In here lies one interesting puzzle. Why has a persistent pattern of imperial presidency? I think we can come with several reasons why. First, it has something to do with Confucian tradition. And we discussed before, Korea had still been in a socialized Confucian tradition. Confucian tradition emphasize the conformity with objective authority. In other words, president tend to be equated with a king of the chosen dynasty. Therefore, president is being seen as ultimate authority in Korean society. Therefore, complying with president is kind of a civic virtue, okay. And the kind of a Confucian tradition has been one of the reasons why it has been persistent pattern of pricing and period pricing in South Korea. Another important factor has something to do with presidential monopoly of security and intelligence apparatus. Police report to president directly, prosecutor's office, intelligence and security agencies. They all work for the president. The president has all the information. Presidential office can really control and manipulate the civil society in less take a branch even judicial branch by utilizing those kinds of information. And it is really negative legacy of authoritarian rule. But I understand since democratic transition in 1987, there kinds of bad legacy have been very much removed. But again, there is a kind of institutional inertia that deeply remained in Korean society. Which is then in turn facilitate the continuation of imperial presidency. And also the vertical control, president's political control over bureaucrats through personal appointment, okay. For example, if you look at the parliamentary system, if you look at, let's say Japan. And it is usually argued that the bureaucracy retains such little relative autonomy, vis-a-vis, chief executive okay. The age of bureaucratic tradition, okay. And the government ejected branch, it's the chief executive can come and go, the bureaucrats remain. And therefore, bureaucrats tend to have its own mutual domain, okay. But in Korea, that is not the case. There is a very strong objective of vertical control over bureaucrats. The most important tool is personnel appointment. And there's why bureaucrats tend to show an unusually high degree of conformity and loyalty to chief executive, okay? Fourth, as I mentioned before, president's control of the ruling party is another big issue, okay? That is a big debate. In particular, when a president comes near or the end of the term, then it has been kinds up in the public calling that the President should get out of the party and should remain neutral. But in ordinary case, president tend to control ruling party in the past through the nomination power, okay. And particularly during the authoritarian regime, political slush fund in the hands of president which to be distributed whenever there is a general election, okay. Therefore, a nominating power for the national assembly seat. And slush fund made the president have upper hand vis-a-vis the legislative branch and the ruling party. And of course, during the colonial output, during the authoritarian rule, suppression and co-optation of opposition parties through various means made president imperial. But those kinds of authoritarian leaders have disappeared. But still, president has influence over nomination of national assembly seat, okay. Now with this president doesn't have political slush fund. But through the budgetary allocation, a president can favor certain members of national assembly against the other. That has make a president all the more in a powerful and influential, okay. And obviously president can control the legislative branches through the policy tools. Of course, legislative branch has a right to examine budget, pass or reject executive proposal on national budget. But still, allocation of budget long stood discretionary domain of president. If the president can reward the friendly members in national assembly by giving more budget, okay? Or by pursuing a favorable policy and was co-opting the neutral and punishing the hostile, okay. Compare with the other mutual democracy, president of South Korea can does have more leeway in allocating those kinds of the resources and policy, okay? And as I pointed out, as the judiciary branch, president has again, a personnel appointment power, particularly appointment power to the supreme court and constitutional court. They're all the judges have a kind of conditional ambition. They all want to be members of the supreme court and members of constitutional court. They tend to show the so-called the non-confrontational behaviour vis-a-vis executive branch, okay. And finally, there's a deep-rooted tradition of state corporatism, okay. Now corporatism is based on organic theory of the state, okay. Aristotle was one of the earlier pioneer with this concept of corporatism. Aristotle argues supporting a community is inseparable, okay. Now when a citizen needs member of a community, he or she's a born into that community, okay. Therefore, community has its own optimal life, independent of its members, okay. And the state corporatism means a state organize the civil society, subsidize civil society and supervise the civil society. That has been particularly not the American pattern of in the state corporatism. There has been a predominance of state over civil society. And state has been organizing civil society and controlling and supervising and even manipulating civil society. That was very prominent during the authoritarian rule, but that tradition still continuous to some extent. It is how the chief executive, president, head of the state more powerful and influential in Korean society. In other words, this imperial presidency is somewhat pass dependence, okay. It comes from the old tradition, okay? And South Korea despite the democratic tradition could not sever unfortunate ties with the past. Therefore in other words, removing imperial presidency would be one of the most important challenges facing Korean democracy.
