on the right.

That is the extent of Soviet advance,

Soviet Army's advance in 1943.

So Kiev was liberated on 6th November 1943.

But the battle continued, so despite the mutual dissatisfaction,

the Allies had to stick it out together.

The conference where they discussed the future peace happened

in Tehran on 28 November- 1 December 1943.

The second front was finally promised for May 1944.

By then, the Allies were worried.

They thought that, actually, the Soviet Army could conquer the whole Europe,

without any assistance at all.

In Tehran, Stalin promised to enter the war

against Japan as soon as the war in Europe was finished.

It was quite obvious that the point of contention between the Allies and

Stalin would be the Polish borders.

That question had to be left for future meetings.

[MUSIC]

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