Now, the strategic and ethical line
between the bombings of Hamburg, or Dresden
of Tokyo and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is blurry at best.
How do we distinguish between these two forms of violence.
Despite the fact that they were aware of the destructive power of the weapon.
The first nuclear bomb was largely seen
as an extension of scale of strategic bombing.
And it took some time for the
notion of a nuclear difference to be widely understood.
That is after the explosion many recognized that a line had been crossed.
But there was still sort of confusion about
how the atomic bomb was different from others.
Now in terms of human suffering, the two atomic bombings were on
par with the worst incidents of strategic bombing in 1943 and 1945.
And then if you want to compare it to the eastern fronts 30 million or more
deaths in less than four years the destruction
in Japan in August of 1945 was not exceptional.
What was different here from the kind of strategic bombing that had occurred,
was the logistical support needed to annihilate
a city, was the amount of effort.
Now, granted, the production of an atomic bomb required billions of dollars and a
massive scientific infrastructure, but the delivery of
the death blow required only a single bomber.
In the case of Japan,.
There was not even any escorts needed, given that the Japanese
air force and it's ability to protect, the, Japan had essentially disappeared.
What you have here is new ratio of resources per casualty.
That is, that a, a fewer direct resources
are being used to annihilate even more people.
It's a much more dramatic transformation
than even that of the gunpowder revolution,
which again, improved, if you will, the capacity
of one group of humans to kill another.
The atomic bombs in a sense, took that to the very next level.
The new question after 1945 was how to use this bomb?
Initially the mystery and novelty of the weapon
gave the U.S. an inestimable advantage and the promise
of even more damage may have played an
important role in the timing of the Japanese surrender.
Initially it also served as a deterrent for any Soviet consideration of
utilizing their massive and regular forces in the European theater.
That is, that the threat of the atomic bomb
could protect and could make up for the fact
that the Soviet armies were much more powerful in
the European continent than those of the other allies.
The existence and the monopoly of the weapon, provided the
US with the strategic safety switch allowing for rapid disbarment.
This is important, that the presence of the
atomic bomb, in a sense allow the United
States to get a piece dividend very, very
quickly which was critical for the post war economy.
After 1949 and the Soviet success in producing
their own bomb, this strategic logic was altered.
Even with limited numbers of weapons, each side could threaten
the destruction of whole armies in significant parts of Europe.
Its potential as destroyer of worlds, however.
Remained uncertain due to the limitations of delivery.
So everyone was aware of this, the
capacity for destruction but this notion that
it would lead to the complete destruction of the world had not quite developed.
In fact some, like Douglas MacArthur thought of the bomb
that could be treated almost as a powerful battlefield weapon.
The aura of its power, in a sense, was still shrouded, and it could still be
treated as just another advancement in the kind of weapons that had been used in war.
Two key developments transformed nuclear weapons into
a very different sort animal.
First, the exponential increase in destructive power.
The the term used The Net Damage Efficiency.