Bar Peda says,
Kal Va-Homer, if one who invalidates his own children not himself invalidated.
Isn't it logical that one who tried to invalidate another but
didn't invalidate should not be himself invalidated either?
Bar Peda suggests that this type of argument can be
used to draw an analogy between a known legal ruling and
the opening case of false testimony in the Mishna.
Bar Peda points out that a priest who invalidates his own children,
namely a priest who fathers children with a divorcee
is not himself invalidated from the priesthood.
He suggests that a logical analogy be drawn from this.
If a person who actually manages to invalidate someone else,
in this case his offspring doesn't get punished by being invalidated himself.
Then someone who didn't manage to invalidate anyone, in this case
the falsely accused person certainly shouldn't receive that punishment.
Bar Peda analogy highlights the unique nature of invalidation
from the priesthood.
Invalidation his analogy implicitly points out is normally not a punishment at all.
But solely a personal status issue based on facts of genealogy.
Even a priest who commits a serious transgression by having children
with a forbidden partner doesn't become invalidated because nothing has changed
the fact that his own lineage is perfectly legitimate.
If that's the case, Bar Peda's analogy implies, then how could the law possibly
treat invalidation as an artificially imposed punishment in the case
of edim zomemim who unsuccessfully accused someone else of being invalid.
Though Bar Peda's logic seems to have some merit, a later fourth century rabbi named
Ravina objects to Bar Peda's analogy, not because he disagrees with the conclusion,
both rabbis agree with the Mishnah,
that edim zomimem are not themselves invalidated from the priesthood.
Because he sees Bar Peda's logic as fundamentally incompatible.
With the entire rabbinical understanding of false witnesses.
Ravina objected, if so
you have essentially abolished the law of edim zomemim.
If one who gets someone else stoned to death is not himself stoned to death,
isn't it logical that one who tries to get someone else stoned to death but
didn't get that person stoned to death should not be stoned to death either?
Ravina sees the thrust of Bar Peda's analogy
as extrapolating from someone who did affect certain consequences,
in this case the priest who invalidated his children,
to someone who merely attempted to affect those consequences, the false witnesses.
Ravina's objection brings up a troubling aspect of the way the rabbis
understood the punishment for bringing false testimony.
According to a Mishnah later on in our chapter,
there was a dispute between the Pharisees, a second temple sect whom the rabbis
identify as their ancestors, and a competing sect, the Sadducees,
about the point at which false witnesses become liable for execution.
The Sadducees that the biblical verse states a life for
a life and that therefore the edim zomemim should only be liable for
execution if their victim had been executed.
Against this position the rabbis argued that the falsely accused person must have
received his death sentence but still be alive in order for
the edim zomemim to be subject to the death penalty.
If the sentence had already been carried out though, even if the witnesses
were conclusively proven to be zomemim, they would be exempt from punishment.
Ravena as in amora is aware that according to the Mishnah's view of Hazuma
the legal category is only applicable when the intended victim has not yet
been falsely punished.
Thus if Bar Peda's Kal Va-Homer were to be accepted.
It could be applied to all instances of testimony to prove that no ed zomem could
ever be punished.
The problematic expanded version of Bar Peda's Kal Va-Homer.
The reductio ad absurdum version would go as follows.
If a successful false witness who actually did manage to get another person stoned to
death is not liable for execution then an unsuccessful false witness who didn't
manage to get another person stoned to death certainly shouldn't be put to death.
You may, in fact, find that argument compelling.
But because it would destroy the fundamental rabbinic understanding about
how the laws of Edim's Zomemim work,
the Talmud prefers to stick with the Midrash taught By Rabbi Joshua bin Lavey.
But rather it is evident that it is as we taught initially.
With this line the Talmud rejects Bar Peda's Kal Va-Homer and
upholds the Midrashic explanation offered by Rabbi Joshua bin Lavey.
The singular pronoun in the verse is interpreted to mean
that the punishment must effect only the edim zomemim, not their offspring.
You have now seen an example of how Rabbinic Interpretive Logic works.
In the next video,
we'll look at the continuation of the passage which employs another Kal Va-Homer
that in many ways follows the model of the ones we just treated in this video.
If you have been put off by the flip and see with which the Rabbi
seem to talk about capital punishment, execution and stoning.
Try to honor that feeling while also realizing that the Rabbi's
are deeply immerse in hypothetical law.
As we will see towards the end of the course the Rabbis were not implementing
these laws in real life and they were able to really embrace the opportunities for
hypothetical discussion.
Many were been a text or off putting by today's standards because they treat
sensitive topics with little sensitivity.
In order to study the Talmud, you do have to accept some tolerance for
this kind of thing even as you can recognize that in today's context,
there's little room for these insensitivities.
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