5.5 The Case of the Nile Basin II: the Recent Changes Affecting Egypt’s Power in the Nile

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From the course by University of Geneva

Water Resources Management and Policy

353 ratings

University of Geneva

Water Resources Management and Policy

353 ratings

Water management today is faced with new challenges such as climate change or the effects of human activity. Public and private stakeholders who are active in this field must develop new ways to better manage the water cycle "as a whole". The objective of this MOOC is to develop an understanding of the problems related to water management. Firstly, this course will define a resource and, more specifically, the resource of water. It will look at how water is used and the activities associated with it as well as any potential conflicts. The course will look at water management in detail through the analysis of the different types of rights and obligations associated with, for example, the development of a multi-sectorial regulation system or a watershed management approach. By the end of this course, our aim is to enable you to: 1) Identify the main issues and strategies linked to water resource management 2) Acquire the key reading material needed to understand the many variables (environmental, institutional and political) which affect water and which, in terms of management, may require adjustment. This course was developed by the Geneva Water Hub. Alongside researchers from the University of Geneva from a range of faculties, researchers from other universities and research centres will be involved in this course. Practitioners who deal daily with the political dimension of water management will also input into the course. This MOOC is designed for all those interested in the water sector. Prior training is not necessary to follow our program. The findings presented in this course can be easily reapplied to different contexts and to different scales of analysis. This MOOC is supported by the Geneva Water Hub and the University of Geneva along with the MOOC in « Ecosystem Services: a Method for Sustainable Development » (www.coursera.org/learn/ecosystem-services) and the one in "International Water Law" (www.coursera.org/learn/droit-eau). This course is funded by the Global Programme Water Initiatives of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). This course is also available in French : www.coursera.org/learn/gestion-eau

From the lesson

Module 5: Water as a Source of Conflict and Cooperation

We have reached the final module. Module 5 is dedicated to the issues of conflict and cooperation associated with water resources. We will present the framework of hydro-hegemony with the aim of understanding transboundary interactions. This will be illustrated with the case of the Nile River Basin. Here we examine the relationship between Egypt (as the country furthest downstream) and the other riparian countries. The various institutional mechanisms for cooperation among states will be detailed. This will include an examination of how international river basins are managed using the Senegal River Development Organisation and the Mekong River Commission as case studies. The role of international water law in cooperation forms the final part of this module. The module is concluded by a quiz worth 20% of the final grade. You must have at least 80% of the responses correct to pass the module. We hope that this course has presented you with some interesting new perspectives and has encouraged you to want to explore the field of water management further. Thank you for participating!

5.2 Water Wars: Debates and Limits7:58

5.3 The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony and Transboundary Interactions9:41

5.4 The Case of the Nile Basin I: the Development of Egypt’s Power in the Nile9:36

5.5 The Case of the Nile Basin II: the Recent Changes Affecting Egypt’s Power in the Nile10:22

5.6 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: a Source of Conflict or a Basis of Cooperation in the Nile Basin?8:12

Meet the Instructors

Christian Bréthaut
Assistant Professor
Institut des sciences de l'environnement, Université de Genève
Géraldine Pflieger
Professeure associée
Institut de Gouvernance de l'Environnement et de Développement Territorial

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We are now going to shift

our attention to the case of upstream countries.

We'll see how their position has evolved over time,

and I suggest we focus now on the case of Sudan.

To remind you, Sudan benefited from the 1959 Agreement

and its rather favourable quota

since it was given the right to 18 billion cubic meters of water from the Nile.

But until now, until recently, it gives

six billion cubic meters to Egypt.

So, since the pacification of relations between Sudan

and South Sudan, there was a the development of a series of

hydraulic projects and new dam projects in Sudan,

notably as a result of investments from companies or foreign states.

The most important are without doubt Chinese investments

but also investments from neighbouring Arab countries.

These investments help Sudan

to create a series of infrastructures.

The first is the Merowe Dam

inaugurated in the north of the country in 2009.

But there are new projects underway.

So for now, it does not totally destabilized water relations

between different countries, as Sudan can remain within its

18 billion cubic meters, but all projections show that,

ultimately, it is clear that Sudan will have less and less capacity,

less possibilty, to let flow those six billion cubic meters down to Egypt.

So, all this brings us to question the

(up until now) relatively balanced relationship between Egypt and Sudan.

You may recall that I explained how

conflict and cooperation are not two opposing dimensions.

With the following scheme, I propose we stay

a moment longer with the historical relations between Sudan and Egypt, and,

given everything that we have seen, discuss them.

In the first step, there is a situation

where relations were quite balanced.

Where the intensity of the conflict is relatively low.

And relations between states are in place precisely to

cooperate and avoid conflict.

This was until 1959. This brief conflict forces the renegotiation of the agreement

which will enable Sudan to have a larger quota of the Nile water.

This 1959 conflict will open a new channel primarily dedicated to

enhanced cooperation under the pro-Egyptian government in charge

of the political management of Sudan.

The governments will work on maintaining pacified relations with Egypt

and precisely, to limit the risk of conflict between Egypt and Sudan.

Then, during the 90s, we return to a situation where the risk of

conflict is more present when Omar el-Béchir comes to power.

He gradually challenges the position of Egypt

and returns to discussions on how the Nile waters should be shared.

So we see here that the relations,

the cross-border interactions around water resources are evolving,

mixed between conflict and cooperation,

and we can see how these relationships have evolved over time.

Now I propose we focus on the case of Ethiopia.

The case of Ethiopia will be developed further by

Rawia Tawfik in the next section

but the case is relatively similar to that of Sudan.

It is also the story of a country experiencing a recent technological development,

the arrival of new capacity from foreign investment,

or from World Bank aid for its economic development.

And it is also a country that will develop a series of dams,

the largest of which is the Renaissance Dam

which will eventually be one of the largest dams in the world.

And this dam is the symbol of Ethiopia's development strategy which passes

through hydropower development as was the case for Egypt after the war.

Hydraulics serves the construction of hydroelectric dams

and irrigation infrastructure.

At this stage we can not say that Ethiopian development strategies

completely put into question the water relations between states.

The creation of hydroelectric dams on a watercourse does

not fundamentally alter the river, and the irrigation projects

are still in project stage and does not involve massive water withdrawals.

But it is very clear that on present trends,

the Ethiopian position predicts higher level of withdrawals

upstream of Egypt, and potentially an overexploitation.

So, if we add together the projects of Sudan and Ethiopia

upstream, we see a trend. The Nile will be increasingly

exploited and its waters will be increasingly used

for both irrigation and hydropower.

The recent technological and infrastructural developments in Sudan

and Ethiopia, the development of these water projects, will lead countries

upstream to call for a renegotiation of historical agreements which

were discussed and endorsed in the colonial era.

The initiative will come, unsurprisingly from Ethiopia,

which will gather together a number of countries.

Until recently, Sudan was not involved.

But all other upstream countries have worked to discuss

a common initiative for the creation of a cooperation framework agreement

around the Nile basin, which calls for a more equitable sharing of the resource.

These initiatives will take several years.

After several failures in the 1960s, then 1980s,

the Nile Basin Initiative in 1990 was the most successful. It led to a

cooperative framework agreement currently signed by six countries.

Only three of them have ratified it

but the ratification process is still on-going.

This cooperative framework agreement does not set quotas for the moment

but it calls for a more equitable sharing of the resource.

This means, quite clearly,

sharing the resource more fairly with the downstream countries, Egypt.

And also Sudan.

De facto,

the upstream countries develop their power and their negotiating skills.

They also develop their exploitation potential,

as we have just seen, in Ethiopia and Sudan.

This is called the counter-hegemonic strategies.

They build capacity,

the dimensions of the hegemony which countries do not have at the start.

And we see through this scheme that Sudan and Ethiopia,

with a previously favourable position upstream, will develop

not only exploitation potential but also reinforced negotiating powers,

to attempt to balance relations with Egypt.

This brings us very quickly

to question the future of Egyptian power and strength.

With the Arab Spring and the revolutions

of spring 2011, it is possible that the power of Egypt could be mitigated.

Indeed, domestically, it is weakening

and in political terms it could lead to

a weakening of its military position, and its regional industry.

It is true that we could question,

until the recent coming to power of President al-Sissi,

a return to military power, but for a period of two or three years

we questioned how relations will be rebalanced

between different countries due to the weakening of Egyptian power.

This is no longer on the agenda because, very clearly,

Egypt's new president accepted the same methods of

politicization and security of resources as his predecessors.

The whole issue will be whether the return of

Egypt on the political scene, in a context where the position of Ethiopia and

Sudan has considerably strengthened, changed significantly over the

last ten years, will bring strengthened cooperation,

more active cooperation to find a fair agreement.

Or, if the dependence of Egypt is growing, always present,

will it lead instead to conflicts, cold conflicts or aggressive verbal conflicts,

between the different countries of the river basin.

I propose that we continue with Rawia Tawfik,

who will present, more specifically,

the recent developments in Ethiopia with the case of

the Renaissance Dam.

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