[MUSIC].

The Cat and Purrs seemed to represent the opposite ends of a spectrum,

whereas the cat drives a skeptical point home that the mere logical possibility

of skeptical alternatives seems to undermine all kinds of knowledge, purrs

precludes from the onset alternatives that one does not face in the actual world.

In that respect a midway view is represented

by John Austin, the philosopher.

We will discuss now here in front of the Podium Library.

To know something one does not have to eliminate all logically

possible skeptical alternatives, that would be an endless task and so

it doesn't make sense for finite beings like you and me, but on the other hand,

restricting oneself to take into account only the alternative

explanations with which one is de facto confronted would be too little.

So when is it enough?

This is the question Austin asks, this is the question Austin addresses,

what does it mean, enough?

Like a number of other philosophers from Oxford, Austin was an ordinary language

philosopher, he believed that the starting point of all philosophical investigations

should be what we ordinarily say about philosophical matters.

Austin said, ordinary language has the first word but

not the last, so in principle, philosophical investigations could

result in suggestions how we could improve our ordinary language,

how we could make it philosophically more sophisticated, adequate.

In practice, however, Austin did not only give the first word to ordinary language,

but also the last word.

Now what did Austin say about the possibility of knowledge?

Here is an only slightly adapted example from Austin, suppose

two persons are looking into a garden and are having the following conversation.

>> Do you see that bird there?

Now that's a goldfinch.

How do you know, how can you tell?

>> Because it has a red head.

>> But are you sure it's a goldfinch?

Woodpeckers have red heads as well.

>> I'm sure that's a goldfinch, look at the eye markings.

>> At face value, this little dialog seems an innocent perhaps a little bit boring or

even trivial tort example, but make no mistake,

it's one of the most profound dialogs in the history of epistemology and

it's full of pure epistemic suspense.

What Orson is after is what it means, what it involves,

not only to make a knowledge claim, to say or indicate that you know something,

but also what it means, what it involves, to challenge a knowledge claim,

to put a knowledge claim into question, to ask for

justification or further justification of a given knowledge claim.

Roughly, if someone makes a knowledge claim,

that person should be prepared and able to justify it.

In the dialogue, the person claiming to know that the bird is a goldfinch

is prepared and able to justify the claim,

that's a goldfinch, by referring to the bird's red head.

That's a good answer,

because it's a relevant characteristic, goldfinches have red heads.

But then, the other person in the dialog is able and

allowed to insist, are you sure?

Because there still is a relevant alternative,

woodpeckers have red heads as well.

Finally and fortunately, all ends well because the eye marking

is another relevant characteristic that does make the difference

between the goldfinch on the one hand and the woodpecker on the other hand.

In a sense, something profound has happened

to the person making the knowledge claim that the bird is a goldfinch,

the epistemic status of his knowledge claim has changed during the dialog.

But carefully considering the relevant alternative that it might be a woodpecker,

and by eliminating that relevant alternative on the basis of a relevant

criterion, he has deepened his factual knowledge that bird is a goldfinch indeed.

Summing up, it can make sense and may sometimes be necessary to consider

alternative explanations, what seems to be a goldfinch might be a woodpecker.

But considering alternative explanations only make sense if they are relevant, and

whether or not an alternative explanation is relevant, depends on the context.

The traditional interpretation of Austen's response to skepticism

is that he argues for, or at least anticipates, contextualism.

Contextualists believe that the conversational context determines

the salience of a skeptical alternative and that one only has propositional

knowledge if the skeptical alternatives are not contextually salient.

What are the resemblances and differences between this traditional interpretation

and my interpretation of Austin in terms of contextual relevance?

Can you find textual evidence for either or

both interpretations in Austin's Other Minds?

Austin's response to Cartesian Skepticism

The Politics of Skepticism

Meet the Instructors