[MUSIC] [MUSIC] We are now going to shift our attention to the case of upstream countries. We'll see how their position has evolved over time, and I suggest we focus now on the case of Sudan. To remind you, Sudan benefited from the 1959 Agreement and its rather favourable quota since it was given the right to 18 billion cubic meters of water from the Nile. But until now, until recently, it gives six billion cubic meters to Egypt. So, since the pacification of relations between Sudan and South Sudan, there was a the development of a series of hydraulic projects and new dam projects in Sudan, notably as a result of investments from companies or foreign states. The most important are without doubt Chinese investments but also investments from neighbouring Arab countries. These investments help Sudan to create a series of infrastructures. The first is the Merowe Dam inaugurated in the north of the country in 2009. But there are new projects underway. So for now, it does not totally destabilized water relations between different countries, as Sudan can remain within its 18 billion cubic meters, but all projections show that, ultimately, it is clear that Sudan will have less and less capacity, less possibilty, to let flow those six billion cubic meters down to Egypt. So, all this brings us to question the (up until now) relatively balanced relationship between Egypt and Sudan. You may recall that I explained how conflict and cooperation are not two opposing dimensions. With the following scheme, I propose we stay a moment longer with the historical relations between Sudan and Egypt, and, given everything that we have seen, discuss them. In the first step, there is a situation where relations were quite balanced. Where the intensity of the conflict is relatively low. And relations between states are in place precisely to cooperate and avoid conflict. This was until 1959. This brief conflict forces the renegotiation of the agreement which will enable Sudan to have a larger quota of the Nile water. This 1959 conflict will open a new channel primarily dedicated to enhanced cooperation under the pro-Egyptian government in charge of the political management of Sudan. The governments will work on maintaining pacified relations with Egypt and precisely, to limit the risk of conflict between Egypt and Sudan. Then, during the 90s, we return to a situation where the risk of conflict is more present when Omar el-Béchir comes to power. He gradually challenges the position of Egypt and returns to discussions on how the Nile waters should be shared. So we see here that the relations, the cross-border interactions around water resources are evolving, mixed between conflict and cooperation, and we can see how these relationships have evolved over time. Now I propose we focus on the case of Ethiopia. The case of Ethiopia will be developed further by Rawia Tawfik in the next section but the case is relatively similar to that of Sudan. It is also the story of a country experiencing a recent technological development, the arrival of new capacity from foreign investment, or from World Bank aid for its economic development. And it is also a country that will develop a series of dams, the largest of which is the Renaissance Dam which will eventually be one of the largest dams in the world. And this dam is the symbol of Ethiopia's development strategy which passes through hydropower development as was the case for Egypt after the war. Hydraulics serves the construction of hydroelectric dams and irrigation infrastructure. At this stage we can not say that Ethiopian development strategies completely put into question the water relations between states. The creation of hydroelectric dams on a watercourse does not fundamentally alter the river, and the irrigation projects are still in project stage and does not involve massive water withdrawals. But it is very clear that on present trends, the Ethiopian position predicts higher level of withdrawals upstream of Egypt, and potentially an overexploitation. So, if we add together the projects of Sudan and Ethiopia upstream, we see a trend. The Nile will be increasingly exploited and its waters will be increasingly used for both irrigation and hydropower. The recent technological and infrastructural developments in Sudan and Ethiopia, the development of these water projects, will lead countries upstream to call for a renegotiation of historical agreements which were discussed and endorsed in the colonial era. The initiative will come, unsurprisingly from Ethiopia, which will gather together a number of countries. Until recently, Sudan was not involved. But all other upstream countries have worked to discuss a common initiative for the creation of a cooperation framework agreement around the Nile basin, which calls for a more equitable sharing of the resource. These initiatives will take several years. After several failures in the 1960s, then 1980s, the Nile Basin Initiative in 1990 was the most successful. It led to a cooperative framework agreement currently signed by six countries. Only three of them have ratified it but the ratification process is still on-going. This cooperative framework agreement does not set quotas for the moment but it calls for a more equitable sharing of the resource. This means, quite clearly, sharing the resource more fairly with the downstream countries, Egypt. And also Sudan. De facto, the upstream countries develop their power and their negotiating skills. They also develop their exploitation potential, as we have just seen, in Ethiopia and Sudan. This is called the counter-hegemonic strategies. They build capacity, the dimensions of the hegemony which countries do not have at the start. And we see through this scheme that Sudan and Ethiopia, with a previously favourable position upstream, will develop not only exploitation potential but also reinforced negotiating powers, to attempt to balance relations with Egypt. This brings us very quickly to question the future of Egyptian power and strength. With the Arab Spring and the revolutions of spring 2011, it is possible that the power of Egypt could be mitigated. Indeed, domestically, it is weakening and in political terms it could lead to a weakening of its military position, and its regional industry. It is true that we could question, until the recent coming to power of President al-Sissi, a return to military power, but for a period of two or three years we questioned how relations will be rebalanced between different countries due to the weakening of Egyptian power. This is no longer on the agenda because, very clearly, Egypt's new president accepted the same methods of politicization and security of resources as his predecessors. The whole issue will be whether the return of Egypt on the political scene, in a context where the position of Ethiopia and Sudan has considerably strengthened, changed significantly over the last ten years, will bring strengthened cooperation, more active cooperation to find a fair agreement. Or, if the dependence of Egypt is growing, always present, will it lead instead to conflicts, cold conflicts or aggressive verbal conflicts, between the different countries of the river basin. I propose that we continue with Rawia Tawfik, who will present, more specifically, the recent developments in Ethiopia with the case of the Renaissance Dam. [MUSIC] [MUSIC] [MUSIC]